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SUMMARY 
 
 Most evolutionary models of human behaviour are looking for sine qua non 
of being human. Such single-factorial approaches target usually more general (i.e., 
linguistic ability) or more specific cognitive skills (i.e., shared intentionality), or 
present a causal chain of skill evolution in humans. Csányi (2000) proposed an 
alternative analysis suggesting that, after the Pan-Homo split, human behaviour 
evolution underwent a series of small changes affecting a wide array of social 
features. The so-called “Human Behaviour Complex” provides a framework for 
those skills in which these changes were the most significant. The basic statement of 
this model is that human behavioural evolution should not be explained by a single 
causal chain of changes but, instead, it is the result of a “mosaic evolution” of several 
skills that gave rise to complex social behaviour in a synergetic way. This 
multifactorial approach identifies three important general behavioural dimensions 
(sociality, behavioural synchronization, constructive skills) that affect most social 
skills to some extent, and assumes that it is the sum change in these dimensions of 
behaviour, which, on the surface, produce a qualitative difference, in comparison to 
our closest relatives. It is assumed that this behavioural evolutionary process was 
governed by newly emerging environmental challenges for the Homo species 
including the social dimension of their lives.  
 The general aim of this dissertation is to provide a conceptual and theoretical 
framework as well as empirical findings for the notion that functionally analogous 
forms of many traits of the Human Behaviour Complex are present in dogs and 
therefore domestic dog (Canis lupus familiaris) represents a natural experimental 
model for studying some aspects of the human behaviour in general and human 
social-communicative skills in more particular. The first part of the dissertation 
(chapters 1 & 2) is devoted to arguing that comparative social cognition provides a 
comprehensive framework for understanding the evolutionary origins of uniquely 
human social skills as well as to outlining the idea that “caninization” (i.e. the 
evolutionary process that led to the emergence of domestic dog from the wolf), and 
hominization can be seen as convergent evolution during which functionally human-
analogue behaviours emerged in dogs. This approach is based on the argument that 
after having been adapted to similar environments different species might develop 
functionally similar skills. Accordingly, we may assume that dog-human and dog-
wolf comparisons make us possible to understand how adaptational challenges by the 
human social environment could lead to the emergence of social cognitive abilities in 
dogs. The second part (chapters 3-5) includes several experimental studies that have 
been conducted over the past few years with the aim of providing empirical support 
for this theoretical framework. These experiments focused on different aspects of 
dogs’ social cognition including (I) social attraction and attachment in interspecific 
(i.e. dog-human) relationships; (II) increased and more flexible means of 
synchronization (behavioural and emotional synchronization, social learning and rule 
following); and (3) complex, pre-linguistic forms of communication allowing active 
information sharing and joint participation in actions. Finally (chapter 6) we review 
the different approaches to characterization of dogs’ social competence and provide a 
synergetic model of the emergence of socio-cognitive skills in dogs. We also provide 
a description of the infant-like functional aspects of dogs’ social cognition and show 
how these functionally human-analogue manifestations of social-cognitive skills 
make the dog able to participate in communicative interactions in a preverbal infant-
like manner. 
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PART I. 
 
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK* 
 
 
 It is widely agreed that one of the important and controversial questions for 
cognitive science is “What makes human behaviour and cognition unique in the 
animal kingdom?” From an empirical viewpoint, not denying the generally accepted 
premise that the evolution of human behaviour rests crucially on uniquely human 
abilities, this question could be raised either from an evolutionary or from a 
developmental perspective. While the first approach focuses on the question, “What 
kind of specific changes took place during hominization?” the second approach 
points to the role of human social environment in the emergence of human behaviour. 
 In searching for answers to these questions, different disciplines argue for 
different approaches suggesting theoretical and/or experimental analyses of human 
behavioural evolution and its underlying cognitive processes. At present, 
comparative social cognition is widely believed to be the most relevant discipline to 
deepen our understanding of the evolutionary origins of human behaviour. 
Comparative social cognition looks for the presence or absence of human-like skills 
in animals that are often directly comparable at the behavioural level and suggests 
that the issue of human uniqueness can be addressed by asking about the specific 
behaviours of our species with respect to cognitive functioning. Here we argue for 
the utilization of the domestic dog as a model organism that not only illustrates a 
single aspect of human behaviour but there is a complex level of similarity in a set of 
functionally shared behavioural features. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Based on: 
Miklósi Á, Topál J (2012) The evolution of canine cognition. In: J. Vonk and T. 
Shackelford (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology 
Oxford University Press pp. 513-568. 
 
Topál, J., Miklósi, Á. Gácsi, M. Dóka, A. Pongrácz, P. Kubinyi, E. Virányi, Zs. 
Csányi, V. (2009) Dog as a complementary model for understanding human social 
behavior. Advances in the Study of Behavior, 39: 71-116 
 
Miklósi Á, Topál J., Csányi V. (2007) Big thoughts in small brains? Dogs as a model 
for understanding human social cognition. NEUROREPORT 18: 467-470  
 
Miklósi Á, Topál J, Gácsi M, Csányi V. (2006) Social cognition in dogs: Integrating 
homology and convergence. In: Fujita K, Itakura S (eds.) Diversity of cognition: 
Evolution, development, Domestication and Pathology. Kyoto: Kyoto University 
Press, pp. 119-142 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE 
 
 
1.1 WHAT MAKES US DIFFERENT FROM NON-HUMAN SPECIES? THE 
HUMAN BEHAVIOUR COMPLEX  
 
 While searching for the “crucial difference” between human and non-human 
behaviour and the underlying cognitive mechanisms, many researchers have focused 
on a single causal chain of events involving the effect of environmental factors and 
adaptive behavioural responses or they have argued for a restricted set of cognitive 
skills gaining significance during our evolution.  
 In line with this approach, several theorists have developed specific proposals 
about human uniqueness. Tomasello, Kruger and Ratner (1993), for example, 
pointed out the importance of complementary cognitive mechanisms (e.g. linguistic 
skills, theory of mind) that make someone able to learn “culturally”. In a more recent 
study, Tomasello and his colleagues (2005) have argued that the crucial difference 
between human and non-human cognition is in the ability of “shared intentionality” 
based on construction of dialogic cognitive representations and mind reading. Other 
key features of hominization are supposed to be the emergence of identification-
based imitative learning (Tomasello et al. 2003a), or the evolution of the ability to 
teach and to learn from teaching (pedagogical receptivity – Csibra & Gergely 2009). 
Regarding the human specificity of imitative abilities it has been shown, for example, 
that humans but not chimpanzees tend to copy even when it is not obvious how the 
action will bring about a desired result (Horner & Whiten 2005). Others suggest that 
as a result of hominization the importance of direct aggression in the maintenance of 
partnership and rank order within the group has gradually diminished, while within-
group interactions have been increasingly influenced by cooperative tendencies 
(Hare & Tomasello 2005). These specific changes in temperament might have freed 
socio-cognitive abilities from situational limitations in humans. For example, visual 
perspective taking is a highly generalizable skill among humans and has especial 
importance in the development of understanding communicative referential acts in 
infants (e.g. Flom et al. 2004). Chimpanzees, however, show this ability only when 
competing for food and not in cooperative tasks (Povinelli et al. 1990; Hare et al. 
2000). The fact that apes usually under-perform in cooperative tasks suggests that 
their social competence is biased toward competitive situations (Hare, 2001). In line 
with this assumption some experiments seem to provide evidence that apes (Melis et 
al. 2006), unlike humans (Warneken and Tomasello 2007), show limitations in 
cooperation. 
 A common feature of the aforementioned approaches to human behaviour 
evolution is that all of these lay emphasis on a single “main” cognitive feature. 
Others, however, argued against these ‘unidimensional’, ‘sequential’ approaches 
because it is unlikely that the separate effect of a single or a few behavioural features 
determined human evolution (see e.g. Csányi 2000). The aforementioned approaches 
can be contrasted with system theoretical models (Csányi 1989) emphasizing the 
parallel nature of changes that have taken place in the process of human behavioural 
evolution. That is, instead of assuming major dramatic alterations, hominization can 
be viewed as a series of successive and parallel small changes in a wide set of skills, 
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as a process that affected many features of human behaviour in a complex interacting 
way (Byrne 2005; Hermann et al. 2007).  
 Nowadays, it is increasingly accepted that parallel emergence of some 
behavioural alterations and their simultaneous presence might provide a more 
plausible hypothesis for human-specific behaviour. Csányi (2000), for example, has 
proposed that during evolution, humans adopted a set of species-specific skills that 
influenced critically their social life, allowing them, among others, to form large, 
closed individual groups. These include advanced cognitive skills as well as other 
behavioural traits which have evidently played a role in the manifestation of human-
specific cognitive skills. 
 According to Csányi (2000), during human evolution social behaviour has 
changed in three important aspects: sociality, synchronisation and constructive 
activity. These can be used as broad collective groups of social behaviour traits. 
 The first one, sociality, refers to those components of social behaviour that 
contributed to marked changes in sociality. After socialisation, individuals in human 
groups express strong attachment to each other (Bowlby 1972). At the group level, 
this is manifested as loyalty, and presents a sharp contrast to the agonistic attitudes 
towards strange groups (xenophobia; LeVine & Campbell 1973). Decreased 
aggressive tendencies and increased self-control facilitate the emergence of complex 
cooperative interactions, which are characterized by the subdivision of joint tasks 
into a set of complementary actions (Reynolds 1993). Switching the role of the 
initiator in executing collaborative activities seems to be a unique feature of our 
species. Finally, humans have the ability to form groups that have their own identity 
(Csányi 2001).  
 Synchronizing activities have a facilitating effect on the interaction of group 
members. Such synchronization is achieved by the employment of different means, 
such as the ability for emotional contagion (Hatfield et al. 1993), empathy or reliance 
on rhythms, dance and music. In addition, synchronization can be also increased by 
behavioural mimicry (“blind” imitation), and activities involving teaching (Csibra & 
Gergely 2009) and other disciplining behaviours. The spontaneous human tendency 
to follow social rules (de Waal 1996) is especially advantageous in organizing the 
behaviour of humans living in large groups. It is assumed that through a process of 
internalization, social rules are incorporated in the representational system of 
dominance-submission relationships, and consequently humans possess a hybrid rank 
order system consisting of relative rankings of both individuals and particular social 
rules. This trait paved the way for the emergence of complex and variable social 
structures in human communities. At the same time, individuals are often members 
of different groups, follow different rules and live in parallel and divergent rank 
orders. Moreover, humans are able in general to extract social rules by experiencing 
and observing actions and the interactions of others, similar to how a child extracts 
the rules of language when over-hearing linguistic interactions. 
 The third group of traits is concerned with the constructive character of social 
behaviour. In contrast to animal communication systems that transmit mainly the 
inner motivational state of the signaller, human language enables the transfer of 
complex mental representations involving past, present and future states, such as 
plans and desires. Being an open system, it is in principle suited for transmitting an 
infinite number of messages. The language system is able to represent actors, actions 
and phenomena as events occurring in the environment. In addition they can be 
combined into novel representations as a reconstruction of reality (Brown 1973). 
Importantly, such categorical representations do not presuppose the presence of 
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language, and are very likely present in many non-human species (Bickerton 1990). 
Humans are not exceptional among animals in using tools, although non-human tool 
use is highly restricted for solving special tasks. Human tool use can be considered as 
an open constructive system that is isomorphic with linguistic competence and 
conceptual thinking. Humans can construct novel objects based on planning, can 
combine different tools, and can use them to make further tools. Objects are 
integrated parts of social interactions and their use and construction is heavily 
dependent on and influenced by, social rules, enabling the creation of machines and 
technologies. 
 The closed social system based on increased sociality together with 
synchronization, constructing and conceptual abilities, has provided the basis for rich 
variation in individual action plans. This in turn has resulted in rapid cultural 
evolution. Most of the activities of these closed groups are directed towards 
themselves, so as a result, the group continuously reconstructs itself over time 
(Csányi 1989). 
 In summary, it seems that the success of present day Homo sapiens lies in the 
fact that it has accumulated a very efficient set of these abilities which led to the 
emergence of complex human-specific social skills. The empirical answer to the 
question of human uniqueness is, however, complex because behavioural traits and 
their underlying cognitive mechanisms develop as a result of epigenetic processes 
consisting of interactions between the social and non-social environment and the 
genetic makeup of the organism. In searching for answers to these questions, 
different disciplines argue for different approaches suggesting theoretical and/or 
experimental analyses of human behavioural evolution and its underlying cognitive 
processes.  
 
 
1.2. COMPARATIVE SOCIAL COGNITION: A COMPREHENSIVE 
FRAMEWORK FOR PRACTISE AND THEORY  
 
 Comparative studies have a long history in experimental psychology. 
Sometimes the subject in question serves as a model for some particular ability or 
their ability is evaluated in relation to some supposed human performance (see Kamil 
1998 for an overview). It is important to note, however, that in modern life sciences 
one has difficulties to formulate questions without taking evolutionary models into 
account, and behaviour (including its social-cognitive aspects) is not an exception. 
Although in early research on comparative cognition a clear evolutionary argument 
was often hard to find, later investigations have changed the state of affairs providing 
a rich theoretical framework for understanding how social cognition might have 
emerged and changed in the course of evolution (see Shettleworth 1998 for a review). 
 Depending on the ecology of the species, individuals interact at variable 
frequency with conspecifics. Especially for individuals living in groups, companions 
represent an integral part of their immediate environment. Researchers on social 
cognition are interested in understanding behavioural processes related to interactions 
between conspecifics (social agents), a topic that is partially based on the assumption, 
not shared by all researchers, that the mechanisms controlling such interactions differ 
from those that are at work when the individual interacts with the physical environment. 
This distinction has been underlined in many pioneering studies on social cognition by 
ethologists who realized that the social dimension (“social field”; Kummer 1982) of life 
often presents different challenges for the animal than do physical aspects of the 
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environment (e.g. Jolly 1966; Goodall 1986; de Waal 1986, 1991a; Cheney & Seyfarth 
1990; Tomasello & Call 1997). Broadly defined, social cognition integrates a wide 
range of social phenomena, including recognition and categorization of conspecifics 
(e.g. Dittrich 1990) and their emotions (Andrew 1962), the development and 
management of social relationships (“attachment” - e.g. Wickler 1976), “friendship” - 
de Waal 1991a), the acquisition of novel skills by interacting with conspecifics (“social 
learning” - e.g. Whiten & Ham 1992; Miklósi 1999; Bates & Byrne 2010), the 
manipulation of others by means of communicative signals (e.g. Hauser & Nelson 
1991; Gomez 1996a), the competence to perform joint cooperative actions and the 
question of “mind-reading” skills (e.g. Whiten & Byrne 1991). Furthermore, social 
cognition research often aims to describe mental representations that emerge in the 
course of social interactions and how these representations affect and control behaviour 
(see e.g., Smith & Collins 2009).  
 In recent years there have been several interesting shifts in research 
tendencies in the field of comparative social cognition. Perhaps most important, 
scientists moved out from the somewhat cryptic corners of their laboratories and 
have begun to study their subjects in the field. This change stems from the 
recognition, that comparative studies can be (and should be) put in a broader 
perspective. Based on the seminal paper by Tinbergen (1963) it was increasingly 
accepted that in line with his “four questions” one should frame research questions in a 
functional (ecological) and evolutionary context, even if the study is aimed at the 
mechanisms and the development of the behaviour. This move gained support from 
behaviour ecology research because of the increasing interest in behaviour 
mechanisms behind the functional considerations of behaviour. Behavioural ecology 
has recognized the importance of studying behavioural mechanisms (reviews in Dukas 
1996; Shettleworth 1998) and this has given way to the rediscovery of the importance 
of investigating social cognitive processes in a functional and evolutionary framework. 
Although the research field of comparative cognition associated mainly with traditions 
of comparative psychology, in line with these changes, cognitive ecology (Healy & 
Braithwaite 2000) has emerged as a new integrative research field that attempts to 
integrate functional explanations of behaviour with an understanding of the cognitive 
mechanisms. 
 A further shift is attributable to the new challenges of social cognition 
sparked by influential volumes on Machiavellian intelligence and more broadly on 
the evolution of social cognition including the problem of theory of mind (e.g., 
Byrne & Whiten 1988). Experimental work on social cognition involved much richer 
procedures, which drifted away from the relatively inflexible systems investigating 
associative learning by Pavlovian or Skinnerian methods. Traditionally, comparative 
researchers were interested mainly in the evolution of human social cognition and have 
concentrated on the study of apes and monkeys (“chimpocentrism” - Beck 1982). 
However, in line with the increasing acceptance of evolutionary viewpoint, nowadays 
it is widely accepted that a modern research agenda in comparative cognition cannot 
be restricted to only a handful of species. This slow change has been preceded by 
intensive discussions on whether such a move would be useful or actually 
unproductive. Supporters of the latter arguments insisted that there have been only a 
few significant transmissions in the evolution of animal cognition; therefore, for 
studying cognitive architecture, only a few “flagship” species are needed. In contrast, 
others have argued that the phylogenetic considerations should be taken more 
seriously (Shettleworth, 1998), and instead of hypothesizing prematurely some sort 
of cognitive ladder in the evolution of animals, a detailed analysis could lead to much 
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better understanding of how ultimate causes like evolutionary history and local 
adaptation might have been supported by changes in mental mechanisms.  
The traditional “chimpocentrism” has gradually diminished, and current research in 
comparative social cognition addresses how challenges of social living have formed 
the cognitive structures that control behaviours involved in communication, social 
learning and social understanding across a wide range of human and non-human 
animal species (Emery & Clayton 2009).  
 
 
1.3 TRACING THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF UNIQUELY HUMAN 
SKILLS 
 
1.3.1. On the hunt for the homologous traits 
 
 At present, comparative social cognition is widely believed to be the most 
relevant discipline to deepen our understanding of the evolutionary origins of human 
behaviour. Comparative social cognition looks for the presence or absence of human-
like skills in animals that are often directly comparable at the behavioural level and 
suggests that the issue of human uniqueness can be addressed by asking about the 
specific behaviours of our species with respect to cognitive functioning. When it 
came to the comparative aspects of human cognition, primates always had an 
exceptional role (Povinelli et al. 1999). The scientific interest in primates, and 
especially in apes, gained power after it became undeniable that humans and apes 
shared common ancestors in some distant past, six million years ago. Köhler (1925) 
and Yerkes (1930) were among the first influential scientists who took this challenge 
seriously, and studied the cognitive abilities of monkeys, and especially apes, in 
detail. Researchers felt an urge to look for similarities between humans and apes, and 
a long battle began between proponents of evolutionary continuity seeing only 
quantitative differences and those, who suggested that there are major qualitative 
differences. Perhaps the most exposed case was the comparative study of language 
use in apes where both type of arguments have often been referred to (Savage 
Rumbaugh et al. 1993; Wallman 1992). With some breaks of variable duration, this 
tradition has continued until today and includes research laboratories all over the 
world and in many field stations in the natural habitats of these species (for a 
monograph see Tomasello & Call 1997). 
 This trend in comparative cognition has mainly been concerned with 
homologies in behavioural or cognitive skills. Such research programs are centred 
around the problem of whether the origin of some behavioural traits or cognitive 
skills can be traced back in time, i.e., whether they can be assumed to have been 
present in the common ancestor or, alternatively, whether they have evolved after the 
Pan-Homo split and thus are possibly adaptive (but see Gould & Vbra 1982) species-
specific traits in Homo sapiens. In line with the notion that any similarity in certain 
abilities could be interpreted as a feature that existed already in the common ancestor, 
comparative work has revealed an array of social behavioural traits which appear to 
have a common origin in Homo and apes (e.g., de Waal 1996).  
 Many studies, however, reported specific differences between humans and 
other great apes (e.g., Povinelli et al. 1999). These findings are of great importance 
because they call for specific hypotheses about the selective nature of ecological and 
social environments that has provided the evolutionary scenario(s) since our lineage 
split from the other great apes (Hermann et al. 2007). In fact chimpanzees and 
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humans not only are separated by 6 million years of evolution but they also occupy 
and are adapted to different niches. So even if there is perhaps less than 1% percent 
divergence between the DNA sequence of humans and chimpanzees this relatively 
small difference amounts to a big difference at the level of behaviour. Species 
specific ecological niches can be characterized by different levels of social 
complexity and involve different social problems to solve (Humphrey 1976). In 
principle, therefore, any of the social-cognitive abilities of these species could have 
been formed by specific adaptational demands. These selective forces were either 
shared for the two species (i.e. acted before the split of Pan-Homo lineage), or were 
different (i.e. emerged after the Pan-Homo split).  
 Although using homolog models has a natural appeal to most scientists, and it 
has indisputable advantages in scientific investigations, recent reviews suggest that 
human-ape comparisons also have clear limitations both from theoretical and 
practical points of view (Boesch 2007). The general problem with searching for the 
“key difference” between ape and human behaviour and cognition is that due to a 
lack of historical data there are problems in verifying the evolutionary scenario. In 
addition, the emphasis on a single “main” cognitive feature, as mentioned above 
(see: 1.1), obscures the real complexity of socio-cognitive behaviour.  
 As regards the validity and reliability of human-ape comparative results 
further concerns can be raised about the sample size, rearing condition and 
differences in social experience. In contrast to the large number of human subjects 
who have been involved in experimental studies of social-cognitive abilities, most 
nonhuman ape studies were conducted on a few human-reared subjects. The 
traditional technique has been to bring wild-caught animals to the laboratory and/or 
socialize captive born individuals with humans. However, this has introduced a 
complicating factor because these apes or monkeys are variously constrained in 
getting species-specific experience and, in addition, they are exposed to a variable 
extent to some aspects of the human social environment. So the comparison becomes 
a difficult scientific endeavour because, behavioural resemblances or similarities in 
performance could often be dismissed as peculiarities of the subjects’ exposure to 
humans, while any differences could be explained by the lack of either 
familiarization with the human environment and/or social behaviour or the lack of 
species-specific experiences (see e.g. Bering 2004). For example, it has been argued 
that chimpanzees are tuned to view social interactions as being inherently 
competitive in nature (Hare & Tomasello 2005) in contrast to humans, and this 
would constrain their ability of using gaze direction as a behavioural marker for 
attention (Hare 2001). Therefore the high variability in environmental experience and 
the low number of individuals studied raise problems of external validity including 
the reproducibility of the research. This is most striking when a few “arbitrarily 
chosen” captive apes are compared to a large number of children without accounting 
for the diversity of the apes or for their local ecological adaptations (see e.g. – Penn 
et al. 2008 versus Boesch in press). 
 Moreover, adult apes are often compared to human infants without 
controlling for external variables including previous experience and 
experimental/developmental factors. Ideally, species to be compared must have the 
same experience both with the environment in general as well as with the particular 
situation in which the subjects will be tested (experience bias). For example, 
differences in sensitivity to novelty or speed of habituation could lead to false 
interpretations of cognitive differences between species (Lefebvre 1995). Many ape-
human experimental comparisons show experience bias, because the social 
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experience of young children and most captive apes can hardly be compared (see e.g. 
Povinelli et al. 1997). A possible solution to this problem is the systematic 
modification of experimental variables so that the species assumed to be “inferior” 
could also be able to improve its level of performance (“positive control”). 
Unfortunately, however, human-ape comparative studies mostly fail to consider 
experience biases by the use of such positive controls. 
 Finally, the maintenance of apes and monkeys in captivity for experimental 
purposes creates an unsolvable welfare problem because these artificial environments 
cannot fulfil the natural needs of the species. The paradox here is that the more we 
know about the apes’ complex social and mental skills, the less we become entitled 
to keep them under artificial conditions. Even if there are possibilities that could 
offer partial solution for the problems raised above (e.g., studying apes at habituated 
sites in their natural environment; Boesch et al. 1994), it is increasingly accepted that 
it is high time to look for alternative and complementary paradigms. Such novel 
approaches may contribute a lot to exploring the evolutionary origins of the uniquely 
complex human cognition and behaviour. 
 
1.3.2. Convergent modelling 
 
 Whilst the evolutionary reasoning behind homologue models seems to be 
simple and straight forward, the argument for developing convergent models is more 
complicated. Convergent evolution is assumed when similarities between 
evolutionarily unrelated characters of species are attributed to their independent 
adaptation to similar environments. Thus the detection of phenotypic convergence in 
different species lies at the heart of the evolutionary argument because it provides 
critical evidence for the operation of adaptive processes. However, adaptation is a 
complex process that may involve single traits, correlated traits or even a set of 
complex changes (Gould and Vbra 1982). For example, in order to adapt to living in 
water, Cetaceans underwent a series of changes including morphological (e.g., skin, 
limbs and body form), physiological (e.g., brain functioning, breath regulation) and 
behavioural (e.g., communication) modifications (see also Marino 2002).  
 Observing and understanding convergent phenomena in evolution is 
important to evaluate whether the emergence of a trait in another species is a 
response to an evolutionary challenge and not a product of chance. From our point of 
view the most interesting question is whether such changes are single isolated 
convergent adaptations or whether they should be viewed as a complex set of traits 
emerging in concert. This is particularly important in the case of human evolution 
where one tries to separate homologous traits from those that emerged under neutral 
conditions or are adaptations to certain environmental challenges. In the case of 
behaviour, the only possible solution seems to be to look for other organisms that 
evolved under similar adaptational challenges. Studies on a wide range of species 
seem to suggest that convergent approaches would be useful (e.g., dolphins: Herman 
2002; corvids: Emery & Clayton 2001), but these are functionally restricted in the 
sense that they model only a narrow aspect of human behaviour. 
 Alternatively, the development of human-like behaviours can be facilitated by 
raising individuals of evolutionarily distant species in the human social environment. 
Such an example comes from the “Alex project” in which an African grey parrot 
provided evidence for conceptual quantitative ability (Pepperberg 1987), social 
learning and communicative abilities (Pepperberg & McLaughlin 1996), in addition 
to remarkable linguistic skills (Pepperberg 1991, 1992). These studies clearly argue 
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that tamed animals are being shaped (in the psychological sense of the word) by their 
human environment. Human handling ensures very complex stimulation which may 
lead to the development of such complex behavioural and/or cognitive skills that are 
unobserved in natural environment (Bering 2004). However, since the captive 
environment is ecologically irrelevant for the subject’s individual development, it is 
unclear how the process of socialization (enculturation) affects cognitive 
development and the emergence of different cognitive skills in these cases (Gomez 
2004).  
 Although many different species have been used for human-animal 
comparisons to model one or another aspect of the hominization process, there seems 
to be no perfect solution. For analyzing a wide spectrum of interacting phenotypic 
features a “multifunctional” species would be needed that shares an evolutionary and 
developmental history with humans by living in a similar environment. 
 It is also important to note, that when comparing analogies one should not 
assume similar mechanisms controlling the behaviour observed. For example, earlier 
several studies have reported that attachment behaviour in the dog-human 
relationship shares many features with the mother-child attachment in humans (e.g. 
Topál et al. 1998; Gácsi et al. 2001; Palmer & Custance 2008). Although the authors 
of these studies have argued for a case of analogy, nevertheless they do not claim 
that the very same behavioural mechanisms are at work or that the underlying neural 
organisation has the same complexity. 
 
 
1.4 INTEGRATING HOMOLOGY AND CONVERGENCE: A TWO-
DIMENSIONAL APPROACH FOR STUDYING SOCIAL COGNITION  
 
 The foregoing discussion on homology and analogy could lead one to argue 
for a different research concept, which actually integrates the two approaches. For 
such a strategy however, we need to broaden the number of species used to account 
for differences in the “homology” and “analogy” dimensions. Namely, such 
comparisons should include both homologous species (related by common ancestor) 
and analogous species (not related by common ancestor but sharing abilities of the 
species under investigation). For example, the study of food storing as an adaptive 
skill for dealing with occasional shortages of food in the environment has compared 
a wide range of bird species in learning tasks associated with behavioural 
mechanisms underlying the efficient recovery of hidden food. Studies have compared 
not only closely related species (e.g. food-storing marsh tits, Parus palustris, and 
nonstoring blue tits, P. caeruleus; e.g. Healy & Krebs, 1992) but also birds from 
different evolutionary clades (corvids and parids; Clayton & Krebs 1994).  
 In addition to the species that are usually targeted in comparative cognition 
(apes, humans), the study of dogs and related canids may offer some interesting and 
novel avenues for research integrating homology and convergence. On the one hand, 
it is increasingly assumed that domestic dog (Canis lupus familiaris) is a promising 
candidate for convergent modelling as this species not only illustrates a single aspect 
of human behaviour but there is a complex level of similarity in a set of functionally 
shared behavioural features (see later for more details). Moreover dogs share many 
behavioural characteristics with their wild relatives and this offer the possibility of 
making interspecific comparisons within the framework of homologue modelling. 
 Following the suggestion of Timberlake (1993), aims of comparative research 
can be systematized in a two-dimensional space reflecting genetic relatedness and 
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ecological relevance (Table 1.4.1). Interestingly, the original suggestion concerned 
different combinations of species for each type of the four possible comparisons; 
however, in three out of four cases, members of the Canis genus offer valuable 
possibilities for comparative research.  
 
Genetic relatedness 
 Low High 
 
High 
Convergence 
dog versus human 
(e.g. communicative 
behaviour) 
Microevolution 
wolf versus coyote 
(e.g. territorial behaviour) 
 
 
Ecological 
Relevance 
 
Low 
Classification 
dog versus human 
(e.g. manual abilities) 
Homology 
wolf versus dog 
(e.g. territorial behaviour) 
 
Table 1.4.1 A general framework for comparing cognition and behaviour in the Canidae 
(based on Timberlake 1993). This table defines two independent dimensions (ecological 
relevance and genetic relatedness) which determine a “comparative matrix”. Depending on 
the basic assumptions and questions research agendas may belong to different cells of this 
matrix (adopted for the specific case in Canis; from Miklósi 2007).  
 
 From the cognitive point of view, the idea of comparing behaviour and 
mental skills on the basis of homologies and convergences is important. The 
comparison of wolves and dogs is based on the assumption of a common ancestor 
living probably 25.000–50.000 years ago, and differences may reflect the specific 
changes in either the “lupus” or the “familiaris” route of evolution (e.g., Frank 1980; 
Kubinyi et al. 2007). That is, the wolf could provide a very important control for 
evaluating the behaviour evolution and in this sense the homologue relationship 
between dogs and wolves is equipotential to the relationship that exists between 
humans and apes. Accepting that the evolution of dogs has been affected by their 
long-term cohabitation with man, one may invoke concepts of convergence and ask 
whether the common environment has selected for commonalities in behaviour and 
mental skills in the case of dogs and humans especially with regard to socio-
cognitive abilities. Finally, interspecific comparison of wild-living canid species or 
subspecies may also be informative in terms of microevolution, looking at the 
evolutionary plasticity of the canis genome and how it may give rise to different 
local adaptations. Comparative research on wolves, coyotes, jackal species, or 
different types of feralized dogs, such as the dingo or New-Guinea singing dogs, has 
not been paid much attention so far. Undoubtedly, such work could also provide 
valuable insight for the evolution of cognitive skills in canids, and it would also place 
the more advanced wolf-dog comparisons into a better perspective. 
 Despite being aware of continuous changes in the evolution of the species, 
comparative cognitive (and behavioural) research is often based on a more static 
picture, mainly because we can work with only extant species. Thus, in contrast to 
morphological evolution, in which fossils represent species, there is much 
uncertainty about the timing of behavioural and mental changes. Moreover, there is 
the unvoiced assumption that some species included in comparative research have 
not changed over time. For example, extant chimpanzees may reflect a behavioural 
feature set that was typical for the common ancestor. Although this may or may not 
have been the case, there is little we can do about this in the case of Hominoidea. 
However, in the case of canids, the situation is somewhat different, because of the 
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more recent divergence of the species and the presence of a handful of relatively 
closely related extant forms (e.g., wolves, jackals, coyotes, dingoes) and their 
ecological variants. Thus, by looking at the phylogenetic relationships and even to 
present-day events, one can get at least some good estimation on the possible 
dynamics of the changes that may help to put our knowledge into a better perspective.  
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CHAPTER 2.  
 
DOGS AS THE “NEW CHIMPANZEES” FOR COMPARATIVE SOCIAL 
COGNITION 
 
 
2.1 THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN OF THE DOG 
 
 The fascination with the somewhat bizarre association between humans and 
dogs has often diverted cool-headed attention from the evolutionary processes in the 
history of Canidae, and Canis in particular (but see Miklósi 2007; Wang & Tedford 
2008). According to present knowledge, the story of the former began around 40 
million years ago. These ancient canids and their relatives do not seem to be very 
specialized predators, and in many fossils we see trends toward an omnivorous diet. 
Nevertheless, the Canidae seem to be a very successful group of species, because, in 
contrast to their sister-taxa, they conquered the whole Northern Hemisphere 
including Eurasia and North America. The first species that are recognized as 
members of the Canis genus emerged in the Pliocene (5–6 million years ago), and 
they tended to be more specialized in hunting. Several Canis-species have controlled 
large herds of grazing mammals; some species gained in size and were regarded as 
top predators of the food chain. The last surviving member of these times was the 
large-sized Canis dirus, which lived until 10.000 years before the present in North 
America. In the last 100.000 years of their existence the dirus-wolf shared their 
habitat with populations of the Gray wolf (Canis lupus), which evolved in Eurasia 
but crossed to the New Continent. After the extinction of Canis dirus, the Gray wolf 
became the top predator throughout the Northern Hemisphere. This “status quo” 
changed only with the intrusion of humans that started at approximately 100.000 
years ago, and the emergence of dogs is thought to have taken place sometime 
between 25.000–50.000 years ago in East Asia and/or the Near East (Hold et al. 
2010; Savolainen et al. 2002). 
 This condensed history of the Canis genus revealed important lessons for the 
behavioural and mental evolution of these species. First, in contrast to other taxa of 
mammalian carnivores, canis-species showed a flexible feeding behaviour. This trait 
became especially advantageous in the case of dogs, and probably facilitated their 
association with humans who also show omnivorous tendencies. Second, in Canis we 
find a wide diversity of social systems, which may reflect some challenges of the 
selective environment. For the extant population of Gray wolves, it has been 
suggested that the dependency on large-sized prey may facilitate the existence of 
larger groups in which the individuals can cooperate in hunting (Mech & Boitani 
2003). This flexibility in organizing social groups may have been a key factor in the 
success of the Gray wolf. Third, the last 100.000 years has witnessed a turn taking in 
glacial and interglacial periods. This meant that Gray wolves were faced relatively 
often with the need for accommodation to very different environmental conditions. 
One may hypothesize that this dynamic evolutionary scenario has “conditioned” the 
genetic material of the wolf for being able to support a very plastic phenotype with 
regard to behaviour and mental skills. It is easy to see how less specialised feeding 
habits, social flexibility, and genetic plasticity could have played a key role in the 
evolution of dogs in anthropogenic environments.  
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 The social cognition of the domestic dog is the outcome of a many-thousand-
years-long process during which the wolf-like capabilities were specifically 
transformed by the challenges of living with humans (Hare & Tomasello 2005). This 
account suggests that the evolutionary roots of the dogs’ social cognitive skills 
cannot be understood by deeming the dog as a purpose-bred domesticated carnivore, 
only that it has been originally selected for hunting, herding, or guarding, and so 
forth. Instead, the transformation from wolf to dog can be viewed as a product of a 
more general process. In fact, recent findings provide some scientific support for the 
laypeople’s belief that the dog is a peculiar species that was selected and formed by 
the man “in his own image.” The notion that the transition from the wild state to the 
domesticated one had changed the selective forces radically, leading to the adaptive 
specialization of dogs in the human environment, has recently gained support from 
the dog-wolf and dog-human comparative studies on the social-communicative skills 
(see later for more details and Miklósi 2007 for a review). 
 
 
2.2 THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE DOG IN THE HISTORY OF BEHAVIOUR 
SCIENCE 
 
 From the point of view of behaviour sciences dogs always had a doubtful 
status. They have often been regarded as an ethologically “uninteresting” species, 
given their curious history of domestication, even though the dog is one of the most 
successful mammalian species that has dispersed around the earth. Studies reflecting 
increased interest in the social behaviour of canidae in the 1960s and 1970s viewed 
the dog as a kind of “control” species in comparison with “real”, wild canid species 
such as the wolf, Canis lupus, jackal, C. aureus, and coyote, C. latrans; e.g. Fox 
1971; Bekoff 1977; Frank 1980; Frank & Frank 1982.  
The ethological description of the canidae was supplemented with the behaviour 
description of dogs (Fox 1971), and starting somewhat earlier dogs have been found 
to provide a good genetic model for investigation on social behaviour (Scott & Fuller 
1965). Ethologists and comparative psychologists advanced a very different view on 
dogs, especially by recognizing the significant role of the evolved dog–human 
relationship (Hare et al. 2002; Cooper et al. 2003; Udell et al. 2009) but even in these 
studies the behaviour was described only as a kind of phenotype with little reference 
to the natural behaviour of dogs. 
 The situation changed toward the end of the 90ies when our research group 
initiated some studies on dog-human attachment and communication (Miklósi et al. 
1998; Topál et al. 1997, 1998), which was followed by a series of investigations (for 
review see Miklósi 2007). The historical roots of this renewed interest can be found 
both in writings of Lorenz (1954) who emphasized the special relationship between 
man and his dogs, and in the work of Scott who used the dog as a model for 
understanding human attachment (Scott 1992). Although it is a trivial fact that the 
majority of dogs spend their life in or around human social setting, often in very 
close contact with humans (living in the family), it was only recently that this 
observation formed the starting point of ethological investigations on dogs.  
 Nowadays many agree that the natural place of the dog is around humans, so 
they can be just as rightful subjects of ethological studies if one observes them living 
in the human social group. This new approach soon proved to be very fruitful by 
leading to a large body of research in just few years and thus to the present-day 
renaissance of dog ethology. 
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 In contrast to the dogs’ fairly nice career as subjects of behaviour 
investigations, looking at the recent literature indicates that they are “newcomers” to 
comparative cognition research. This is really astonishing, because dogs have been 
around from the beginning of studies of animal minds. Among others, they were also 
the subjects of the famous experiments by Thorndike on problem-solving behaviour, 
and Lloyd Morgan (1903) who referred to the mental aspects of behaviour based on 
observation of dogs. However, except for a few isolated examples, research on 
cognition in dogs was nonexistent until the early 2000s. Edited volumes (e.g., Heyes 
& Huber 2000), and even more provocative accounts (Griffin 1992) on animal 
cognition contain very little, if any, reference to any member of the Canis genus, 
including man’s best friend. 
 However, on the basis of recent experimental evidence (see Miklósi, 2007 for 
a review) it has been suggested that the dog presents a useful subject for the 
comparative study of human social evolution and this species may be the “new 
chimpanzee” for studies of comparative social cognition (Bloom 2004). The study of 
domestic dogs offers a useful alternative to the study of human traits in the view of 
evolutionary processes, because dogs could have evolved many such traits as a result 
of their adaptation process. Nowadays, there is an increasing interest in comparative 
canid cognition and this newly emerging trend have led to intensive research 
programs on canine mentality, with ever-increasing numbers of papers published 
each year in the last decade.  
 
 
2.3. THE CONTRIBUTION OF DOGS TO UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL 
COGNITION - WHY DOG IS AN OPTIMAL SOLUTION? 
 
 As indicated above, dogs could provide a valuable source for extending our 
understanding of the evolutionary processes that shape social cognition. Comparative 
work is an essential part of social cognition research and nowadays the dog seems to 
be definitely a rising star of this emerging line of research. Figure 2.3.1 clearly 
indicates that in the last few years something has changed about the dog in the field 
of cognitive science. This change stems from the recognition that domestic dog can 
offer novel aspects to the study of social cognition in an evolutionary framework.  
 
Figure 2.3.1.  
The number of scientific 
papers published with the 
keywords ‘social cognition’ 
and ‘dog’ or ‘cat’’ in the last 
twenty five years (source: 
Scopus, 10.01.2011). The 
number of studies published 
on the social cognition of 
dogs increased significantly. 
The trend is even apparent 
in comparison with the 
number of papers aiming at  
the social cognition of cats that are also domestic animals and, similarly to dogs, are 
commonly kept as pets. 
 
(i) The first point of the dogs’ privileged position in comparative cognition is the 
widely accepted notion that the dog is unique among domesticated species. 
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 Generally speaking, domestication can be interpreted as a special form of 
evolutionary change by which “a population of animals becomes adapted to man and 
to the captive environment by genetic changes” (Price 1984, page 3). Importantly, 
although a handful of animal species have come into contact with humans through 
the process of domestication, the dog’s origin dates back earlier than that of any 
other domestic species (Vilá et al. 1997; Savolainen 2002). Many argue that in the 
last 15-35.000 years dogs invaded the human niche, that is, the dog as a species has 
moved from the niche of its ancestor (which is shared by wolves) to the human niche. 
In this new niche, being a social species, dogs have formed a close contact with 
humans (at both species and individual levels), which has led to the emergence of 
hetero-specific social groups. 
 Evidently, the switch of niches by the dog could have been achieved only if it 
had been accompanied by some forms of behavioural change which enhanced their 
survival in human groups (e.g. Paxton 2000; Schleidt & Shalter, 2003). This 
behavioural change could in part be because the association with humans, who live 
in more complex social systems than dogs, provided different selective forces (for an 
account of evolutionary processes that could have shaped behaviour of the dog, see 
Coppinger & Coppinger 2001). Unlike other domestic species, dogs are used and 
probably have been selected for  many different functions in human groups including 
such “ancient” roles as hunting or guarding (Clutton-Brock 1984) and more “novel” 
ones like assisting disabled people (James & MacDonald 2000). They provide also 
emotional support (Wells 2004) and participate in therapeutic programmes 
(Odendaal 2000).  
 As mentioned above (see: 1.4), domestication may have paved the way for 
some behavioural features in dogs that may converge to their human counterpart. As 
a result of cohabitation, dogs and humans share some particular social skills, thus 
dog domestication provides a typical case for convergent evolution. Evolutionary 
parallels can also be observed in cats or horses, where the domestication process has 
contributed to their adaptation to the human environment, however, in these non-
canine cases, the transition from the wild to the domesticated is likely to represent an 
earlier state of domestication than is the case for dogs (Bradshaw & Cook 1996; 
Bradshaw et al. 1999).  
 
(ii) The second, point of the dogs’ “rising star” status in comparative cognition lies in 
the fact that human social environment seems to provide a natural niche for dogs. 
 Compared with monkeys and apes studied mainly in captivity and under 
semi-natural conditions, dogs, like human children, can be observed in their natural 
environment. Dogs are prepared in an evolutionary sense to live in the human 
environment, while apes, monkeys and other species need to be individually 
socialized to be available to such comparative research. Although little is known 
about how early stimulation affects the development of dog-human relationship, dogs 
seem to be predisposed to develop close contact with humans (Riedel et al. 2008; and 
see also our experimental data later). This is true, despite the fact, that the levels of 
socialization among dog and human populations are highly variable, ranging from 
stray dogs that fend for themselves in or around villages and live in very loose 
contact with humans to others that spend their life as pets in homes with their human 
owners. Even if some dog populations have lost most of their direct contact with 
humans, living as feral animals for many generations, the inter-specific contact can 
be re-established rapidly because the genetic variability between pet dogs and stray 
or feral dogs is smaller than the environmental variability causing behavioural 
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differences in these phenotypes (Boitani et al. 1995). Since pet dogs can revert to 
feral life within a few generations (Daniels & Bekoff 1989), the reverse is possibly 
also true for feral animals. The lack of an appropriate social environment can also 
cause irreversible effects on social behaviour towards humans in the case of both 
dogs (Scott & Fuller 1965) and humans (Candland 1993). 
 In dogs, domestication should be viewed not only as a process that adapted 
the animal to the human environment, but also as an accumulation of genetic changes 
that rely on (“expect”) certain environmental input and interaction with the 
environment to exert their full contribution to the emerging behaviour of the 
individual. Therefore, applying the term enculturated introduced to account for more 
humanlike social skills in chimpanzees reared in close human contact in households 
(e.g. Tomasello & Call 1997), we should distinguish between species that can be 
enculturated by rearing such individuals in a human environment, and species that 
are enculturated as part of their natural development. A somewhat more detailed 
discussion of the term enculturation and the significance of this phenomenon in 
studying dogs’ social cognitive skills will be given in the next section (2.4.). 
 All in all it follows that dogs can and should be studied in their natural group, 
that is, where and when they are living with humans and we should combine the 
methods of naturalistic observation and experimentation on hetero-specific groups 
involving dogs and their owners. This approach provides a very useful way of 
studying dog social cognition and may also be useful for comparative social 
cognition in general, provoking new questions and perhaps providing some answers 
to the evolution of social cognitive systems, and in particular to the emergence of 
complex human social skills.  
 
(iii) Third, the dog has a living ancestor, the wolf.  
 Comparison with the ancestor is important for convergent modelling and dogs 
offer a unique opportunity for making behavioural comparisons not only with the 
“niche-mate”, the human, but also with the living ancestor, the wolf (Canis lupus). 
The wolf provides a very useful comparative background because we assume that the 
convergent skills of extant dogs are derived from homologous traits of the wolf (see 
e.g. Kubinyi et al. 2007). For example, wolves show complex social behaviour 
involving cooperation in hunting and parental care, expressive means of 
communication and context-dependent dominance relationships (Mech & Boitani 
2003). Presumably, the presence of these skills facilitated the successful adaptation 
of the dogs’ ancestor to the human social environment and served as the basis for the 
emergence of specific social behaviours. In our view, the divergence of dogs and 
wolves involved a process in which the emergence of the dog was accompanied by 
increased sociality, cooperativeness and communicability in the anthropogenic 
environment analogous to the changes that took place during hominization (i.e. the 
divergence of the Pan-Homo clade). 
 
(iv) Fourth, it is also an important point, that the dog represents a natural 
experimental model and they are less exposed to risk of welfare and sample size 
problems  
 Apart from the evolutionary and developmental arguments elaborated above, 
this model has many practical advantages. Dogs sharing our life as companions are 
not only exposed to an environment that shares many physical and social factors that 
influence human life but observing free-ranging dogs in their natural environment 
allows for setting up situations in which the subjects can be tested in a rigorous 
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manner. This includes the possibility of comparing directly the behaviour of dogs 
and humans using similar experimental protocols without removing the subjects from 
their natural environment (e.g. Lakatos et al., 2009). This method has the potential to 
achieve higher external validity owing to a theoretically unlimited number of 
subjects, and at the same time, (at least partly) eliminates reliability and welfare 
concerns relating to research on apes and monkeys (see also above: 1.3). 
 It is also important that dogs represent not only a species but also a set of very 
variable populations that differ in their genetic bases (breeds) and levels of 
socialization (e.g. feral dogs, dogs living in shelters, working dogs). Thus in the 
study of complex social skills, dogs present one of the few possibilities where limited 
experimental manipulation on many individuals is possible, and such research should 
shed light on how genetically derived information interacts with the social 
environment. The question here is whether and how such genetic diversity influences 
social cognition in dogs, and whether there are social abilities shared by all dog 
breeds independent of their genetic makeup. Equally important would be to know the 
role of the social environment in shaping social abilities of dogs, by comparing dogs 
that have been reared in different human environments at different levels of social 
interaction with humans.  
 For example, some early observations showed that dogs living in the garden 
are more persevering and independent in new problem-solving situations than dogs 
sharing the flats of their owners (Topál et al. 1997). Others have reported that dogs 
from more rural areas are also more territorial, less fearful, and have less social 
contact with their human owners in comparison to urban companions (Baranyiova et 
al. 2005). Questionnaires may also provide a useful tool to inquire about “cultural 
effects”, such as attitude to dogs, views on the dog-human relationship, as well as 
about intersubjective ways of investing in the relationship, including training and 
spending time together. A recent large-scale study involving over 14.000 people 
showed that quite a few aspects of the ownership may influence the behavioural traits 
(personality) in pet dogs (Kubinyi et al. 2009). For example, sociability, which may 
be an important factor in experimental investigations, was influenced by the training 
experience and interaction with the owner.  
 
(v) Finally, the dog is a promising candidate species which have the potential to 
become a non-invasive model of neuroscience. 
 It is increasingly assumed that dogs can be a model for an alternative 
neurobiological approach favouring modern non-invasive techniques of neuroscience. 
In general, all methods that are presently available and ethically applicable to 
humans can be utilized in freely living populations of dogs. Several methods like 
these are available which if applied it simultaneously, could have a powerful effect. 
A starting neurogenetic approach could be based on the effects of allele 
polymorphisms on behaviour. For example, in the case of the dopamine DRD4 
receptor an association with temperament-related behavioural traits has been 
described in humans (Lakatos et al. 2000). Recent molecular genetic investigations 
revealed the presence of an analogue polymorphism in dog DRD4 receptor (Ito et al. 
2004). The implication of this polymorphism in human attachment (Lakatos et al. 
2000) has potential for the elaboration of a dog model. Sequencing of the dog 
genome has put mechanistic approaches of behavioural and mental skills into a novel 
perspective. Moreover it is to be expected that the genome sequence of other canids 
will also be available shortly, which offers an unprecedented possibility to gain some 
insight into the changes of the genetic causes of behavioural and mental differences. 
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However, such genetic data can be utilized only if the phenotype is characterized 
under well-described conditions (Miklósi 2007) and comparable comparative 
investigations are available. The non-invasive measurement of physiological 
parameters like heart rate variability or hormone levels (cortisol, testosterone) could 
also reveal psychophysiological changes paralleling sociocognitive behaviour (Maros 
et al. 2008).  
 It has often been observed that in certain situations dogs express abnormal 
behaviours which show a close correspondence to human neuropsychiatric 
conditions. In line with this recent studies have advocated the use of dogs as natural 
models of human psychiatric conditions (Overall 2000) and dogs proved to be also a 
useful model species for tracing mental changes in human ageing (Tapp et al. 2003; 
Milgram et al. 2002). These approaches rely heavily on the evolutionary convergence 
of the two species in combination with proximate causal factors such as unnatural (or 
lack of) social experiences causing malformation of social behaviour or the extension 
of life expectancy in some dog populations due to increased protection from 
environmental challenges. 
 
 
2.4. ENCULTURATION: WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR COMPARATIVE 
COGNITION OF CANIS? 
 
2.4.1. Enculturation as the desideratum for dog development 
 
 If we accept the theory of domestication for dogs (see above), then, by 
“default”, the dogs’ natural environment is the human family or some form of social 
grouping. This means that dogs have been selected for being enculturated, that is, 
their natural development depends on specific physical and social input from the 
human environment. It follows that, albeit dogs survive also outside the 
anthropogenic environment, this should be regarded as a deviation from the natural 
route of development. Not everyone agrees with this view, and many regard feral 
dogs as the true representatives of the species and think about socialized dogs as a 
special scenario of the individual development. 
 Importantly, in the case of enculturated apes, the situation is reversed because 
they have not been specifically selected for sharing the human social environment. 
The relatively straightforward enculturation of apes is rooted in our common 
evolutionary heritage. Experimental observations suggested that apes raised in 
intensive human contact performed superiorly in comparison to less well socialized 
conspecifics. These led researchers to assume that enculturation may change the 
mental (psychological) stance of these animals making them more “human-like” 
(Tomasello & Call 1997, but see Tomasello & Call 2004). These observations 
generated a debate about whether enculturation causes mental changes that surpass 
the natural boundaries of species-specific cognitive skills or whether such experience 
increases the familiarity of the testing environment and facilitates learning in general 
(Bering 2004; Suddendorf & Whiten 2001).  
 Without taking sides, it is clear that, for apes, enculturation is not a part of the 
natural developmental scenario, and it may be that, despite all types of social-
environmental enrichment in captivity, wild chimpanzees possess even more 
sophisticated social skills (see also Boesch 2007 for review). Thus, enculturation 
may also influence socio-cognitive skills in dogs but, in contrast to the chimpanzees, 
this may reflect the natural situation. It follows that, if some form of enculturation is 
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requisite for normal social development of the dog, then all other cases should be 
seen as representing some form of social deprivation. This is important because 
social skills are often portrayed as being the outcome of a complex epigenetic 
process. Thus, comparing the situation in apes and dogs, we propose that 
enculturation of the former is a kind of social enrichment or “luxury,” whereas in 
dogs it is a precondition. Apes missing intensive social contact of humans should be 
considered as normally developing animals; however, non-enculturated dogs are 
socially deprived. 
 
2.4.2. Enculturation as a procedural factor 
 
 In addition to the aforementioned differential functional effect of 
socialization on apes and dogs, the issue of enculturation inherently raises 
methodological problems of experimental design. Most experiments rely heavily on 
anthropocentric procedures; thus, only well socialized animals are expected to 
participate with any chance of success. Eventually, this has lead to the intensive 
socialization of apes, but, in parallel, no such extra effort is needed in the case of 
family dogs. Some form of socialization or enculturation is generally used in the 
process of upbringing experimental animals, although it may vary depending on the 
species and laboratory practice. It is, however, problematic that such interventions 
are rarely quantified making comparisons both within and among species very 
difficult.  
 Paradoxically, researchers often assume that enculturation has a strong effect 
on the behaviour of the prospective experimental subjects, but there is little tendency 
to explain the nature of these effects. Variations in the enculturation procedure might 
include the timing of the early socialization period, the degree of social experience 
(e.g., number of familiar persons, type of interaction), and some specific training and 
execution of social routines. Sparse data in the literature on socialization in wolves 
shows that the time and extent of separation from conspecifics (preferably as early as 
4–6 days after birth), the experience of humans, and the nature of social interaction 
influences the behaviour of enculturated wolves. Differences in temperament may 
have also contributed to the difference in responsiveness to enculturation (Hare & 
Tomasello 2005). Selection for tameness, which can manifest as a reduced fear from 
non-conspecifics (decreased neophobia) resulting in less fear-related aggression, 
could contribute to better interspecific social skills and social interactions with 
humans.  
 Recent observations show that the performance of wolves in food-finding 
tasks in which they have to rely on human gestures depends on how these animals 
have been socialized (Hare et al. 2002; Miklósi et al. 2003; Udell et al. 2008). 
Wolves that were socialized in a more intensive way and may have been exposed to 
specific forms of training may perform better in such tasks compared to conspecifics 
with less experience. Although this may sound trivial, the lack of exact information 
about the enculturation process hinders the interpretation of these effects in all 
species of Canids. 
 Given the assumption that the species differ in their genetic constitution, only 
a qualitatively and quantitatively equivalent enculturation procedure can allow us to 
connect the observed behavioural or cognitive differences to evolutionary scenarios. 
This simple insight provided the basis for a recent comparative research program on 
wolves and dogs (Kubinyi et al. 2007) during which members of both species were 
enculturated in a similar manner. The 24-hour-long togetherness with the wolf cubs 
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for the first four months, exposure to many different types of humans providing 
variable social experience, and little direct training (apart from some experimental 
test situations) have been thought to be the minimal social experience for successful 
experimental work with wolves. Importantly, this amount of enculturation is already 
more intensive than everyday dogs would experience; therefore, for comparative 
observations, dogs were raised in the same way (for more details and experimental 
results see below in Part II.).  
 It is also important to note that the cessation of enculturation may affect 
enculturated wolves and dogs differently. Anecdotal observations suggest that 
wolves may become deculturated more rapidly than dogs. However, the 
deculturation process in dogs should not be equated with deprivation, that is, lack of 
stimulus input during development. Dogs living in the shelter, depending on their 
(often uncertain) history, may or may not have been subjects of either a deculturation 
or a deprivation process. Shelter dogs follow a different developmental route with 
regard to human social experience. Thus, the socio-cognitive behaviour and 
performance of such populations may be affected by several complicating factors. 
This should prohibit the utilization of these animals for providing evidence for the 
lack or the need of enculturation on the normal development of socio-cognitive skills 
in dogs (Hare et al. 2010; Udell et al. 2008). 
 Finally, there are two important aspects of the enculturation process that are 
often not articulated. First, the individual shows differential sensitivity for social 
input during development. The behavioural and cognitive skills unfold in a 
predetermined sequence that determines to some degree what kind of environmental 
and social input is needed or expected. Second, environmental input may irreversibly 
change, to some extent, the course of events in a developing individual, and the 
enculturation process can be conceptualized as acting through positive feedback 
loops: the more social experience is gained the larger the capacity emerges for more 
social experience. This also means that social input early in development plays a 
more significant role than later influences, and actually later social effect may 
depend critically on the earlier social experience. 
 
 
2.5. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND WORKING HYPOTHESIS 
 
 Human-dog comparisons have already been initiated long ago (e.g., Scott & 
Fuller 1965; Scott 1992), especially with regard to social behaviour. However these 
authors did not make explicit whether the comparisons were built upon a presumed 
homologous or convergent relationship. Based on evidence pointing to temporal and 
geographical coincidence between the emergence of mankind and dogkind, others 
have also noted that the evolution of the dog-human relationship was “closely 
woven” (Paxton 2000; Schleidt & Shalter 2003), and analogies have been argued for 
in the case of social-communicative skills (Hare & Tomasello 2005) and personality 
models (Jones & Gosling 2005). Either explicitly or implicitly, recent enthusiasm for 
studying dogs reinforces the view that this animal species can provide a unique 
possibility for modelling human behaviour.  
 As mentioned earlier (see 1.1), in explaining human evolution at the 
behaviour level Csányi (2000) has proposed a number of changes that took place in 
parallel and led to the emergence of Homo sapiens in contrast to a single factor 
models, which emphasise the primacy of one major trait (e.g. tool making).  
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 In line with the aforementioned strong version of the domestication 
hypothesis suggesting that caninization and hominization can be seen as convergent 
evolutions during which functionally human-analogue behaviours emerged in dogs 
(see 2.3), we can propose a similar approach in the case of the dog, where it is likely 
that many relatively small but definite changes lead to a behaviourally very different 
species in comparison to the wolf ancestor. The significance of identifying 
evolutionary convergence between dogs and humans is that this makes it possible to 
draw inferences from dog evolution to human evolution regarding the factors that 
contributed to the rise of human-specific behaviours. That is this approach aims at 
finding out whether and how the interaction between separate behavioural changes 
leads to the accumulation of social skills that could resemble in many respects the 
human social behavioural system.  
 Accordingly we may assume that the comparative study of social cognition in 
dogs has the potential to answer questions regarding the functionality of human 
behavioural components and the following working hypothesis could provide an 
operational framework for this. 
 
Main components of the working hypothesis: 
 (i) The three main dimensions of the human behaviour complex (sociality, 
behavioural synchronization and constructive skills see 1.1.) are assumed to have 
undergone changes after the Pan-Homo split.  
 (ii) Taking a behavioural evolutionary perspective, the divergence of the dog 
from the wolf represents steps taken in the same direction of increased sociality, 
cooperability and communicability as has been observed in the case of the Pan-
Homo clade.  
 (iii) As a result of this evolutionary parallel, dogs possess a set of functionally 
analogous skills corresponding to that of humans, which can be derived from 
homologous traits of the wolf. Although the time scale is evidently different (i.e., 
wolf-dog separation took place a few tens of thousands of years ago, whilst the 
Homo-line diverged 6 million years ago), the evolution of dogs may mirror some 
aspects of hominization.  
 (iv) It follows from this that many social skills in dogs have undergone 
convergent evolutionary changes and the study of the behavioural convergences 
between dogs and humans offers a comprehensive framework for understanding the 
evolutionary emergence of human social behaviour (see also section 2.3). 
 (v) The model developed for the description of human behaviour traits (i.e. 
human behaviour complex, see 1.1.) might provide a useful framework with which to 
conceptualize evolutionary changes in dogs. The “dog behaviour complex” defines 
those components of dog behaviour for which there is evidence that they have 
contributed to the species’ success in the human social niche. Obviously, dogs cannot 
fully mirror the human behaviour complex because of evolutionary constraints 
including differences in anatomy and cognitive processing (e.g., lack of linguistic 
skills in dogs, differences between dogs and humans in their ability to manipulate 
objects etc.). However, the overlapping elements of human- and dog behaviour 
complexes help to identify the minimum set of skills that had to be present at the 
beginning of Homo evolution. Thus the study of “dog behaviour complex” can 
capture some aspects of the early stage of hominid evolution when people evolved a 
set of social skills that provided the basis for complex interaction and it can also 
show that complex social behaviour and interaction at the group level is possible 
even in the absence of linguistic abilities. 
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PART II.  
 
IN SEARCH FOR THE FUNCTIONAL ANALOGUES OF HUMAN SOCIAL 
COGNITION IN DOGS – EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
 
 
 Recent research has just begun to show that wolf-dog-human (infant) 
comparative triangulation could shed light on the infant-like functional aspects of 
dogs’ social cognition (see Miklósi 2007 for a review) and in the second part of the 
thesis we will show empirical findings with respect to those components of the “dog 
behaviour complex” (i.e., interpsecific social attraction and attachment; social skills 
for behavioural synchronization; behavioural manifestations of the constructive 
character of communication skills) that can facilitate the manifestation of complex 
interactions at the group level. However, we have to keep in mind that convergent 
behaviour modelling emphasizes the surface similarity of the behaviour, and 
investigates the extent of the functional resemblance between humans and dogs, 
without making specific assumptions regarding the underlying cognitive capacities 
and physiological mechanisms controlling these skills. Consequently, heated debates 
about the hidden mental factors and underlying mechanisms (see e.g., Reid 2009; 
Udell et al. 2009) may turn out to be unproductive; they divert our attention from the 
more pragmatic, functional aspects of behaviour, especially if the underlying 
evolutionary factors are still not clear. From the functional viewpoint, no matter if 
dog-wolf differences and dog-human similarities lie in specific (qualitative) changes 
in the dogs’ cognitive processing or far less specific (quantitative) changes in the 
attention and memory skills and associative learning capacities etc.; in reviewing 
parallels between human and dog behaviour, it is better to refrain from premature 
interpretation of the cognitive processes that control the observed performance.  
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CHAPTER 3. 
 
SOCIALITY 
 
 
 There are three main factors in the “sociality” domain of Dog Behaviour 
Complex which influence dog-human social relationships: social attraction, 
attachment and agonistic behaviours. 
 The behavioural manifestation of group cohesiveness and intragroup 
attraction that holds groups together can be defined as social attraction (Oakes et al. 
1998). In contrast to attachment, which can be regarded as individual personal 
attraction, social attraction is based on “liking of each other as group members”, not 
as unique individuals. For both human and non-human species, attraction to 
conspecifics is a prerequisite for forming complex social groups. While there is an 
array of possible mechanisms to achieve mutual attraction among conspecifics, the 
situation is more complex if such attraction is expressed towards heterospecifics. The 
idea that dogs might have some predisposition to be attracted to humans has been 
around for a long time. Earlier it had been observed that dog puppies develop 
preferences towards humans after only a brief exposure (Stanley & Elliot 1962) and 
despite being punished for social contact (Fisher 1955). In fact, anyone who has 
raised wolves and developed a close relationship with them has noticed major 
differences between human-oriented social behaviour in dogs and wolves (e.g., Fox 
1971) .Comparative experiments provided various types of evidence that overall 
dogs show a stronger attraction toward humans than wolves show toward humans 
(Zimen 1987; Frank & Frank 1982). 
 As regards the agonistic aspects of social behaviour, wolves are often 
portrayed as being fiercely aggressive animals, in contrast to the gentle manner of 
“man’s best friend”. Both classic studies (Scott & Fuller 1965) and recent accounts 
(Hare et al. 2005) have assumed that selection has led to reduced aggressive 
behaviour in dogs (see also Price 1999). In contrast, other observations on dog and 
gray wolf puppies does not provide support for a generally lower level of aggression 
in the former, as dog puppies have been found to display agonistic behaviour more 
frequently than wolves of similar age (Feddersen-Pettersen 1986).  
 In the following two studies (STUDY I & STUDY II) we aimed to 
investigate the early social behaviour of hand-reared dogs and wolves in a 
comparative manner. We have hypothesized that if the environment of wolves and 
dogs is equalized then the remaining behavioural differences could be explained in 
terms of inherited factors (and/or maternal prenatal influences). 
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3.1. STUDY I. SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIAL ATTRACTION TO 
HUMANS: COMPARISON OF EXTENSIVELY HAND-REARED DOG 
PUPPIES AND WOLF PUPS.* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 It has been often argued that the sophisticated social behaviour of dogs is 
mainly the result of environmental influences dominated by human intervention. In 
this regard one crucial point is, whether there are species-specific behavioural or 
cognitive differences after a similar manner of enculturation of dogs and wolves if 
the amount of socialization remains within the normal range that is typical for dogs 
living in social environments. In order to reveal early species-specific differences, we 
observed the behaviour of dog puppies and wolf pups hand raised and intensively 
socialized in an identical way. The pups were studied in two object-preference tests 
at age 3, 4, and 5 weeks. After a short isolation, we observed the subjects’ behaviour 
in the presence of a pair of objects, one was always the subject’s human foster parent 
(caregiver) and the other was varied (nursing bottle, unfamiliar adult dog, unfamiliar 
experimenter or familiar conspecific age mate). Although dogs and wolves did not 
differ in their general activity level during the tests, they showed species-specific 
differences in the social preference towards their human caregiver. Moreover, wolf 
pups were more likely to show aggressive behaviour toward a familiar experimenter 
and also seemed to be more prone to avoidance. In addition to these differences, 
compared to wolves, dogs tended to display more communicative signals that could 
potentially facilitate social interactions with humans.  
 These results demonstrate that already at this early age—despite 
unprecedented intensity of socialization and the comparable social (human) 
environment during early development—there are specific behavioural differences 
between wolves and dogs mostly with regard to their interactions with humans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Based on: 
 
Gácsi M, Győri B, Miklósi Á, Virányi Zs, Kubinyi E, Topál J, Csányi V (2005). 
Species-specific differences and similarities in the behaviour of hand raised dog and 
wolf puppies in social situations with humans. Developmental Psychobiology 47(2): 
111-222. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Although dogs and wolves seem to be similar in their social developmental 
processes with regard to conspecifics, some marked differences in their behaviour 
toward humans have been observed (Frank & Frank 1982; 1985). However, 
previously there have been rather few research programs using wolves and dogs with 
similar rearing history (Frank & Frank 1987) but even in these studies, the sample 
size was small so it was difficult to clearly establish the genetically based 
behavioural differences. Feddersen-Petersen (1986) compared the intraspecific 
behaviour of young wolves and dogs having limited contact with humans. Others 
have raised wolves and dogs in human environments (Fentress 1967; Frank 1980; 
Frank & Frank 1982; Frank et al. 1989; Woolpy & Ginsburg 1967) in order to 
investigate motivational and cognitive differences. Such comparative research 
usually assumes that the revealed species characteristics and/or specific differences 
reflect the influences of differential genetic determination. With the same general 
assumption, our research program is distinctive in two very important aspects from 
earlier ones.  
 First, we decided that both dogs and wolves should experience the same and 
especially intensive socialization by humans. That is, each human caretaker spent the 
first 2–4 months with one individual by providing care for 24 hr a day. Observations 
that humans can only socialize wolf pups successfully if they are separated very early 
(before eye opening) from the mother (Klinghammer & Goodmann 1987) suggest 
very early learning and/or strong genetic preference of conspecifics in the wolf. So 
we planned our socialization regime especially carefully to exclude results deriving 
only from the differing sensitivity for early socialization in the two species.  
 Second, we socialized a relatively great number of individuals in order to 
have more chance to discriminate behavioural traits that are exclusively specific to 
one of the species (qualitative differences) from those that are present in both species 
and possibly represent two extremes of the same distribution (quantitative 
differences).  
 In the first experiment, we wanted to see whether members of both species 
developed similar preference for their primary (human) caregiver. For the testing, we 
have applied an object-preference test, a method often used to look for early effects 
of social experience. The subject usually has the opportunity to choose between two 
(social or nonsocial) simultaneously presented objects by spending more time with 
one or the other stimulus object (e.g., Sackett et al. 1964). This method allowed us to 
use a natural set-up that interfered relatively little with the behaviour of the subjects. 
Because of earlier indication for differences in temperament traits already at this age 
(e.g., Frank & Frank 1987), we have also measured signs of aggressive and 
avoidance behaviour. 
 In previous studies, we have provided evidence that dogs have an advantage 
to use face and eye-related gestural cues (e.g., Soproni et al. 2001). Further, there 
appears to be a species-specific difference in the use of face/eye contact in social 
interactions with humans when comparing 4-month-old wolves and dogs (Miklósi et 
al. 2003). To address this question, we investigated whether the species-specific 
differences can be traced back to an earlier stage of development, and in a second 
experiment (Reinforced Eye Contact tests) we tried to study whether these 
differences can be masked by learning procedure. 
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METHODS  
 
Subjects  
 
 In year 2000–2003, our group raised 13 gray wolf pups (Canis lupus) born at 
Horatius Ltd. Animal Park (6 males and 7 females, from five different litters) and 11 
dog puppies (Canis familiaris) from three shelters (6 males and 5 females from five 
different litters, all mongrels). All the animals were socialized and tested the same 
way. Not all of the subjects could participate in every test and in some cases (9 
subjects’ 16 tests from the total 144 tests), the data were lost due to technical 
problems.  
 
Socialization Procedure  
 
 Subjects (dogs and wolves) were individually hand raised by humans after 
being separated from their mothers and littermates on Day 4–6 after birth (before 
their eyes opened). Each subject spent the first months of their lives in 24-hr close 
contact with their human foster parents, they lived in the homes of the caregivers and 
slept together with them at night. They were bottle-fed and from the age of 4–5 
weeks hand fed also with solid food. The caregivers carried them in a pouch, so the 
pups could participate in their everyday activities (travelling by public transport, 
attending classes at the university, visiting a friends, etc.). The pups frequently met 
unfamiliar humans, and at least twice a week they also met conspecifics of about the 
same age and adult dogs. This way, they were regularly exposed to novel stimuli and 
situations as well as to familiar individuals.  
 At the age of 4 months, wolves were placed back at the animal park where 
they could interact daily with humans and other wolves whilst dog puppies were 
adopted by their caregivers (N = 7) or by others (N = 4). 
 Our team was licensed by the Department of Nature Conservation, Ministry 
of Environmental Affairs (No.3293/2001) to hand rear and expose the wolf pups to 
extensive socialization, and our department has also been licensed by the Ethical 
Committee for Animal Experimentation at the Eötvös University to conduct such 
research.  
 
 
3.1.1. EXPERIMENT I/1  
 
Experimental procedures - Object-Preference Test  
 
 The subjects were presented with all together six object-preference tests; two 
tests were conducted on every subject at the age of 3, 4, and 5 weeks. On each 
occasion, all subjects were observed first in the first test one-by-one and then in the 
same order in the second test. The tests were performed in the morning and the 
caregivers fed the animals with milk at least 2 hr earlier. Before the tests, each 
subject was isolated for 5 min in a 9 m x 9 m x 9 m cardboard box situated in an 
unfamiliar empty room. (This was done in order to elicit similar motivational levels 
in all pups to initiate social interactions during the test.) The subjects was put into the 
box and taken out of it by a familiar female experimenter.  
 Following the isolation period, the subject was carried into another room (2.6 
m x 3.6 m) that was unfamiliar to them at the first occasion (at the age of 3 weeks). 
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The subjects’ behaviour was observed for 5 min (see Figure 3.1.1.1. for the testing 
design). 
 
Figure 3.1.1.1. Schematic 
illustration of the test room. (A) 
and (B) indicate the position of 
the two different types of 
objects that were presented 
simultaneously during the 5-min 
tests (caregiver, experimenter, 
adult dog, conspecific pup, milk 
bottle according to the type of 
the test). The objects’ location 
(right or left side) was 
counterbalanced on the same 
day. The grey-shaded areas 
represent the proximity of the 
objects. At the beginning of the 
object-preference test, the 
familiar female experimenter 
 (E) put the subject (S) on the starting point, which had been marked on the floor. The two 
objects were 1.1 m from each other and 1.5 m from the subject’s starting position. A 
cameraman, standing behind a 1.2 m high plastic screen, recorded the tests with a camera 
positioned on a tripod.  
 
Object Pairings  
 In all tests, the caregiver of the subject was one of the objects (“reference”) 
who were paired with different kinds of other social objects with the only exception 
of the nursing bottle in the very first test (see Table 3.1.1.1). The human participants 
always sat cross-legged and motionless on the floor quietly facing the subject. Their 
hands were placed on the floor in front of them with upturned palms.  
 
 
3 Weeks (20–22 Days) 4 Weeks (27–29 Days) 5 Weeks (34–36 Days) 
5-min isolation in box 
Bottle-caregiver object-
preference test  
(N(W) = 12, N(D) = 9 
Conspecific pup-caregiver 
object-preference test  
(N(W) = 9, N(D) = 8) 
Dog-caregiver object-
preference test  
(N(W) = 12, N(D) = 11) 
10–15-min in pen  
5-min isolation in box 
Dog-caregiver object-
preference test  
(N(W) = 12, N(D) = 11) 
Experimenter-caregiver 
object preference test  
(N(W) = 12, N(D) = 11) 
Experimenter-caregiver 
object-preference test  
(N(W) = 12, N(D) = 11) 
 
Table 3.1.1.1. The sequence of testing at the age of 3, 4, and 5 weeks  
Note. On each occasion, the procedure started with a 5-min-long isolation. Immediately after 
the isolation, subjects participated in the first object-preference test. It was followed by a 10–
15-min period when the animals rested in the pen. Then the pups were isolated again and the 
second object-preference test came next. The number of participating subjects is indicated in 
case of each test (some of the tests could not be analyzed due to technical problems; these 
are omitted from the table).  
A B
0.3 m
0.3 m
1.1 m
1.5 m
S
E
camera
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Bottle-Caregiver 
 
 There was some lukewarm milk (used for feeding) in the nursing bottle that 
was placed on a small cloth soaked with milk. The caregiver was looking at the 
subject during the test.  
Experimenter-Caregiver  
 Both humans were looking at the subject during the test. In both tests, the 
same female experimenter took part. At the first time, she was unfamiliar to the 
subjects, and did not have any contact with them between the similar tests at the age 
of 4 and 5 weeks. 
 
Dog-Caregiver  
 
 The adult dog was positioned facing the starting point of the subject. He was 
a well-trained, adult Belgian shepherd male that at the time of the first test was 
unfamiliar to the subjects and had no contact with them apart from the tests. The dog 
lay calmly at his place for 5 min. This time the caregiver adjusted her behaviour to 
that of the adult dog, that is, she oriented to the subject only when the dog did so.  
 
Conspecific Pup-Caregiver 
 
 We always selected a same age sleeping conspecific from the subject pool in 
order to avoid interactions. Conspecific subjects knew each other equally well, as 
they had the possibility to meet regularly from the age of 2 weeks. The sleeping pup 
was gently placed to the floor and watched for a few seconds whether it was lying 
calmly. The caregiver sat motionless looking at the subject.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 As the duration of the test sessions varied slightly, we calculated the relative 
percentage of the time spent with each behaviour. 
 
Activity (%) 
 In this early age, social behaviour obviously cannot be analyzed without 
considering the animals’ general mobility or activity level. Taking into account the 
immature motor behaviour of the subjects, we assessed activity observing the time 
(s) spent standing or moving on four legs. (We only considered the time when the 
subjects were not in physical contact with the objects.) For statistical analysis, we 
used the mean activity value measured in the two tests on the same day. Activity 
level at the age of 3 weeks = (A1/t1 + A2/t2) /2. 
(A1 = time standing or moving on four legs during the first test at the age of 3 weeks, 
t1 = total time of the first test at the age of 3 weeks, A2 = time standing or moving on 
four legs during the second test at the age of 3 weeks, t2 = total time of the second 
test at the age of 3 weeks.)  
 
Proximity (%) 
 We measured the relative duration of the total time spent in proximity with 
each object closer than the length of the subject’s own body (i.e., the subject is closer 
than approximately 25–35 cm to any part of the stimulus). For statistical analysis, a 
preference index was calculated (see below).  
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Vocalization (%) 
 The relative duration of the total time spent with any form of vocalization. 
For statistical analysis, we used the mean vocalization value measured in the two 
tests on the same day (same calculation as in case of activity). The occurrence of 
vocalization (score, 0–1) was also recorded by the familiar experimenter just before 
she entered the room where the subject was isolated.  
 
Gazing at Face (Relative Frequency) 
 Gazing was defined as orienting the nose toward the human’s face, which was 
characterized by lifting of the head. This variable was recorded only while the animal 
was in proximity with a human (caregiver and unfamiliar experimenter). The 
frequency of gazing at human face was calculated by dividing the number of gazings 
by the time spent in proximity with the humans. For statistical analysis, we used the 
mean of gazing frequencies measured in the two tests on the same day. (The adult 
dog’s eyes were not high enough to identify the subjects’ head movements as 
gazing.)  
 
Tail Wagging (Score, 0–1)  
 The subject was given a score 1 if it wagged its tail when approaching either 
of the objects for the first time (getting closer than 30 cm) or while first getting into 
physical contact with either of them. A score 0 was given if this behaviour was not 
observed on these occasions or the animal did not get into proximity with a stimulus 
during the test.  
 
 We have recorded signs of avoidance and aggressiveness of the subjects 
toward the approaching familiar experimenter both before and after each test when 
the animal was handled: first, at the end of the isolation periods when the familiar 
experimenter took the subject out of the box and for the second time, when she 
slowly approached, caught, and lifted the subject at the end of the object-preference 
test.  
 
Avoidance (Score)  
 The subject scored 1, if it showed avoidance toward the familiar experimenter, 
or a score 0, if it did not show avoidance (i.e., behaved passively or approached her). 
 
Aggressiveness (Score) 
 We categorized the reaction of the animal as aggressive if it growled or tried 
to bite the familiar experimenter. The subject was given a score 0 if it showed no 
aggression toward the familiar experimenter and a score 1, if it growled or tried to 
bite.  
 
 All object-preference tests were videotaped and analyzed later. Interobserver 
agreement between her and a naive observer on the behaviour categories was 
assessed by comparing their parallel coding of the same video records and evaluation 
of the 22% of the data (eight wolves, eight dogs). The following Cohen Kappa 
results were obtained (Martin & Bateson, 1986): activity = 0.85; proximity = 0.96; 
vocalization = 0.76; tail wagging = 1; gazing at face = 0.93; avoidance = 1; 
aggressiveness = 1. 
 In the case of proximity, we have calculated a preference index as follows: 
(relative duration of time spent with caregiver-relative duration of time spent with 
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other object)/(relative duration of time spent with caregiver + relative duration of 
time spent with other object). In case of the preference index, first we tested for 
divergence from zero (i.e. no preference) by one-sample t-tests. Then we compared 
the preference index of dogs and wolves by one-and two-way ANOVA. We scored it 
as missing value, if the denominator was zero (no time spent in proximity of any of 
the two objects). ‘Gazing at face’ did not show normal distribution, therefore 
nonparametric Mann–Whitney U-test was used for analysis. ‘Tail-wagging’, 
‘avoidance,’ and ‘aggressiveness’ were analyzed with Fisher exact test.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Activity 
 First of all, we wanted to determine whether there was any difference in the 
motor ability or general activity level of the species during the object preference This 
was measured by calculating the mean activity level for the two tests at all three ages. 
The two-way ANOVA (species x age, with repeated measures for age) revealed no 
difference between the activity level of the wolf and dog pups at any age (F(1,20) = 
1.878, p = 0.186). However, the subjects spent more time with active behaviour as 
they got older (F(2,40) = 7.995; p = 0.001) (Figure 3.1.1.2). The species-age 
interaction was not significant (F(2,40) = 1.649; p = 0.205).  
 
Proximity (Preference Index) 
 To assess the social behaviour after a short isolation, we compared the time 
spent in close proximity to the objects presented. Comparing the preference index to 
zero (assuming no preference for either object presented), we found that both dogs 
and wolves tended to show either no preference at all or preference for the caregiver. 
Wolves preferred to be in the proximity of the caregiver in two tests: at the age of 3 
weeks (Bottle-Caregiver) and at the age of 5 (Experimenter-Caregiver). Dogs tended 
to spend more time with the caregiver in three tests: at the age of 4 weeks in both 
tests (Pup-Caregiver and Experimenter-Caregiver) and at the age of 5 (dog-
caregiver) (see Table 3.1.1.2).  
 
Figure 3.1.1.2. Mean 
value (+SE) of relative 
durations of the time 
spent in activity at the 
age of 3, 4, and 5 weeks 
averaged the results of 
the two object-preference 
tests. The comparison of 
the activity values at 
different age categories 
by repeated-measures 
ANOVA revealed no 
significant difference 
between wolves and dogs. 
The activity increased 
with age, the species-age 
interaction was not 
significant.  
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 3 Weeks 4 Weeks 5 Weeks  
 Bottle-caregiver Conspecific pup-caregiver Dog-caregiver  
Wolves t(9) = 5.489, 
p < 0.05 
t(8) = 1.043,  
p = 0.327, ns 
t(11) = -0.524,  
p = 0.611, ns 
Dogs t(4) = 0.662,  
p = 0.544, ns 
t(5) = 3.83,  
p < 0.05 
t(9) = 12.131,  
p < 0.01 
 
  
Dog-caregiver 
 
Experimenter-caregiver 
Experimenter-
caregiver  
Wolves t(10) = 1.664, 
p = 0.127, ns 
t(9) = 1.648,  
p = 0.128, ns 
t(11) = 3.768, 
p < 0.01 
Dogs t(7) = 0.777,  
p = 0.462, ns 
t(9) = 2.72,  
p < 0.05 
t(9) = 1.532,  
p = 0.159, ns 
 
Table 3.1.1.2. Results of the Comparison of Preference Indexes in all Tests  
Note. The differences of the preference index from zero were analyzed with one-sample t-
tests, and the p-values were corrected with False Discovery Rate adjustment (Benjamini et al. 
2001). In all cases, significant differences (highlighted with bold face) refer to preference to 
be in the proximity of the caregiver.  
 
 The preference index of dogs and wolves was compared by one-way ANOVA 
in case of the two pairings that were carried out only once (Bottle-Caregiver and 
conspecific Pup-Caregiver). Two-way ANOVA (with repeated measures for age) 
was used to compare the species in those two pairings (Experimenter-Caregiver and 
Dog-Caregiver), which were tested two times (at different ages).  
 We found no difference in the preference index of dogs and wolves at the age 
of 3 weeks in the Bottle-Caregiver test (F(1,14) = 2.54, p = 0.135) and also at 4 
weeks of age in the Conspecific Pup-Caregiver test (F(1,14) = 0.77, p =.395). 
 Similarly, no effect of the species has been found in the Experimenter-
Caregiver tests (F(1,17) = 0.05; p = 0.824), lacking also the effect of age (F(1,17) = 
0.113; p = 0.74) and interaction (F(1,17) = 0.45; p = 0.24). The Dog-Caregiver tests 
also showed no overall difference in the social preferences of the two species 
(F(1,16) =2.16; p = 0.16) and no effect of age was found either (F(1,16) = 0.04; p = 
0.84). However, the significant interaction (F(1,16) = 7.08; p = 0.02) indicates that 
compared to wolves dogs showed more pronounced preference for the caregiver 
when they were 5 weeks old.  
 It also seemed informative to analyse which unfamiliar social partner 
(experimenter or dog) took greater effect on the animals in the presence of the 
caregiver, that is, in case of which object they showed less preference toward the 
caregiver. Comparing the preference index values in the two tests at the age of 5 
weeks, we found that dog puppies tended to prefer the caregiver less if the other 
object was the unfamiliar human (t(8) = 2.77, p = 0.024) while wolf pups showed 
less (actually no) preference toward the caregiver when the other choice was the 
unfamiliar adult dog (t(11) = -3.84, p = 0.003) (Figure 3.1.1.3). 
 
Vocalization  
 During the isolation period, distress vocalization was characteristic mainly for 
dogs. While seven of eight dogs vocalized (high pitched sounds or howl) at least on 
one occasion just before the experimenter entered the room, only three of nine 
wolves showed similar behaviour. All vocalizations were high-pitched sounds (e.g., 
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whining or yelping: see Cohen & Fox 1976; Ohl 1996) thus reflecting most probably 
signs of distress because the animals vocalized mainly when they were not in the 
proximity of the objects. Using two-way ANOVA (with repeated measures for age), 
we have found that dog puppies spent more time with vocalization during the tests 
than wolf pups did (F(1,20) = 1.24; p = 0.003) without an effect of age (F(2,40) = 
1.954; p = 0.115). However, significant interaction (F(2,40) = 3.912; p = 0.028) 
indicated that the tendency for vocalization decreased with age in dog puppies, while 
in case of wolf pups, no such change was evident (Figure 3.1.1.4).  
 
Figure 3.1.1.3.  
 Preference index 
values of 5-week-old 
dogs (two upper bars) 
and wolves (two lower 
bars) in the ‘‘Caregiver-
Dog’’ (filled bars) and 
the ‘‘Caregiver-
Experimenter’’ (dotted 
bars) object-preference 
tests. Index values 
different from zero refer 
to preference to be in 
the proximity of the 
indicated objects. The 
 index values were calculated as: (relative duration of time spent with caregiver – relative 
duration of time spent with other stimulus)/(relative duration of time spent with caregiver + 
relative duration of time spent with other stimulus). A comparison of the index values from 
the two types of tests at the same age reveals in which test subjects showed greater 
preference toward their caregiver. Dogs preferred their caregiver less when the other object 
was the experimenter, while wolves showed actually no preference toward their caregiver in 
the presence of an adult dog (paired t-tests). Significant differences are indicated with 
asterisks (*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01). 
 
Figure 3.1.1.4.  
Mean value (+SE) of relative 
durations of time spent with 
vocalization at the age of 3, 4, 
and 5 weeks averaged the 
results of the two object-
preference tests. The values of 
the two species at different age 
categories were compared by 
repeated-measures ANOVA. 
Dogs spent more time 
vocalizing than wolves, with no 
effect of age. Significant 
interaction indicated that 
vocalization tended to decrease 
with age in the case of dogs, 
while wolves’ vocalization did 
not change with age.  
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Tail Wagging  
 Wolf pups never wagged their tails while approaching the objects for the first 
time or while first getting into physical contact with them. (Even if we consider the 
entire period of tests, there was only one pup that showed this behaviour orienting 
toward the adult dog and also toward the caregiver in one test at the age of 5 weeks. 
This happened, however, not at the first approach or in physical contact with the 
objects.) Despite the lack of tail wagging in wolves during the observed periods, the 
two groups did not differ statistically in the tendency for showing tail wagging in 
respect of any object at the age of 3 weeks. In the proximity of the nursing bottle and 
the adult dog, none of the animals showed tail wagging and only few dog puppies 
(two subjects in the Bottle-Caregiver and three in the Dog-Caregiver test) wagged 
their tail when approached or contacted the caregiver.  
 However, 4-and 5-week-old dog puppies significantly differed from wolf 
pups in case of all objects. Compared to wolves, more 4-week-old dog puppies 
showed some tail wagging toward the caregiver both in the Experimenter-Caregiver 
(Fisher exact test; p < 0.001) and in the Pup-Caregiver test (p = 0.029). We found the 
same species difference in tail wagging in Experimenter-Caregiver test toward the 
experimenter (p = 0.037) and in the Conspecific Pup-Caregiver test toward the pup 
(p = 0.029). This difference was also characteristic in case of 5-week-old subjects as 
dogs wagged their tail more often toward all objects (Dog-Caregiver test: caregiver: 
p < 0.001; adult dog: p = 0.005, Experimenter-Caregiver test: experimenter: p = 
0.001; caregiver: p < 0.001).  
 
Gazing at Face  
 As we found no difference between the caregiver and the unfamiliar human in 
respect of gazing at their face (dogs: z = - 1.69, p = 0.09; wolves: z = - 0.45, p = 0.66 
by Wilcoxon test), and considering the relative rare occurrence of this behaviour, we 
added up the number of gazings at any human face during the tests at a certain age. 
Three-and 4-week-old animals gazed rarely at the human face, and no difference was 
found between the species (N(dogs) = 8; N(wolves) = 11; U = 38.50, p = 0.241; 
N(dogs) = N(wolves) = 11; U = 40.00, p = 0.104, respectively). At the age of 5 
weeks, however, dog puppies gazed at the humans’ face more often than wolf pups 
did (N(dogs) = 11; N(wolves) = 12; U = 31.00; p = 0.02) (Figure 3.1.1.5). 
 
Figure 3.1.1.5.  
Frequency (number/min) of 
gazings at the humans’ face 
in the three age categories 
during the two tests. The 
medians of nonparametric 
data are represented by bold 
lines, and boxes indicate the 
50% of the data (lower and 
upper interquartile range). 
Whiskers extend to the 
smallest and largest values 
excluding outliers and 
extremities. Mann–Whitney 
U-tests showed that 5-week-
old   dogs   gazed   at   the  
humans’ face significantly more frequently than wolves did. Significant differences are 
indicated with asterisks (*: p < 0.05).  
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Avoidance  
 Considering all three age categories together only one dog showed avoidance 
on 1 occasion (1%) of 98 interactions (taking up the puppy by the experimenter) in 
contrast to eight wolves displaying such behaviour on 19 occasions (17%) of 106 
interactions. Due to the small sample size and the relatively rare occurrence of this 
behaviour, however, this did not mean significant difference between the species in 
avoidance shown toward a familiar experimenter at the age of 3 and 4 weeks (Fisher 
exact test; p = 0.214 and 0.242, respectively) and only a tendency could be 
demonstrated in case of the 5-week-old pups (p = 0.057).  
 
Aggressiveness  
 None of the dog puppies behaved aggressively in the 99 interactions with the 
familiar experimenter during the tests. Among the 13 wolf pups, however, there were 
nine individuals that one or more times growled at the familiar experimenter and/or 
tried to bite her (in 29 cases of 112 interactions, 26%). Comparing the species by 
age-categories, we have found that aggressive behaviour was more pronounced in 
wolves than in dogs at each age (Fisher exact tests: 3-week-olds, p = 0.04; 4-week-
olds, p = 0.013; 5-weekolds, p = 0.001).  
 
 
3.1.2. EXPERIMENT I/2  
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects 
 
 This experiment was carried out only with three dog puppies and four wolf 
pups, so the results should be regarded as preliminary. Subjects were tested both at 
the age of 5 and 9 weeks, but most 5-week-old wolf pups fell asleep during the 
session so only the result of the dogs could be analyzed for this age.  
 
Experimental procedures– Reinforced eye contact test 
 
 In case of three dog and four wolf pups, we tried to increase the frequency of 
eye contact with a familiar experimenter by reinforcing them with food for the 
required behaviour. The 4-min test sessions were conducted at a familiar place; first, 
when the subjects were 5 weeks old (after the object-preference tests) and later when 
they were 9 weeks old. Prior to the test, the incentive value of the food reward was 
tested by placing small pieces on the floor 1 m from the subject. When we released 
the subjects, each of them ran to the food and ate it up immediately. Then a familiar 
experimenter (the same person in all tests) sat on the floor facing the subject 
continuously. A plate of food (small pieces of cold cut) was placed on a table beside 
the experimenter out of subjects’ reach. The animal could move freely around and 
when it made eye contact with the experimenter, she signed it with a clicker (a small 
device that gives a sudden snapping sound when pushed) and immediately threw a 
piece of food to the animal. If the animal went farther than 1.5 m from the 
experimenter, she made noise with the plate to redirect its attention. The caregiver sat 
still 2 m away from the experimenter.  
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Data recording 
 
 The whole session was videotaped. Reviewing the tapes, we counted the 
number of ‘‘clicks,’’ which equalled the number of eye contacts between the 
experimenter and the animal.  
 
RESULTS 
 
 Comparing the number of eye contacts at the age of 9 weeks, no difference 
was found between the performance of the species in the first minute (t5 = 0.985, p = 
0.370). At the beginning, all animals made intensive attempts to take the food 
directly from the plate, which was unreachable for them. As the session went on, 
however, dogs tended to gaze more at the experimenter’s face. Wolves, on the 
contrary, kept mainly orienting toward the plate, even though they always got a food 
pellet from the experimenter if they happened to gaze at her. Compared to wolves, 
dogs achieved significantly more eye contact with the experimenter during the fourth 
minute (t(5) = 4.811, p = 0.005). 
 To look for any learning effect across the two ages, we compared their 
performance (difference between number of eye-contact in min 4 and min 1) at the 
age of 5 and 9 weeks, and found very similar pattern of performance (t(2) = -0.615, p 
= 0.601) (Figure 3.1.2.1). 
 
 
Figure 3.1.2.1. 
Mean number of eye 
contacts with a familiar 
experimenter during the 4-
min long operant 
conditioning test sessions of 
dogs at the age of 5 and 9 
weeks versus that of 9-
week-old wolves. (The 
results of 5-week-old wolves 
could not be evaluated.) 
Comparing the number of 
eye contacts in the presence 
of a plate with food, 9-
week-old dogs’ and wolves’ 
behaviour did not differ du- 
 -ring the first minute. During the last minute, however, dogs initiated more eye contacts than 
wolves. No significant difference was found in the performance of dogs at the age of 5 and 9 
weeks.  
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3.1.3. STUDY I. GENERAL DISCUSSION  
 
 Both dogs and wolves in the present study were extensively hand-raised so 
the main question was whether similar experience in the two species affected their 
interspecific social attraction in a similar manner. 
 Wolves preferred the caregiver to the bottle at the age of 3 weeks, which 
affirms the findings that in some contexts, social stimuli have higher incentive value 
than food reinforcement for wolf pups (see Frank & Frank 1988). Moreover wolf 
pups, at the age of 5 weeks (but not at the age of 4 weeks) showed a clear preference 
for their human ‘‘parent’’ over the unfamiliar human. It could be assumed that the 
unfamiliar human, being a novel social agent, evoked exploratory behaviour on the 
part of the 4-week-old wolf puppies. Thus they showed no preference for the 
caregiver at the age of 4 weeks but it emerged 1 week later when the test was 
repeated and the other human had lost its ‘novelty value.’ An alternative explanation 
might be that for this time the (relatively) novel stimulus may evoke some 
fearfulness besides the exploratory behaviour in wolf pups. Interestingly, however, 
social preference towards the human caregiver was masked when the unfamiliar 
human was replaced with a canid (adult dog or wolf pup); wolves never preferred 
their “foster parent” in these situations. 
 Dogs displayed preference for the human caregiver starting from the 4th week, 
and this preference disappeared only in the last test when they were tested with two 
humans. This could suggest that dogs, unlike wolves, develop a preference toward 
humans as they get older, and additionally this preference is not restricted to the 
caregiver but becomes more generalized by the age of 5 weeks. It is also possible 
that dog puppies are more sensitive to being “ignored” by their motionless caregiver 
than are wolf pups, thus are more prone to seek contact (try to initiate social 
interaction) also with the experimenter.  
 Taken together, this suggests that both species are able to learn about its 
heterospecific (human) foster parent but there might be differences in the ability to 
generalize its characteristics to other similar “objects”. If we assume that such 
recognition (or social attraction) is based on learning a set of features of the parent 
then the difference may be that wolves are more restrictive in their choice when the 
caregiver is highly different from the natural parent. While the recognition of a 
“wolf-like” parent seems to be the “default” state of wolves’ learning system, 
domestication might have changed this in dogs by making the recognition process 
less precise, that is, recognition can occur in greater ranges of these characteristic 
features.  
 It is also important to note that in the case of some communicative signals, 
further species differences were observed. Dogs vocalized more during the tests that 
could be the result of a decreased threshold for the elicitation of distress calls in dogs, 
which is supported generally by the observation that dogs are more vocal in 
comparison to wolves (Fox 1971). Moreover wolf pups showed more avoidance and 
aggression toward a familiar human, though the observed difference in such 
responses might be not unique to interactions with humans. The greater number of 
growls and attacks (e.g., attempted biting) in wolves and the absence of these 
behaviours in the case of dogs could be best explained by supposing that wolves 
either did not like to be touched or constrained in their movements, or they had a 
lower threshold for the elicitation of aggressive behaviour.  
 Although tail wagging is listed as a behaviour unit in the ethogram of the 
wolf (McLeod 1996; Zimen 1987), we found tail wagging only in the dogs during the 
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observed periods. It seems that dog puppies are either more prone to show 
submission toward passive social stimuli at the age of 4–5 weeks, or may use tail 
wagging for a somewhat broader communicative intention to facilitate interaction. 
The high position of their tail during tail wagging seems to give some support to the 
latter explanation. It is also interesting to note that tail wagging became also more 
frequent in the foxes selected for tameness (Belyaev 1978).  
 Further differences were found in relation to gazing behaviour toward 
humans. Despite extensive socialization with humans, wolves seem to avoid looking 
at the face of the experimenter, which was revealed in the low frequency of gazing in 
the object-preference tests. Their behaviour in the eye contact test 4 weeks later 
supports the idea that this difference cannot be explained simply by a delay in the 
development of their social communication system. As wolves proved to be 
motivated by the food when they could get it for “free” prior to the eye contact test at 
both ages, we suggest that their reaction could be explained by the strategy observed 
in wolves in other situations as well when responding to “unsolvable” problems they 
first tried on their own and then gave up and had a rest (Miklósi et al. 2003).  
 In the conditioning test, the required behaviour was a very simple one and 
food reinforcement always followed the eye-contact right away. There are two 
possible explanations for increased tendency to gaze at the human’s face in dogs; 
either they learned the association between eye-contact and food reward very quickly, 
or they might not have learned much, but in this moderately stressful situation, they 
looked more into the human’s eyes only because “solicitation” came more natural to 
them. In the first case, the difference in the performance could stem again from two 
factors; looking into the eyes of a human can be less “convenient” behaviour for 
wolves, or there might be some other type of learning difference between the two 
species in this situation (i.e., dogs were simply more quick in this conditioning task). 
However, comparative studies on the problem solving abilities and species-specific 
constraints on learning in the two species have revealed no inferior performance of 
wolves (Frank & Frank 1985, 1988; Frank et al. 1989).  
 These results raise the possibility that dogs have been selected for being more 
resistant to gazing and/or they have been selected for gazing preferentially at humans. 
Comparative investigations (Frank & Frank 1985; Miklósi et al. 2003) seem to 
support the latter view when noting that increased gazing at humans could pave the 
way for the emergence of complex social skills in dogs that are able to utilize this 
visual communicative channel used predominantly by our species.  
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3.2. STUDY II. INFANT-LIKE PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT 
BEHAVIOUR IN DOGS BUT NOT IN WOLVES.* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Using the Strange Situation Test originally developed for testing the mother-
infant relationship in humans, we have compared the attachment behaviour of 
extensively socialized (hand-reared) dog (Canis familiaris) and wolf (Canis lupus) 
puppies toward their human caregiver to pet dog puppies of the same age. The 
experiment was designed to study (I) whether dog puppies as young as 16 weeks 
show attachment to a human caregiver (II) whether extensive socialization by human 
caregivers affects attachment behaviour of dog puppies and (III) whether 
evolutionary changes (in the form of species-specific differences between wolf and 
dog pups) play a role in emergence of dog-human attachment. 
 Results show a characteristic selective responsiveness to the owner in young 
dogs that is similar to that observed in adults, and this supports the view that already 
puppies display the patterns of attachment toward their owner. Additionally, we have 
found that extensive socialisation had only a minor effect on the attachment 
behaviour in dog puppies as the behaviour of pet dogs and hand-reared dogs was 
basically similar.  
 However, we have found significant species-specific difference between 
wolves and dogs because both extensively socialized and pet dog puppies exhibited 
highly different responsiveness toward the owner in comparison to an unfamiliar 
human participant, in contrast to extensively socialized wolves. Behavioural 
differences could be best explained by assuming that selective processes took place 
in the course of domestication (genetic changes) that are related to the attachment 
system of the dog. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Based on: 
 
Topál J, Gácsi M, Miklósi Á, Virányi Zs, Kubinyi E, Csányi V. (2005). The effect of 
domestication and socialization on attachment to human: a comparative study on 
hand reared wolves and differently socialized dog puppies. Animal Behaviour 70(6): 
1367-1375. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the basic behavioural phenomena of the social relationships is 
attachment. The evolutionary approach to function and mechanism suggests that 
attachment is one of the main behaviour organizing systems in parent-offspring 
relationships, and is also claimed to be the basic organizational factor for any 
species’ social structure leading to group formation (Bowlby 1958). Attachment is an 
asymmetrical social relationship between two individuals, which can be 
experimentally tested in choice situations like the Strange Situation Test (SST) 
originally developed to study the mother-infant relationship in humans (Ainsworth & 
Wittig 1969). The paradigmatic element of this procedure is that separation from the 
caregiver in an unfamiliar environment evokes anxiety (which is behaviourally 
manifested in proximity seeking), whilst the activated attachment system upon 
reunion with the caregiver manifests in different forms of contact seeking behaviours. 
Importantly, attachment behaviour is oriented mainly toward the caregiver, in the 
sense, that there is a significant difference in the level of proximity and contact 
seeking and efforts for the maintenance of contact between the caregiver and an 
unfamiliar person in the same novel situation.  
 Earlier we have reported that adult dogs show specific patterns of attachment 
behaviour towards their owner in the SST (Topál et al. 1998; Gácsi et al. 2001). 
Others also found this procedure to be a valid method for assessing dogs’ attachment 
behaviour (Palmer & Custance 2008) pointing to the functional similarities between 
dogs’ and human infants’ behaviour in the SST (see also Prato-Previde et al. 2003). 
Although one could assume that the ability to show attachment behaviour to the 
individuals of another species (human) in adulthood is one of the unique features of 
the domestic dog, despite much interest (Scott 1992; Ginsburg & Hiestand 1992), 
there has been no clear theory explaining the emergence of the phenomenon. 
Regarding the question whether inheritance (genetic background) or environmental 
effects (rearing history) plays the more influential role the following two hypotheses 
can be formulated: 
 The Socialization hypothesis suggests that attachment could develop mainly 
as a result of the extensive hand-rearing and individual socialization to the human 
social environment (i.e. enculturation) during the “critical period” of socialization 
(Freedman et al. 1961).  
 The Domestication hypothesis, however, claims that there could have been 
specific genetic changes (in the attachment behaviour organizing system) that have 
emerged as the result of selective breeding for dependency and attachment to humans 
(see also Hare et al. 2002; Miklósi et al. 2003 for similar explanations regarding 
communicative abilities in dogs).  
 In this paper we have designed a comparative experiment to investigate the 
attachment behaviour of hand-reared and extensively socialized wolf- and dog 
puppies and pet dog puppies who received usual socialization regimen by their 
owners. We wanted to seek evidence (I) whether pet dogs’ attachment to human is 
observable in Strange Situation Test as early as 16 weeks of age (II) whether 
extensive socialization by human caregivers causes any change in attachment 
behaviour of dog puppies and (III) whether there are species-specific differences 
between wolves and dogs in their attachment behaviour to human. 
 The Socialization hypothesis predicts that hand-reared wolf and dog puppies 
will show similar forms of attachment behaviour to their human caregiver whilst pet 
dog puppies being less extensively socialized will perform less explicit manifestation 
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of attachment to their owner. In contrast, according to the Domestication hypothesis 
we expect species-specific differences in the attachment behaviour to human 
between wolves and dogs reared in the same way (i.e. dogs should show more 
specific attached behaviour toward human than wolves). We should note that these 
explanations are not mutually exclusive and both of the hypothesized mechanisms 
could affect the behaviour phenotype in interaction.  
 
 
3.2.1. EXPERIMENT II/1 
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects 
 
 Three experimental groups, a group of extensively socialized wolf puppies 
and two groups of dog puppies with different rearing conditions were observed in the 
Strange Situation Test. 
 
Hand-reared puppies 
 Subjects in the ‘hand-reared wolf’ (N = 13) and ‘hand-reared dog’ (N = 11) 
groups were the same as in the above study (STUDY I). They were 4 months old at 
the time of testing (mean age ±SD; wolves: 16.2±0.5; dogs: 16.3±0.5 weeks). 
 
Pet dog puppies  
 Eleven pet dog puppies of different breeds (7 males, 4 females; two mongrels, 
one-one Border collie, Cairn terrier, Cocker spaniel, Cavalier King Charles Spaniel, 
German shepherd, Golden retriever, Husky, Moskow Ovcarka, Spitz) were also 
tested. All of them were raised by their mothers until 7-9 weeks of age, and at the 
time of the test they lived in human households and their mean age (±SD) was 
16.3(±2.5) weeks.  
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 The Strange Situation Test used here for studying dog/wolf-human 
attachment is based on the subject’s differential reaction to the owner and an 
unfamiliar person (stranger) in a moderately stressful environment. The test 
procedure was identical to that of reported earlier (Topál et al., 1998; Gácsi et al., 
2001). A 5.5 m X 3.5 m enclosure with 2 m high, opaque sidewalls was used as 
testing facility. The owner and the stranger (both females) entered and left through a 
90 cm x 2 m door. There were two chairs placed 1.5 m from each other in the middle 
of the experimental area (one for the owner and one for the stranger). There were 
some toys in the otherwise empty place as well. The test procedure consisted of 
seven episodes, each lasting two minutes. Human participants had to follow a 
detailed protocol that determined the form and timing of their behaviour. The 
behaviour of the subjects was videotaped and analyzed later. 
 Episode 1 (owner and dog/wolf): The owner entered the enclosure together 
with the dog/wolf, sat down and started to read. After 1 min. she started to stimulate 
playing or petting the dog/wolf depending on its willingness. (She stopped playing or 
petting when the stranger entered.) 
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 Episode 2 (owner, stranger and dog/wolf): The stranger entered, greeted the 
owner, stopped for up to 5 sec. to allow the animal to respond, and then sits down. 
After 30 sec. she initiated conversation with the owner. Another 30 sec. later the 
stranger started to stimulate playing or petting the dog/wolf depending on its 
willingness. At the end of the episode the owner left as unobtrusively as possible 
leaving the leash on her chair. 
 Episode 3 (stranger and dog/wolf): In this first separation episode the stranger 
tried to play with the animal or offered petting. After 1 min. she sat down and petted 
the dog/wolf if it was close enough. 
 Episode 4 (owner and dog): In this first reunion episode the owner called the 
puppy while she approached the closed door. After entering she stopped for max. 5 
sec. to allow the animal to respond and then went to the chairs. Then the stranger left. 
The owner stimulated playing or petting the dog/wolf depending on its willingness 
for 1 min., and then sat down and petted the puppy if it was close enough. At the end 
of the episode she told the puppy ‘I must go, you should stay here” and left. 
 Episode 5 (dog/wolf alone): This was the second separation episode (Total 
separation). Dogs/wolves were kept in the enclosure for 2 minutes. 
 Episode 6 (stranger and dog/wolf): The stranger entered and stopped for max. 
5 sec. to allow the dog/wolf to respond and then stimulated playing or petting the 
animal depending on its willingness. After 1 min. she sat down and petted the animal 
if it was close enough. She stopped playing and petting when the owner entered. 
 Episode 7 (owner and dog/wolf): In the second reunion episode the owner 
called the animal while she approached the closed door. After entering she stopped 
for up to 5 sec. to allow the animal to respond and then went to the chairs. Then the 
stranger left. The owner stimulated playing or petting the dog/wolf depending on its 
willingness for 1 min. and then sat down and petted the puppy if it was close enough. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 On the basis of the detailed behaviour analysis of two samples of dogs in 
former two studies (N=51 in Topál et al., 1998 and N=60 in Gácsi et al. 2001) seven 
variables were recorded. Proximity seeking upon separation was determined by 
‘Following’ of the departing person (owner/stranger) and by ‘Standing by the door’ 
when the owner/stranger was absent. Contact seeking behaviours upon reunion were 
described by scores of ‘Contact seeking’ towards the entering person 
(owner/stranger) and by measuring the duration of ‘Physical contact’ while greeting 
the owner/stranger. Further, we also measured the duration of the behaviours related 
to other aspects of the social and physical environment as ‘Playing’ with the 
owner/stranger, ‘Exploring’ the environment in the presence of the owner/stranger 
and ‘Passivity’ in the presence of the owner/stranger. 
 Each behaviour category was coded in the presence of both the owner and the 
stranger. The detailed definitions of the behaviour categories were as follows: 
1. Exploration (in the presence of the owner and stranger): Any activity directed 
toward non-movable aspects of the environment, including sniffing, distal visual 
inspection (staring or scanning), close visual inspection or oral examination. 
2. Passive behaviour (in the presence of the owner and stranger): Time spent with 
sitting, standing or lying down without any orientation toward the environment. 
3. Playing (in the presence of the owner and stranger): Any vigorous toy- or social 
partner-related behaviour including running, jumping, or any physical contact with 
toys. 
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4. Stand by the door (in the presence of the owner and stranger): The time spent close 
to the door (<1m) with the face oriented to the exit. The behaviour of the animals 
was always categorised in one of the above four variables during the episodes (non-
overlapping behaviour categories). 
5. Physical contact (with either the owner or the stranger): The amount of time spent 
in any form of bodily contact. 
6. Following (the owner and stranger): The tendency to follow the person leaving the 
kennel was evaluated by using exclusive conditional scores. The puppy did not orient 
towards the leaving person at all, or only for less than 1 sec (score: 0); it oriented 
towards the leaving person for more than 1 sec (score: 1); it followed the leaving 
person to the door (score: 2); it tried to get through the door or stood by the door for 
more than 1 sec (score: 3). Following was recorded only when one person stayed 
with the puppy while the other left the enclosure, as it happened at the beginning of 
episode 3 with the owner, and at the beginning of episodes 4 and 7 with the stranger. 
(Mean of the scores for the stranger were calculated.) 
7. Greeting (the owner and stranger): The behaviour of the dog toward the entering 
owner or stranger was evaluated by using the following five criteria, and summing 
up the scores.  
 approach initiation (+1): the puppy moved toward the entering person;  
 full approach (+1): the puppy approached the entering person until getting 
into physical contact; 
 avoidance (-1): any sign of avoidance behaviour toward the entering person, 
e.g. backing, getting out of the way of the entering person;  
 durable physical contact upon greeting (+1/2): the puppy spent more than 3 
seconds in bodily contact with the entering person; 
 delay of approach (-1/2): when the owner/stranger enters, the puppy hesitated 
to initialize any approach for more than 5 seconds.  
 (The maximum score was 5 with the respect to both the owner/caretaker and the 
stranger, because both of them entered the enclosure twice.) 
 We calculated the relative percentage of the time spent in Exploration, 
Playing, Passive, Stand by the door and Physical contact. All variables passed 
normality test (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff) therefore we applied parametric statistical 
methods (SPSS version 9.0). We analysed the behaviour of puppies in presence of 
the owner and stranger (within subject factor) and the experimental group (between 
subject factor) with mixed ANOVA for repeated measures to the within subject 
factor. Further, we used Sudent-Newman-Keuls post hoc tests (between groups 
comparisons) and paired t-tests (within group comparisons). 
 Before data analysis interobserver agreements for all of the seven behaviours 
were assessed by means of parallel coding of the 50% of the whole sample. We 
calculated Kappa coefficients (Martin & Bateson 1986) and found relatively high 
values for all variables (Exploration: 0.773, Playing: 0.964, Passive: 0.810, Stand by 
the door: 0.909, Physical contact: 0.881, Following: 0.721). In order to assess the 
interobserver agreement for Greeting, we measured Kappa coefficients for latency to 
approach (0.875), avoidance (0.880) and time spent in physical contact upon greeting 
(0.987). 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Regarding the behaviour observed in the presence of the owner and stranger 
first we give a short description of the experimental groups. “In the presence of the 
               dc_378_12
 49
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
O
w
ne
r
pr
es
en
t
St
ra
ng
er
pr
es
en
t
O
w
ne
r
pr
es
en
t
St
ra
ng
er
pr
es
en
t
O
w
ne
r
pr
es
en
t
St
ra
ng
er
pr
es
en
t
Hand-
reared
wolves
Hand -
reared
dogs
Pet dogs
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
du
ra
tio
n Stand-by the
door
Playing
Passive
Exploring
stranger” always refers to those episodes in which the stranger was present (episodes 
2, 3, 6) while those episodes in which the caregiver (owner) was present (episodes 1, 
2, 4, 7) were labelled as “in the presence of the owner”. 
 
Behaviour of hand-reared wolf puppies 
 In the unfamiliar situation subjects spent most of their time exploring the 
environment (62.6% in the presence of the owner and 57.7% in the presence of the 
stranger) and playing (28.7% of the total duration with the owner and 31.5% with the 
stranger). In contrast, they spent hardly any time on passive behaviours (5.6% when 
the owner was present and 5.9% when the stranger was present) and or on standing 
by the door (3% and 4.8% of the total duration in the presence of the owner and 
stranger). (Figure 3.2.1) 
 Wolves seemed to prefer physical contact with the stranger (21.4% of the 
total time) than with owner (8.8%) and were ready to follow both of them (Figure 
3.2.2). They obtained relatively high mean scores of greeting towards the entering 
owner and stranger as well (see Figure 3.2.3). In total separation (episode 5), when 
the subject was alone in the enclosure wolves spent most of their time with exploring 
the environment (36% of the total duration) and stood by the door (55% of the total 
duration).  
 
Behaviour of hand-reared dog puppies 
 Like wolves, extensively socialized dog puppies also played a lot with the 
human participants (41% with the owner and 30.7% with the stranger) and explored 
the environment thoroughly (42.8% and 43.7% of the total duration in the presence 
of the owner and stranger). They spent more time being passive (14.7% and 13.5%) 
than wolves, and they stood by the door less when owner was present (1.38%) than 
in the presence of the stranger (12.02%, Figure 3.2.1.1). They tended to follow and 
greet the owner more than they did with the stranger (Figures 3.2.1.2 & 3.2.1.3). In 
episode 5 (when they were alone) hand-reared dogs spent a lot of time standing by 
the door (43.5%) and exploring the environment (39% of the total duration). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1.1  
Percentage of time on 
various behaviours (non-
overlapping) by wolf or dog 
puppies in the presence of 
the owner or the stranger.  
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Figure 3.2.1.2.  
Mean scores +SE (range 0-
3) for following the owner 
and stranger when she left 
the test room (averaged over 
episodes 2, 4 and 3, 6 
respectively). Paired t-test, 
*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.1.3.  
Mean scores of greeting 
behaviour (maximum 5) 
towards the owner and 
stranger when she entered 
the test room (averaged over 
episodes 4, 7 and 2, 6 
respectively). Paired t-test,  
*: p < 0.02, ** p < 0.002  
 
 
Behaviour of pet dog puppies 
 Pet dogs also showed a lot of exploration (43.9% when owner was present 
and 44.7% in the presence of the stranger) and little passive behaviour (2.5% and 
2.2%). They showed some preference for playing with the owner (46.1% of the total 
duration vs. 29.1% in the presence of the stranger) and stood by the door less when 
the owner was present (7.5% vs. 24%, Figure 3.2.1.1).  
 However, pet dogs spent similar times in physical contact with the owner 
(11% of the total duration) and stranger (14.1%). As with hand-reared dogs, we 
observed a significant asymmetry regarding greeting and following behaviours 
(higher greeting and following scores with the owner – see Figures 3.2.1.2 & 3.2.1.3). 
In the total separation episode pet dogs either explored the environment (59%) or 
stood by the door (41% of the total duration). 
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Between-group comparisons 
 
 Exploring the environment: The groups showed significant differences (wolf 
puppies explored more than dogs; F(2,33) = 3.41, p = 0.045), but neither the within 
subject factor (i.e. exploration in the presence of the owner vs. stranger) nor the 
interaction proved to be significant (F(1,32) = 0.21, p=0.65 and F(2,33) = 0.71, p = 
0.50 respectively). Paired comparisons of the exploration in the presence of the 
owner vs. stranger failed to show significant differences in any of the groups 
(wolves: t(12) = 1.51, p = 0.15, hand-reared dogs: t(10) = 0.49, p = 0.63, pet dogs: 
t(10) = 0.12, p = 0.91). 
 
 Passive behaviours: Two way ANOVA showed significant differences 
between groups (hand-reared dog puppies spent more time with passive behaviours 
than wolves and pet dogs; F(2,33) = 4.84, p = 0.015. In contrast, the within subject 
factor (i.e. passive behaviours in the presence of the owner vs. stranger) and the 
interaction were not significant (F(1,32) = 0.13, p = 0.72 and F(2,33) = 0.17, p = 0.84 
respectively). In agreement with this, within group comparisons did not show 
differences in passive behaviours with owner vs. stranger (wolves: t(12) = 0.42, p = 
0.67, hand-reared dogs: t(10) = 0.46, p = 0.65, pet dogs: t(10) = 0.17, p = 0.87). 
 
 Physical contact with owner/stranger: Wolf puppies spent more time in close 
bodily contact with their human partner than hand-reared dog puppies whilst the 
behaviour of the pet dog group was intermediate (between group effect: F(2,33) = 
3.99, p = 0.028). Within subject factor was also significant (physical contact with the 
owner vs. stranger: F(1,32) = 8.67, p = 0.006) but interaction was not (F(2,33) = 1.56, 
p = 0.23). Interestingly, both hand-reared dogs and wolves had more bodily contact 
with the stranger than owner (t(10) = 2.85, p = 0.017, and t(12) = 2.52, p = 0.027) 
while similar differences were not found in pet dogs (t(10) = 0.72, p = 0.49). 
 
 Playing: The groups did not show significant differences in play (F(2,33) = 
0.39, p = 0.68); however both the person present (i.e. owner or stranger) and the 
interaction were be highly significant (F(1,32) = 18.83, p < 0.0001 and F(2,33) = 
10.02, p < 0.0001, respectively). Both hand-reared and pet dogs but not wolf puppies 
tended to play more with their owner than with the stranger (hand-reared dogs: t(10) 
= 3.75, p = 0.004, pet dogs: t(10) = 5.13, p < 0.0001, wolves: t(12) = 0.81, p = 0.43). 
 
 Following the owner/stranger: The analysis of the subjects’ reaction to the 
person going away failed to show differences between groups (F(2,33) = 1.30, p = 
0.29) whereas the within subject factor was highly significant (F(1,32) = 16.73, p < 
0.0001). We did not find significant interaction in this case (F(2,33) = 1.16, p = 0.34). 
Within group comparisons show that while wolves did not discriminate between 
humans in this case (owner vs. stranger: t(12) = 1.2, p = 0.26), both pet and hand-
reared dog puppies were more ready to follow the owner than stranger (t(10) = 4.03, 
p = 0.002 and t(10) = 2.35, p = 0.041). 
 
 Standing by the door: Two-way ANOVA showed significant effects for both 
the comparisons between groups (F(2,33) = 3.86, p = 0.031; pet dogs stood more at 
the door than hand-reared dogs or wolves) and within subjects (F(1.32) = 21.96, p < 
0.0001). The interaction was also significant (F(2,33) = 4.54, p = 0.018). Hand-
reared and pet dogs spent more time standing by the door when the owner was absent 
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versus present (t(10) = 2.77, p = 0.020 and t(10) = 3.25, p = 0.009 respectively), in 
contrast to wolves (t(12) = 1.38, p = 0.19). 
 
 Greeting the owner/stranger: The subjects’ greeting behaviour toward the 
entering owner and stranger did not show significant differences between groups 
(F(2,33) = 2.07, p = 0.14). However, the identity of the entering person (within 
subject factor: F(1,32) = 8.13, p = 0.008) and interaction (F(2,33) = 4.62, p = 0.020) 
proved to be significant. Paired comparisons of the greeting behaviour showed that 
while dogs of both groups greeted more intensively the owner than the stranger (pet 
dogs: t(10) = 2.85, p = 0.017, hand-reared dogs: t(10) = 4.35, p = 0.001) wolves did 
not make such discrimination (t(12) = 0.61, p = 0.55). 
 
 Behaviour in the total separation: Subjects in all groups spent episode 5 
(subject alone) mainly with exploring the enclosure (in average 44.7% of the total 
duration) or standing by the door (in average 46.5% of the total duration). Between 
group comparisons showed no significant differences for exploration (F(2,32) = 1.11, 
p = 0.34) and standing by the door (F(2,32) = 2.66, p = 0.085). The increased 
durations (41-55%) of standing by the door when subjects were alone in the 
enclosure (in other episodes dogs and wolves stood by the door for 1.4-24% 
respectively) clearly show that puppies in all groups found this episode distressing. 
This is also supported by the fact that almost all puppies (all hand reared dogs and all 
but one wolf and pet dog) followed the leaving person when they were left alone 
(which meant they got the maximum score for following at the end of episode 4). 
 
 
3.2.2. STUDY II. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 In agreement with earlier studies, which suggested that adult pet dogs (Topál 
et al. 1998) and adult shelter dogs after a short handling procedure (Gácsi et al. 2001) 
show patterns of attachment behaviour toward the owner/handler, our results suggest 
that this behaviour can be evoked in dog puppies as early as 16 weeks after birth. 
Table 3.2.1.1. summarizes the paired comparisons of the behavioural variables in the 
presence of the owner and the stranger and gives further support for this conclusion.  
 Traditionally fostered four months old dog puppies showed in most respects 
the same discrimination between human participants (owner versus stranger) as adult 
pet dogs did in our earlier study (Topál et al. 1998). This suggests that the attachment 
behaviour system is activated upon separation from the owner but not the stranger 
(standing by the door upon separation and following the owner who is leaving the 
enclosure), and upon reunion with the owner (increased proximity and contact 
seeking). This characteristic selective responsiveness to the owner supports the view 
that both adult dogs and puppies show the same patterns of attachment toward their 
owner.  
 Our findings strongly argue for a small influence of intensive socialisation in 
dogs on attachment to human caregiver as both hand-reared and pet puppies 
selectively responded to the separation from the owner. Results show only minor 
effect of the socialization history: pet dog puppies spent more time with passive 
behaviours than hand-reared ones, whereas hand reared puppies spent more time 
close to the door and showed a stronger preference for physical contact with the 
stranger. The greater interest in unfamiliar human could be an artefact of hand-
rearing as this was the only apparent feature that was typical for both hand-reared 
               dc_378_12
 53
groups (dog and wolf puppies). In fact, due to their special socialization, hand-reared 
pups had more extensive experience with different unfamiliar humans (strangers) 
during their first months than pets. 
 
 
 
GROUP 
Score of 
contact 
seeking 
Physical 
contact 
Stand by 
the door 
Follo-
wing 
Playing Passive Explo-
ring 
Pet dog 
puppies 
(N=11)  
O > S 
p=0.017 
 
p=0.487 
O < S 
p=0.009 
O > S 
p=0.002
O > S 
p=0.001
 
p=0.870 
 
p=0.904 
Hand-
reared dog 
puppies 
(N=11) 
 
O > S 
p=0.001 
 
O < S 
p=0.017
 
O < S 
p=0.019 
 
O > S 
p=0.041
 
O > S 
p=0.004
 
p=0.655 
 
p=0.631 
Hand-
reared 
wolf 
puppies 
(N=13) 
 
 
p=0.551 
 
O < S 
p=0.027
 
 
p=0.192 
 
 
p=0.255 
 
 
p=0.432 
 
 
p=0.677 
 
p=0.156 
Adult pet 
dogs* 
(N=51) 
O > S 
p<0.001 
 
p=0.131 
O < S 
p<0.001 
Data 
not 
availabl
e 
O > S 
p<0.001
 
p=0.145 
O > S 
p=0.013
 
Table 3.2.1.1. Summary of the paired comparisons of the behavioural variables in the 
presence of the owner (O) versus the stranger (S) *The data for adult dogs are taken from 
Topál et al. (1998); p values are from paired t tests. 
 
 Importantly however, the present study shows, that species-specific 
difference in attachment behaviour toward humans exists between hand-reared dog 
and wolf puppies. Whilst socialized wolf pups did not show the specific patterns of 
attachment (person-specific proximity seeking upon separation and contact seeking 
upon reunion, see Table 3.2.1.1), this behaviour mechanism is unequivocally 
activated in 16 weeks old dog puppies. Additionally, even socially deprived adult 
dogs display such attachment behaviour after a short social handling of an unfamiliar 
person (Gácsi et al. 2001). 
 These results provide little support for either the attachment to humans being 
the outcome of extensive human socialization or processes related to heterochronic 
changes in rates of behaviour development alone (Coppinger & Coppinger 2001; 
Goodwin et al. 1997). This is in contrast to widely held views as up to now both 
processes have been implicated heavily in explaining the development of dog-human 
attachment. Such theories have assumed that the behaviour of dogs shown toward the 
owner is derived directly from the puppy-mother relationship in wolves, supposing a 
behavioural homology between dog and wolf behaviour.  
Regarding the wolf pup attachment behaviour to mother many observed that the 
pups’ proximity and contact seeking behaviour towards their mother gradually 
decreases after weaning (6-8 weeks of age –Mech 1970) and social attachment could 
be observed mainly towards the pack and not a specific individual (King 1954; Rabb 
et al. 1967; Beck 1973). Sixteen-week-old wolves are often left alone at a “meeting 
point” where they are waiting for the hunting group (Mech 1991). It has also been 
reported that in case of 2 months old dog puppies the mother has only minor role in 
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reducing the effect of separation stress (Elliot & Scott 1961; Frederickson 1952; 
Ross et al. 1960) and in choice situations puppies do not show preference for the 
mother in comparison with an unfamiliar bitch (Pettijohn et al. 1977). On the basis of 
these findings many questioned that puppies are able to show attachment behaviour 
to their mother at all despite their ability to discriminate and preference for the 
mother in certain situations (Rajecki 1978). 
 In line with these results we suggest that there is no direct functional 
relationship between puppy-mother attachment in wolves and the life-long behaviour 
phenomenon that can be called attachment between dog and its owner. Based on our 
results the most plausible hypothesis is that besides a destabilizing selection (Belyaev 
1979) that resulted in the fragmentation of the well-organized behaviour repertoire of 
the wolf, dogs have evolved a capacity for attachment to human that is functionally 
analogous to that present in human infants.  
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3.3. THE SOCIALITY DOMAIN OF DOG BEHAVIOUR COMPLEX:  
SUMMARY OF RESULTS. 
 
 
 The comparative analysis of subjects’ behaviour toward human participants in 
the different experimental situations show that even after extensive socialization 
wolves display increased defensive aggression and this indicates a lower threshold 
for socially inflicted constraints. Moreover, hand-reared wolves do not display early-
emerging and generalized preference toward human as well as patterns of attachment 
to humans comparable to that observed in pet dog puppies of different rearing 
conditions. Dogs’ attachment to humans is grounded on a specific behaviour 
organising mechanism while this “software” is seemingly lacking in wolves. 
 These characteristics of social-affiliative behaviour system in dogs do not 
only allow for developing close relationship to a different species but also operate for 
an extended period into adult life (e.g. Topál et al. 1998). This system could also 
serve as the scaffolding on which many forms of complex social behaviour between 
dogs and humans can develop (see also Gácsi et al. 2009).  
 In parallel to other dog-wolf comparisons (Miklósi et al. 2003), these findings 
give rise to the notion that specific selective processes (genetic changes) might be 
associated with the emergence of the “sociality” component of the Dog Behaviour 
Complex. Thus the results of STUDY I & II lend support to the domestication 
hypothesis which claims that in dogs, due to selection for dependency and 
attachment to humans, specific genetic changes in the social-affiliative behaviour 
system have emerged and these changes served as the basis of the evolutionary 
development of dog-human relationship.  
 Our observations also point to clear and testable behavioural differences 
between the results of a socialization process (often referred to as “taming”) and the 
effects of domestication that are reflected in adaptive genetic changes. In the case of 
the dog such genetic changes resulted in a human analogue attachment system that 
has probably strongly contributed to the successful “adoption” of the dog into the 
human social system. 
 We may assume that the development of social attraction and individualized 
attachment serve as a basis for the dogs’ social competence and attachment has an 
important role in synchronisation of interacting parties as this could make 
collaborative activities more easily and efficiently. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
 
SYNCHRONIZATION 
 
 
 Synchronization can be defined as processes leading to behavioural and 
motivational/emotional conformity. Achieving behaviours related in time 
(synchrony) is essential for group cohesion (Engel & Lamprecht 1997). Thus the 
ability for behavioural synchronization probably enhanced the ability of dogs to 
maintain close relationships with humans. Scant research on the interactional 
synchrony between dogs and humans has revealed so far four aspects of dog 
behaviour: (i) complementary cooperation (ii)emotional synchronization, 
(iii)imitative behaviours and (iv) rule following. 
 Complementary cooperation: Goals can often be achieved only by 
cooperative interactions with others in the group. Earlier we have shown that 
interacting dogs and humans establish a complex behaviour pattern when performing 
joint actions (Kerepesi et al. 2005). Dogs are not only sensitive to meta-
communicative signals (e.g. the play bow) in order to maintain play but also engage 
in complex “behavioural projects” in order to continue playing (Mitchell & 
Thompson 1991). More importantly, dogs seem to be able to perform complementing 
actions to achieve a joint goal (Naderi et al. 2001) and this closely resembles 
cooperative activity described in the case of humans (Reynolds 1993). 
 Emotional synchronization: Although evidence is very limited, it is likely that 
dogs have the ability to show emotional synchronization by attending to various 
visual or acoustic social signals emitted by humans. For example, Rooney et al. 
(2001) provided some evidence of synchronization during heterospecific play when 
various play signals seemed to have the potential to evoke play behaviour from the 
other, probably through change in mood. In order to gain a deeper insight into this 
aspect of dog-human synchronization, in the present chapter three experiments (see 
STUDY III) will focus on the dogs’ ability to adjust their own emotional and 
behavioural response in accordance with the human’s attitude.  
 Imitative behaviours: Like in mother-infant relationships (Stern et al. 1977), 
the synchronized routines that dogs and their owners often establish could be an 
important contributor to the formation of social relationship. In line with other 
studies (Miller et al. 2009) here we show that dogs can use human behaviour as a cue 
for selecting functionally similar behaviour. STUDY IV in this chapter provides 
further evidence of dogs’ imitative abilities. 
 Rule following: de Waal (1996) and others assume that obedient behaviour of 
dogs and their “desire to please us” is partially based on their social skill at 
comprehending and following social rules (Bekoff & Allen 1998). There is some 
evidence that dogs are inclined to follow social rules of the group in both the short 
and long term. In a previous study we found that dogs adopt spontaneously a novel, 
arbitrary (actually pointless) behaviour as a result of interaction with their owner 
(Kubinyi et al. 2003). This can be regarded as a simple form of rule following; the 
individual develops and maintains habitual behaviour in a social context in relation 
to its partner. The function of this form of social influence might be to avoid 
conflicts in the group and to cooperate in common actions without any deeper insight 
into the knowledge content of another’s mind. In the last experimental study of this 
chapter (STUDY V) we tested whether dogs’ behaviour could be explained in terms 
of rule following when in an object permanence task. 
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4.1. STUDY III.  DOGS’ SENSITIVITY TO CHANGES IN HUMAN 
BEHAVIOUR.* 
 
Abstract 
 
 Responsiveness of adult pet dogs (Canis familiaris) to an unfamiliar human 
was observed in three experiments. Subjects were faced with an approaching woman 
(Stranger) who showed definite signs of friendliness and threat during alternate 
approaches. Observations consisted of two episodes: the Stranger either approached 
the dog in normal speed of walk while talking to it (Friendly approach) or she moved 
slowly and haltingly and looked steadily into the eyes of the dog without any verbal 
communication (Threatening approach).  
In the first experiment 30 dogs of different breeds were tested in the two conditions 
in a balanced sequential order. The dogs acted appropriately according to the 
different human behaviour cues.  
In the second experiment 60 dogs of three breed groups (20 Belgian shepherds, 20 
retrievers and 20 sled dogs) were first “greeted friendly” and then “approached 
threateningly” by the same Stranger. Results show significant breed specific 
differences in the responsiveness when dogs faced an apparent switch of the human 
behaviour cues. Compared to retrievers and sled dogs, Belgian shepherds more 
frequently changed their response, showing passive or active avoidance or sign of 
aggression when approached threateningly. While sex differences were not found, 
breed comparisons suggest that selective breeding (i.e. for hunting or shepherd work) 
influenced the dogs’ sensitivity to human social cues in different ways.  
In the third experiment we investigated the responsiveness of 23 Belgian shepherds 
toward the Stranger, repeating the test at least six months later. The consistency of 
the dogs’ response was found to be moderately high. This procedure proved to be 
reliable enough to be a valuable measure of a definite part of the personality 
characters of dogs. Results also support the hypothesis that human influence 
(domestication) has led to extreme flexibility of the dogs’ situation-relevant 
behaviour while interacting with an unfamiliar human.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Based on: 
 
Vas J, Topál J, Gácsi M, Miklósi Á, Csányi V. (2005). A friend or an enemy? Dogs’ 
reaction to an unfamiliar person showing behavioural cues of threat and friendliness 
at different times. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 94: 99-115. 
 
Vas J, Topál J, Győri B, Miklósi Á. (2008). Consistency of dogs’ reactions to 
threatening cues of an unfamiliar person. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 112: 
331-344. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Despite the fact that dog trainers routinely utilize social cues in the course of 
training, the problem of how these stimuli are functioning in dog–human interactions 
has received relatively little attention. When the role of social cues in dog–human 
interaction is studied, we should consider that present dogs are the result of a special 
behavioural evolutionary process called domestication. Wolf–dog comparisons led 
some to suppose that domestication resulted in the emergence of an unprecedented 
flexibility of the behavioural system in the dog (Frank & Frank 1987) and this 
plasticity made it possible for the dog to live in the close proximity to humans. 
Generally, it seems that compared to their wild ancestors, dogs social interest 
towards humans is accompanied by relatively greater sensitivity to human 
behavioural cues (Hare et al. 2002; Frank & Frank 1982; see also STUDY I & II 
above). In line with this, dogs should show high responsiveness to a broad range of 
social stimuli from humans and should react very flexibly to the human behaviours 
expressing different emotional attitudes.  
 In this study we investigate how dogs are able to modify their own 
behavioural actions in response to the behavioural changes of a human partner. The 
first experiment is aimed at the questions whether dogs show corresponding changes 
in their reactions to an approaching human who shows apparent changes in her 
behaviour (friendly/threatening).  
 
 
4.1.1. EXPERIMENT III/1. 
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects  
 
 Thirty pet dogs of 19 different breeds and five mongrels were involved in the 
present study on the basis of their owners’ volunteer participation. All subjects were 
adults (aged between 1-10 years) and half of them were females. For the 
observations dogs were divided in two groups.  
 
‘First-Greeted’ group 
 Fifteen individuals (5 males, 10 females; 2-2-2 German shepherds, Hungarian 
vizslas, Belgian shepherds, 1-1 Miniature poodle, Cocker spaniel, Beagle, Border 
collie, Briard, German hunting terrier, Welsh terrier, Fox terrier and a mongrel; mean 
age±SE: 3.5±3.1 years) were tested first in the ‘Friendly approach’ episode.  
 
‘First-Threatened’ group 
 Fifteen individuals (10 males, 5 females; 1-1 German shepherd, Miniature 
poodle, Cocker spaniel, Airdale terrier, Boxer, Belgian tervueren, Hovawart, Great 
dane, Pumi, Rottweiler, Shar-pei and four mongrels; mean age±SE: 2±1.3 years) 
started with the ‘Threatening approach’ episode.  
 
Experimental procedures  
 
 Behavioural observations were made at a visually separated location in a park 
near a dog training school, which was familiar to the dogs. Three participants, the 
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dog, the owner and a young unfamiliar woman (Judit Vas – Stranger) took part in the 
observations. The behaviour of the dog was recorded from the side by another person 
(cameraman) from a greater distance (10 m). The owner was asked to tether his/her 
dog with a 1.5 m long leash to an isolated tree and to make it sit or lie down 
(depending on the dogs controllability) orienting towards the Stranger who stood 
motionless 5 m from the dog. Then the owner stepped back to a predetermined point 
(about half a meter behind the dog) and stayed there without moving or speaking.  
 The test consisted of two subsequent episodes (Friendly approach and 
Threatening approach). The dogs were observed first in either of the episodes. At the 
end of the first episode the Stranger returned to her starting position (5 m away from 
the dog). The owner got the dog to its initial position (sit/lie down) stepped back 
again and the second episode started immediately.  
 
Friendly approach  
 The Stranger stood 5 m away from the dog and called it by its name. When 
the dog gazed at her face, she started to approach it in normal speed of walk while 
she spoke in a friendly manner to the animal and tried to keep continuous eye contact 
with it. If the dog showed explicit signs of fear or aggression (passive or active 
avoidance, attack, vocalization - in detail see below) she stopped and the trial was 
terminated. If the dog did not show any of these behaviours she approached the dog 
and petted it gently (Figure 4.1.1.1 a–c).  
 
Threatening approach.  
 The unfamiliar woman stood motionless and silently 5 m from the dog. At the 
moment when the animal looked at her face, she began to approach it. She was 
moving slowly and haltingly (one step in every 4 s) with slightly bent upper body 
and she was looking steadily into the eyes of the dog without any verbal 
communication (Figure 4.1.1.1 d).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.1.1. Experimental arrangement: (a) initial position of Friendly and Threatening 
approach; (b) Friendly approach: the Stranger is approaching the dog with an upright body 
position, in normal speed of walk, speaking in a friendly manner to the animal; (c) the 
Stranger is petting the dog; (d) Threatening approach: the Stranger approaches the dog with a 
slightly bent upper body, moving haltingly, without any verbal communication.  
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The behaviour of the Stranger was determined and standardized across subjects 
according to the following ‘If ...then...’ rules (a–d):  
 
(a) If the dog kept looking at her, then she continued to approach the dog and finally 
petted it. 
 
(b) If the dog interrupted the eye contact with her (moving away and/or turning head 
away), she stopped and waited motionless for about 4 s and then she tried to attract 
the dogs attention: she made some noise (had a slight cough or scratched the ground 
with her foot). If the dog continued to avert his gaze the Stranger attempted to call 
the dog’s attention two more times (with 2 s in between attempts). Whenever the dog 
looked again at her, the Stranger continued the approach. If, however, the dog did not 
look at her after the third attempt, the Threatening approach was terminated.  
 
(c) If the dog showed active avoidance, that is, it moved away to the back of the 
owner from the approaching Stranger while keeping eye contact, she stopped and 
Threatening approach was terminated.  
 
(d) If the dog showed definite signs of aggression, e.g. barked repeatedly or growled 
continuously (more than 4 s) and/or tried to attack the Stranger (moving ahead and 
stretching the leash), Threatening approach was terminated. If the subject did not 
show any form of fear or aggression mentioned even when the unfamiliar woman 
reached it, she touched the dog’s head and gently petted it.  
 Comparing the two episodes it is important to note that the Stranger 
attempted to obtain continuous eye contact in both of them. In contrast to the 
Friendly approach verbal communication cues were absent in the Threatening 
approach (except for attention getting signals). The speeds of approach of the 
Stranger were normal speed of walk in the case of the Friendly and slow in the 
Threatening episode. The body position of the Stranger was erected in the Friendly 
and slightly bent in the Threatening approach.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 The behaviour of the dogs was scored separately in both episodes by using 
the following definitions: 
 
Moving off  
Score 0: The dog does not move away from the approaching Stranger while gazing at 
her.  
Score 1: The dog moves away from the approaching Stranger while gazing at her, but 
it does not move behind the owner.  
Score 2: The dog moves behind the owner while gazing at the Stranger.  
 
Avert gaze 
Score 0: The dog is continuously looking at the face of the Stranger or if eye contact 
is interrupted, the subject re-establishes it again within 4 s.  
Score 1: The dog averts its gaze from the Stranger for more than 4 s (i.e. “warning 
noise” made by the Stranger is needed to re-establish eye contact).  
Score 2: The dog averts its gaze from the Stranger and does not look back even after 
the third ‘warning noise’ made by the Stranger.  
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Vocalization  
Score 0: The dog neither barks nor growls.  
Score 1: Barking and growling last not longer than 4 s.  
Score 2: The dog barks repeatedly or growls continuously (more than 4 s).  
 
Attack 
Score 0: The dog does not make any sudden movement towards the Stranger 
associated with growling or barking or trying to bite.  
Score 1: The dog initializes some sudden movements towards the Stranger associated 
with a short growling or barking response (0–4 s) while still on loose leash.  
Score 2: The dog makes some sudden movements towards the Stranger associated 
with continuous growling or barking (more than 4 s) or attempts to bite while 
stretching the leash. 
 
Contact seeking  
Score 0: The Stranger cannot pet the dog because the trial is terminated before she 
could reach the dog.  
Score 1: The trial is terminated by petting the dog, but when the Stranger reaches out 
her hand to pet the dog, it does not move towards her or moves towards her without 
tail wagging.  
Score 2: The trial is terminated by petting the dog, and when the Stranger reaches out 
her hand to pet the dog, it moves towards her while wagging its tail.  
 
 Interobserver agreements for all of the five behaviour categories were 
assessed by means of parallel coding of the total sample by two observers and 
relatively high values were calculated in all cases (Index of concordance and Kappa 
coefficient, respectively, are 0.93 and 0.76 for ‘moving off’, 0.9 and 0.75 for ‘avert 
gaze’, 0.95 and 0.84 for ‘vocalization’, 0.97 and 0.81 for ‘attack’, 0.93 and 0.84 for 
‘contact seeking’).  
 
 For data analysis we used nonparametric statistical methods (SPSS, version 
9.0). Mann–Whitney U test was used to compare the scores of the five behaviour 
variables between experimental groups (First-Greeted versus First-Threatened), 
sexes (males versus females) and between the two age groups (1-year-old dogs 
versus more than 3-years-old dogs). Comparisons between the two episodes 
(Friendly approach versus Threatening approach) were analysed by Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed rank test. Chi2 test of homogeneity and Fisher’s exact test were 
applied when the distribution of the dogs in the main response categories were 
analysed.  
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
Order effect of the Friendly/Threatening approach  
 Comparisons of the behaviour variables of the two groups (First-Greeted and 
First-Threatened) did not show any significant differences in the Friendly approach 
episode (N1=N2 = 15; U = 105, p = 0.77 for ‘moving off’, ‘vocalization’ and ‘attack’; 
U = 112.5, p = 1 for ‘avert gaze’ and U = 106, p = 0.81 for ‘contact seeking’). When 
the Stranger approached in a friendly manner, none of the dogs have averted their 
gaze and only 1-1 dog from both groups showed ‘moving off’ or ‘vocalization’ or 
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‘attack’ towards the human. In contrast, most dogs in both groups displayed high 
levels of ‘contact seeking’ (only 1-1 dogs did not show any contact seeking while 
seven and six individuals in the two groups received the maximum score for contact 
seeking).  
 Results were similar when the behaviours observed in the Threatening 
approach episode were compared (First-Greeted versus First-Threatened groups). 
The only difference between the two groups was that dogs in the First-Threatened 
group tended to avert their gaze more during the Threatening approach in 
comparison with those who met the friendly behaving Stranger first (N1=N2 = 15; U 
= 59.5, p = 0.026). None of the other behaviours ‘moving off’ (U = 126, p = 0.56) 
and ‘vocalization’ (U = 92.5, p = 0.41), nor ‘attack’ (U = 112.5, p = 1) and ‘contact 
seeking’ (U = 106, p = 0.81) have shown significant differences.  
 When the Stranger approached the dog she adapted her behaviour to the dog’s 
reaction: the Friendly/Threatening approach was interrupted and the trial was 
terminated when the dog either averted its gaze continuously, or moved off actively 
or showed signs of aggression. Otherwise she fully approached the dog and petted it. 
As Table 4.1.1.1 shows this differentiation provides an opportunity to categorize the 
dogs’ responses on the basis of their behaviour for the further analysis.  
 All dogs in both experimental groups were classified into one of the ‘passive’, 
‘friendly’, ‘passive avoidant’, ‘active avoidant’ or ‘threatening’ categories (Table 
4.1.1.2). In the Friendly approach episode almost all dogs in both groups (14-14 out 
of the 15) showed ‘friendly’ or ‘passive’ behaviours, however, when the Stranger 
approached them threateningly, more than half of them (8 and 9, respectively) 
avoided the interaction with the Stranger (performed either ‘passive/active 
avoidance’ or ‘threatening’ behaviour). Considering the small sample (less than five 
individuals) in 13 out of the 20 cells (see Table 4.1.1.2) we could only compare the 
distribution of the dogs among the main categories (‘Seeking for/tolerating’ versus 
‘Avoiding’, see Table 4.1.1.1). This analysis, however, showed no significant 
differences either in Friendly approach or in Threatening approach episode. First-
Greeted group versus First-Threatened group in Friendly approach episode: chi2(1) = 
0.13, p = 0.71 and in Threatening approach episode p = 1 (in this latter case with 
Fisher’s exact test).  
 
How was 
the trial 
terminated? 
 
Full approach: S. petted the dog.
 
Interrupted approach: S. did not pet the 
dog. 
 
 
The dog’s 
reaction at 
the end of 
the trial 
 
Did not move 
tail waggingly 
towards the 
outstretched 
hand.  
 
Moved tail 
waggingly 
towards the 
outstretched 
hand. 
 
Averted 
its gaze 
continu-
ously. 
 
Moved toward 
the O. or behind 
the O. while 
gazing at the S. 
(and/ or 
vocalizing) 
Made 
sudden 
movement 
toward the 
S. and 
vocalizing 
(stretching 
the leash)  
Response 
categoriza-
tion 
 
passive 
 
friendly 
 
passive 
avoidant 
 
active avoidant 
 
threatening
 Seeking for/tolerating the 
interaction with the S. 
Avoiding the interaction with the S. 
 
Table 4.1.1.1 Categorizing the dogs’ response to the Stranger. (Note: S= Stranger O= 
Owner).  
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                            CATEGORIES 
Seeking for/tolerating the 
interaction with the S. 
Avoiding the interaction 
 with the S. 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Episodes 
 
passive 
 
friendly 
 
passive 
avoidant 
 
active 
avoidant 
 
threatening 
Friendly 
approach I. 
8 (6, 2) 6 (3, 3) 0 1 (1, 0) 0  
First-greeted 
group (N=15) Threatening 
approach II. 
5 (4, 1) 2 (1, 1) 4 (2, 2) 2 (2, 0) 2 (1, 1) 
Threatening 
approach I. 
3 (0, 3) 3 (2, 1) 2 (0, 2) 5 (2, 3) 2 (1, 1)  
First-
threatened 
group (N=15) 
Friendly 
approach II. 
7 (2, 5) 7 (3, 4) 0 0 1 (0, 1) 
 
Table 4.1.1.2 Number of individuals (females, males) showing different responsivity to the 
Stranger in the two episodes. 
 
 It seems that the sequential order of the two episodes (i.e. the fact whether 
Threatening approach was preceded or followed by a Friendly approach of the 
Stranger) had only minor effect on the behaviour of the dogs. Therefore, the two 
groups were merged for further analysis in order to study how the dogs adapted to 
the changes in the behaviour of the Stranger.  
 
Situation-relevant changes in the dogs’ behaviour  
 The question whether the dogs altered their behaviour in accordance with the 
switch in the Stranger’s way of approach was first studied by paired comparisons of 
the five behaviour variables between Friendly approach and Threatening approach 
episodes. This analysis shows significant differences for all but one recorded 
behaviours (T_ = -28, p = 0.015 for ‘moving off’; T_ = -153, p < 0.001 for ‘avert 
gaze’; T_ = -55, p = 0.002 for ‘vocalization’; T_ = -6, p = 0.25 for ‘attack’ and T+ = 
246, p < 0.001 for ‘contact seeking’). Dogs tended to move off, avert their gaze and 
vocalize more in the Threatening approach episode and performed less contact 
seeking compared to the episode when Stranger approached them friendly.  
 Changes in the dogs’ reactions due to the modifications in the Stranger’s 
attitude (i.e. friendly or threatening) can be further analysed by comparing the 
individuals’ distribution among the five response-categories (‘passive’, ‘friendly’, 
‘passive avoidant’, ‘active avoidant’ and ‘threatening’) in the two episodes. This 
analysis showed a highly significant difference chi2(4) = 18.6, p = 0.001). Namely, 
when the Stranger greeted them in a friendly manner almost all individuals were 
scored as ‘friendly’ (13/30) or ‘passive’ (15/30) in contrast to the Threatening 
approach episode when only the minority of dogs responded ‘friendly’ (4/30) or 
‘passively’ (9/30) and many of them (17/30) were categorized as Avoiding the 
interaction with the Stranger.  
 Analysing the behaviour of the dogs in its continuity across the two episodes 
(Friendly approach and Threatening approach) individuals could be assigned to four 
main categories (Table 4.1.1.3).  
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  Threatening Approach episode 
 Response Categories Seeking for/tolerating 
the interaction with the 
S. 
Avoiding the 
interaction with 
the S. 
Seeking for/tolerating the 
interaction with the S. 
Consistently seeking 
for/tolerating  
(N = 13) 
Relevantly 
alternating 
(N = 15) 
 
Friendly 
Approach 
episode Avoiding the interaction 
with the S. 
Irrelevantly alternating 
(N = 0) 
Consistently 
avoiding 
(N = 2) 
 
Table 4.1.1.3. Number of dogs showing different response patterns in the Friendly- and 
Threatening approach episodes. 
 
 This table indicates that irrespective of whether the Threatening approach 
preceded or followed the Friendly approach, the majority of the dogs in both ‘First-
greeted’ and ‘First-threatened’ groups showed either Consistently seeking 
for/tolerating behaviour towards the Stranger (7 and 6 individuals, respectively) or 
Relevantly alternating response (7 and 8 individuals, respectively) and there was 
only 1-1 dogs who showed Consistently avoiding behaviour. Interestingly, none of 
the dogs performed behaviour opposite of the behaviour of the Stranger (i.e. 
Avoiding in the Friendly approach and Seeking for/tolerating in the Threatening 
approach episodes), therefore none of them were categorized as Irrelevantly 
alternating.  
 
The effect of gender on dogs’ reaction to the Stranger  
 Since there are many examples in the literature suggesting that male dogs are 
more aggressive than females (e.g. Wright & Nesselrote 1987) and sex differences 
may also be significant in aggression towards human (e.g. Podberscek & Serpell 
1997) we may assume that males and females react differently to the Stranger in our 
test situation as well. The analysis of the sex differences, however, showed no 
significant effect in Friendly approach episode (N(females)=N(males) = 15; U = 105, 
p = 0.77 for ‘moving off’, ‘vocalization’, ‘attack’ and ‘contact seeking’ and U = 
112.5, p = 1 for ‘avert gaze’) nor in Threatening approach episode (U = 94.5, p = 
0.46 for ‘moving off’, U =104, p = 0.74 for ‘vocalization’, U = 112.5, p = 1 for 
‘attack’, U =102.5, p = 0.68 for ‘avert gaze’ and U = 106, p = 0.81 for ‘contact 
seeking’). In accordance with this, we found that the two sexes were evenly 
distributed among the two main response categories (Seeking for/tolerating and 
Avoiding) in both episodes (p > 0.05 with Fisher’s exact test).  
 In sum it seems that when approached by an unfamiliar human, dogs react in 
two different ways: half of them modified their reactions flexibly relying upon the 
changes in the human’s behavioural cues while the others seemingly ignored these 
changes, and gave consistent (mostly friendly) response. Results suggest that in dogs 
this different responsivity cannot be attributed to sex. The question, however, that 
why some dogs showed consistent friendly behaviour while others tended to show 
sensitive and relevant change in their response to an unfamiliar human remained 
unanswered and called for further investigation. 
 Despite little experimental work many assume that there are breed-specific 
differences in their responsiveness to human cues. For example, analysing the 
behaviour of four breeds (Basenji, Shetland sheepdog, Fox terrier, Beagle) Freedman 
(1958) found that the manner of social interaction with humans had differential effect 
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in a subsequent test (social inhibition of eating). Therefore a second experiment was 
designed to study whether dogs show breed specific differences in their reactions 
towards an unfamiliar person whose friendly behaviour cues are switched suddenly 
to threatening signals.  
 
 
4.1.2. EXPERIMENT III/2 
 
 To test whether the breed can influence the reaction to friendly and 
threateningly approaching human we observed the behaviour of dogs from three 
breeds, which had originally different functions for the humans. The dog breeds are 
partially inbred, genetically isolated strains (Ostrander et al. 2000), and the gene flow 
is today restricted by breeders. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that breed-
specific differences have a genetic basis.  
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects 
 
 Sixty adult pet dogs (aged between 1 and 12 years) were involved in the 
present study. On the basis of their breed subjects were divided into three groups (N 
= 20 dogs in each). All groups were balanced for sex ratio (10 males, 10 females):  
‘Sled dog’ group (mean age±SE = 3.6±1.6 years) consisted of huskies (6) and 
malamutes (14).  
‘Retriever’ group (mean age±SE = 3.1±2.2 years) involved golden retrievers (12) and 
Labrador retrievers (8).  
‘Belgian shepherd’ group (mean age±SE = 3.8±3.4 years) consisted of Tervuerens 
(9) and Groenendaels (11).  
All breed groups represented the same age category (comparing mean ages: F(2,57) 
= 0.43, p > 0.05, ns).  
 
Experimental procedures  
 
 The experimental arrangement and the exact procedure of the test was 
identical to that of described above in Experiment III/1 with the only exception, that 
all subjects are observed first in the Friendly approach episode, which was followed 
by the Threatening approach by the Stranger. Importantly, those dogs who showed 
any sign of avoidance or aggressive behaviours towards the friendly Stranger in the 
first episode were excluded from further analysis (three Belgian shepherds). The 
behaviour of the dogs was scored by using the same five variables (see Experiment 
III/1). Breed groups were compared with nonparametric methods (Kruskal Wallis 
tests with Dunn’s post hoc tests). Mann–Whitney U test was used in order to 
compare the scores of the five behaviour variables between sexes.  
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
Friendly approach episode  
 Dogs in all breed groups performed similar behaviour; 12 individuals of each 
group were scored as ‘passive’ and eight as ‘friendly’ when greeted by the Stranger. 
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All breed groups were characterized by high ‘contact seeking’ scores (mean scores = 
1.4 for all groups and no differences between groups were found: chi2 = 0, p = 1).  
 
Threatening approach episode  
 Comparisons of the five behaviour variables between breed-groups showed 
significant differences for ‘moving off’ (chi2 = 10.71, p < 0.01), ‘vocalization’ (chi2 
= 11.48, p < 0.01) and ‘contact seeking’ (chi2 = 10.95, p < 0.01) but not for ‘avert 
gaze’ (chi2 = 2.1 p > 0.05) and ‘attack’ (chi2 = 3.49, p > 0.05). Compared to sled 
dogs and retrievers, Belgian shepherds tended to move back towards their owners 
more frequently when the Stranger approached them threateningly (Dunn’s multiple 
comparisons post-test: p < 0.05). Moreover, Belgian shepherds vocalized more often 
and for longer periods and obtained lower scores of ‘contact seeking’ towards the 
Stranger than retrievers or sled dogs (Dunn’s multiple comparison post-tests: p < 
0.05). Further, breed specific differences were found when dogs were classified into 
the five response-categories (Table 4.1.2.1, Figure 4.1.2.1). 
 
 
CATEGORIES 
Seeking for/tolerating the 
interaction with the S. 
Avoiding the interaction with the S. 
 
 
 
 
 
Groups 
 
passive 
 
friendly 
passive 
avoidant 
active  
avoidant 
 
threatening 
sled dogs 3 (0, 3) 4 (2, 2) 8 (5, 3) 0   5 (3, 2) 
retrievers 4 (1, 3) 5 (2, 3) 6 (3, 3) 0  5 (4, 1) 
Belgian 
shepherds 
 
0  
 
0 
 
5 (2, 3) 
 
5 (3, 2) 
 
10 (5, 5) 
 
Table 4.1.2.1 Number of individuals (females, males) showing different responsivity to the 
Stranger in the Threatening approach episode  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1.2.2.  
Distribution of individuals in 
the three breed groups based on 
the five behaviour categories 
showed in the Threatening 
approach episode (different 
letters indicate significant 
differences between groups, p < 
0.05).  
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 While a number of individuals responded ‘passively’ or ‘friendly’ to the 
threatening behaviour cues of the Stranger among sled dogs (7 out of 20) and 
retrievers (9 out of 20), none of the Belgian shepherds did. Instead, all of them 
avoided the interaction with the Stranger showing ‘passive/active avoidance’ (5-5 
subjects) or ‘threatening’ behaviours (10 subjects). Comparing the distribution of the 
dogs’ response in the three groups we found highly significant breed specific 
differences (chi2(2) = 11.42, p < 0.01), that is retrievers and sled dogs were less 
likely to avoid the Stranger. Finally, in line with the results obtained in the first 
experiment dogs failed to show any sex related differences in their responsiveness in 
all three groups (p > 0.05 for all behaviour variables). 
 Although the interspecific form of aggression in dogs (i.e. aggression against 
humans) is often believed to be influenced by environmental factors such as 
socialization and individual experiences (Podberscek & Serpell 1997), the above 
results indicate the role of inherited traits leading to breed specific differences in the 
dogs’ responsiveness to human. However, as we have no data about the consistency 
of the dogs’ observed response, it is not clear whether or not the method used in the 
present study is a reliable procedure for tracing some of the personality characters 
(e.g. stress coping styles, aggression) in dogs. The purpose of the next experiment, 
therefore, was to make repeated behaviour observations on subjects from the same 
breed (Belgian Shepherds). Our analysis focused on the consistency of the dogs’ 
behaviour shown towards the same stranger upon repeated tests.  
 
 
4.1.3. EXPERIMENT III/3 
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects  
 
 Twenty-three Belgian Shepherd dogs and their owners were recruited on 
voluntary basis. (15 males, 8 females, mean age±SD: 5.2±0.7 years).  
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 The experimental arrangement, the procedure of the test and the 
categorization of the dogs’ response was identical to that of described above in 
Experiment III/2. However, after recording the first trial subjects were tested in the 
same situation 6-24 months later (the mean inter-trial interval was 12.8±1.0 months). 
Importantly, the location of the testing, the order of the episodes (i.e. Friendly 
approach, then Threatening approach) and the Stranger were the same as at the first 
occasion.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 Dogs showing the same type of responsiveness in the second trial as observed 
on the first occasion were given a score of one (labelling a consistent responsiveness) 
whilst those who changed from ‘non-responsive’ to ‘responsive’ or vice versa, and 
those who showed different behaviour towards the threateningly approaching 
stranger in the first vs. repeated trial were scored as 0 (labelling an inconsistent 
responsiveness). The consistency on the group level (regarding the responsiveness, 
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and the response category shown by the subjects) was analysed by binomial tests 
comparing the observed consistency to the chance level (0.5 in the case of two 
behavioural categories and 0.25 when analysing four categories). For the statistical 
tests the SPSS 10 statistical package was used. 
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
Consistency of dogs’ responsiveness: test - retest comparisons 
 Results show similar pattern when the repeated trial was conducted 6-24 
months later. All dogs in the first episode (Friendly approach) of both trials showed 
Friendly/Passive behaviour towards the Stranger and majority of individuals (18 out 
of 23, 72.3 %) were scored as “responsive” in the first experimental trial. 
Interestingly, when the repeated trial was conducted 6-24 months later, dogs showed 
significant consistency in their responsiveness (p = 0.011). Subjects scored as 
“responsive” in the first trial showed a significant tendency to display the same type 
of reaction towards the Stranger during the repeated trial (p = 0.031), and all (N = 5) 
but one “non-responsive” dogs showed also consistent behaviour upon repetition. 
(However, it was impossible for the statistical analysis to yield p < 0.05 with so few 
subjects.) 
 
Analyzing the consistency of different response categories  
 When responding to the Stranger in the Threatening approach episode dogs 
were assigned to one of the four categories (Friendly/Passive, Passive avoidant, 
Active avoidant, Threatening). Assuming that for an individual the probability value 
of exactly the same behaviour response is ¼ we found a significant tendency to 
replicate the same behaviour towards the Stranger (binomial test, p=0.005; test 
proportion = 0.25). Importantly, however, when the dogs’ willingness to replicate the 
behaviour performed in the first test was analysed separately in the 4 different 
response categories we found apparent differences (Table 4.1.3.1). Namely, whilst 
dogs showing either ‘Threatening’ or ‘Friendly/Passive’ behaviour in the second 
episode of the first trial towards the Stranger (N = 5 and 10, respectively) were 
disposed towards a consistent behaviour upon repeated trial (in 10 of 15 cases), there 
were hardly any dogs showing consistent behaviour in the Active or Passive avoidant 
categories (in 2 of 8 cases).  
 
  2nd test, Threatening approach 
  
Friendly/ 
Passive 
Passive 
avoidant 
Active 
avoidant Threatening p 
Friendly /Passive 4 0 0 1 0.016 
Passive avoidant 0 0 1 2 No stat 
Active avoidant 1 0 2 2 0.555 
1st test, 
Threatening 
approach 
Threatening 3 0 1 6 0.020 
 
Table 4.1.3.1. Cross-tabulation of the first and second test. The number of dogs performing 
different responses in the first and second trials is indicated. Cells indicating consistent 
behaviour are highlighted. The levels of significance (p) are highlighted where dogs showed 
significant consistency in replicating their response towards the Stranger. P values were 
calculated by binomial tests (test proportion = 0.25). 
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 This apparent heterogeneity of the test-retest stability of the 4 behaviour 
categories suggest that different responses can be regarded as different 
manifestations of the same continuum representing the fear/aggression or 
approach/avoidance (Schneirla 1959) motivational conflicts. Accordingly, subjects 
showing a moderate (and/or ambivalent) behaviour (e.g. passive avoidance) towards 
the threatening human are ready to switch to a more definite response (active 
avoidance or threatening) upon repeated trials, whilst dogs performing an extreme of 
this continuum (threatening or friendly) are more consistent over time. Our analysis 
also points to the general problem, that the finer decomposition of the behaviour we 
apply, the less we can identify the observed variables with consistent “personality 
characteristics”. 
 
 
4.1.4. STUDY III. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 The aim of Study III was to investigate the response of adult pet dogs to an 
unfamiliar woman (Stranger) who expressed social behaviour cues of friendliness 
and threat sequentially. The first experiment gave evidence that dogs (of various 
breeds) often show rapid changes of emotional and behavioural response in 
accordance with the flexible switching in the Stranger’s attitude. The majority of 
dogs showed cues of tolerant, friendly behaviours upon ‘Friendly approach’ by the 
Stranger, but many of them gave various signs of avoidance or aggressiveness when 
the Stranger approached them threateningly.  
 We suppose that gazing cues of the Stranger played a key role in eliciting the 
dogs’ response. Extended duration of gazing is often regarded as a form of ritualized 
aggression in wolves (Schenkel 1967) as well as in many social mammalian species. 
Many assume that human gazing function as a “social cue” for dogs as direct eye-
contact is a typical component of the dominant displays (e.g. Line & Voith 1986, 
Serpell & Jagoe 1995). However, our results suggest that the approaching human’s 
attempt to keep eye contact does not evoke unconditional fear or aggression, because 
in both ways of approaching (friendly and threatening) the continuous eye-contact 
between the dog and the human was aimed. Instead, it seems that not the gazing 
alone but other cues of human behaviour pattern, like body posture (straight vs. 
crouched), way of movement (continuous walking vs. halting) and verbal cues 
(friendly calling vs. speechless) have an influence on dogs’ flexible response.  
 This interpretation is in agreement with some earlier observations which have 
suggested that dogs have a sophisticated ability for taking into account different 
aspects of human behaviour. For example, Millot (1994) found that dogs were able to 
discriminate between affiliative and agonistic body postures of children-like 
dummies, and provided evidence for the importance of gaze cues combined with 
signs of body posture, movement and olfactory signals in dog-human interaction (see 
also Lore & Eisenberg 1986). 
 Another important finding of Experiment III/1 is that dogs could be classified 
in two distinct categories. Half of the subjects proved to be “responsive” and they 
performed a flexible, relevant change in response to the altering cues of the Stranger 
(i.e. sought for contact when greeted friendly and avoided contact when approached 
threateningly). In contrast, the other half of the dogs can be regarded as “non-
responsive” as they showed consistent (predominantly friendly, tolerant) response 
and seemingly ignored the changes in Stranger’s behaviour.  
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 This variability in the behaviour of dogs can be explained in different ways. 
First, differences in early social experiences may result in the observed differences in 
interaction with human (Fox & Stelzner 1966). However, we suppose that 
responsive/non-responsive dichotomy cannot be explained merely by major 
differences in our dogs’ socialization prehistory or differences in their individual 
experiences with human. Our subjects represented a relatively homogeneous group 
from this respect: all dogs were kept as pets and they were recruited from dog 
training schools, where they regularly met unfamiliar dogs and people.  
 Second, it can be hypothesised that the two main response categories (i.e. 
relevant and flexible response to the Stranger or consistent friendly, tolerating 
reaction) may be attributed to breed specific differences. Similar effect was found by 
Svartberg (2006) indicating that selection for different purposes is associated with 
differences between personality traits (curiosity, sociability, aggressiveness) within 
many breeds. 
 The comparison of breed groups (sled dogs, shepherds and retrievers) has 
shown important differences and similarities among breeds. The relatively large 
number of “non-responsive” sled dogs and retrievers is in accordance with the 
widely accepted view, that sled dogs (malamutes and huskies) were originally 
working in cooperation with pack members and following the human leader’s vocal 
instructions (and therefore a lower sensitivity to human behaviour is expected) while 
retrievers (Golden and Labrador retrievers) were bred for fetching the prey during 
hunt (so low aggression, low predatory motivation and readiness to retrieve could be 
advantageous). In contrast, all of the Belgian shepherds proved to be “responsive”, 
and a significant proportion of them (50%) performed aggressive/threatening 
behaviour towards the threatening human. This is in line with the widely accepted 
notion that shepherd dogs had herding and watching functions and therefore a 
sensitive reaction to changes in others’ behaviour and some degree of aggression 
against unfamiliar humans is expected. 
 In summary, we suggest that the flexible nature of dog behaviour is the result 
of an evolutionary process during which this species adapted to various degree of 
association with humans. The relatively long-term consistency of subjects’ response 
(see Experiment III/3) further supports the view that this trait can be associated with 
personality characteristics in dogs and the ‘Friendly/threatening Stranger’ paradigm 
is a relevant experimental approach for studying the behavioural plasticity of dogs in 
general and the dogs’ responsiveness to social releasers provided by human in more 
particular. 
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4.2. STUDY IV. IMITATIVE ABILITY OF DOGS: REPRODUCING HUMAN 
ACTIONS AND ACTION SEQUENCES.* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We present evidence that a dog (Philip, a 4-year-old Tervueren) was able to use 
different human actions as samples against which to match his own behaviour. First, 
Philip was trained to repeat nine human-demonstrated actions on command (‘Do it!’). 
When his performance was markedly over chance in response to demonstration by 
one person, testing with untrained action sequences and other demonstrators showed 
some ability to generalise his understanding of copying. In a second study, we 
presented Philip with a sequence of human actions, again using the ‘Do as I do’ 
paradigm. All demonstrated actions had basically the same structure: the owner 
picked up a bottle from one of six places; transferred it to one of the five other places 
and then commanded the dog (‘Do it!’). We found that Philip duplicated the entire 
sequence of moving a specific object from one particular place to another more often 
than expected by chance.  
Although results point to significant limitations in his imitative abilities, it seems that 
the dog could have recognized the action sequence, on the basis of observation alone, 
in terms of the initial state, the means, and the goal. This suggests that dogs might 
acquire abilities by observation that enhance their success in complex socio-
behavioural situations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Based on: 
 
Topál J, Byrne R, Miklósi Á, Csányi V. (2006). Reproducing actions and action 
sequences: Do as I do in a dog. Animal Cognition 9(4): 355-368. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Increasing number of observations suggest that dogs show sophistication in 
situations where they acquire information from humans (for a review see Kubinyi et 
al. 2009). Recent results suggest that socially acquired information can be dominant 
over trial and error learning and that dogs might be in some sense predisposed to 
copy human behaviour. The importance of the social nature of demonstration in 
observational learning situations has been underlined by a study (Pongrácz et al. 
2004), in which it was found that detour demonstrations around a V-shaped fence 
were ineffective when the human did not give any verbal attention-getting signals 
(even though the target object was visible in the hand) and did not make eye contact 
with the dog. Talking to the dog and shared attention, however, proved to be 
effective: dogs learnt to detour the fence after such demonstrations even when the 
human acted with empty hands. In another study Kubinyi et al. (2003) reported that 
dogs were influenced by the behaviour of their owners, even when the goal of the 
human behaviour was opaque. When dogs repeatedly witnessed aimless detouring 
behaviour of their owner, made after their usual daily walks, they gradually started to 
develop a similar habit, although the owner neither rewarded nor encouraged the 
dog’s behaviour. Such an influence suggests that a capacity for action matching in 
the dog, and thus for learning by imitation, may have been overlooked.  
 Imitative processes have been defined as the acquisition of novel or otherwise 
improbable behavioural action in the observer as a result of observation of this action 
in another individual (Thorpe 1956), or as an animal learning some part of the form 
of the behaviour by observing other animal (Whiten & Ham 1992). In our 
investigation of the imitative abilities of the domestic dog, we focus on a 
fundamental feature–contingent behavioural similarity between the observed and the 
replicated behaviour.  
 The present study was designed to investigate whether a dog is able to show 
imitative behaviour, just in the sense of being able to use the behaviour of a human 
demonstrator as the basis for performing matching actions, either a single action or a 
sequence of actions. We used the so called ‘Do as I do’ paradigm (Hayes & Hayes 
1952), which has been widely used for studying a subject’s ability to imitate 
specified actions in great apes (Call 2001a; Custance et al. 1995; Myowa-Yamakoshi 
& Matsuzawa 1999), parrots (Moore 1993), and dolphins (Herman 2002). For 
success, a subject must perform matching behaviour in response to a variety of 
actions demonstrated by a human. The procedure involves training the subject to 
perform a small set of actions presented by the experimenter on verbal command (e.g. 
“Do it!”). After the subject reaches high levels of correct performance with the 
training set, they are tested with novel demonstrators and/or with novel (untrained) 
actions. Successful transfer to copying novel actions is taken as evidence that the 
subject has acquired the basic rule needed for imitative performance; that is, repeat 
an action after having observed it (Zentall 2001).  
 
 
4.2.1. EXPERIMENT IV/1 
 
 In the first experiment, we limit our aims to provide evidence for recognizing 
of an imitation rule in a dog. The question was whether the dog would be able to 
choose a single, matching action from his repertoire in response to a variety of 
actions demonstrated by a human.  
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METHODS  
 
Subject 
 
 The subject was a castrated male Belgian Tervueren, Philip, who was 4 years 
old at the beginning of the experiment. Philip was originally trained to assist his 
disabled owner by the trainers of a Hungarian charity (Dogs for Humans) for 6 
months when he was 1.5 years old. Being an assistant dog, Philip was trained to open 
and shut doors, pick up items, fetch named items (e.g. mobile phone), switch on/off 
lights, pick selected items from supermarket shelves and put them in a basket, etc. 
Importantly, however, his training was based on traditional operant conditioning 
methods and “imitative techniques” (see below) were never used by the trainers. 
Subsequently, two members of our research team observed the dog over 3 years, in 
weekly 2-h visits, testing him on various sociocognitive and communicative tasks 
(e.g. Soproni et al. 2002). Apart from familiarisation to the various tasks, the 
researchers had never explicitly trained the dog at the start of the experiment. All 
visits were recorded on video.  
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 We defined the match between the human’s action and the trained action of 
the dog on the basis of functional correspondence (i.e. behaviours performed by the 
human/dog entail the same goal and–given the species-specific differences in the 
behaviour repertoire of humans and dogs–were executed in similar ways). For 
detailed description of the actions used in the “Do as I do” training, see Table 4.2.1.1. 
Importantly, all of the dog’s actions had been previously trained by conventional 
methods (operant conditioning in the course of training for assistance work, or later 
by the disabled owner). However, these pairings of human demonstrations and 
expected dog responses were novel (i.e. dog was never taught to perform an action in 
response to human behaviour demonstrations) and somewhat arbitrary (i.e. pairings 
were arbitrarily predetermined from among possible alternatives). For instance, in 
response to human’s jumps (“Jump in the air”), the dog was trained to jump in the air 
by raising only the two forelegs, while other possibility could have been rising on his 
hind legs (similarly to the standing human) and then jumping in the air.  
 Therefore, the task for the dog in this experiment was to recognize a human 
demonstration and to perform an action corresponding to it on the basis of the 
predetermined rule used in the training, i.e. functional correspondence, and the 
question of interest becomes whether the dog is in any way able to recognize and 
generalize this rule.  
 
Training phase 
 
Preliminary training 
 Three of the trained demonstration-action correspondences –’Turn around’, 
‘Jump in the air’ and ‘Bow’– had already been partly trained by the owner using non-
standardized methods. In our preliminary training, we refreshed Philip’s knowledge 
of these pairings using conventional operant conditioning with the command ‘Do it!’, 
using access to a favourite toy to reward success. The rewarded action always 
matched the just-preceding action of the owner, which was always one of ‘Turn 
around’, ‘Jump in the air’ and ‘Bow’.  
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Short name Action as performed by the demonstrator (H) 
The dog’s (D) expected 
action for full 
correspondence 
Turn around 
H spins fast around the vertical 
body axis by pushing off using 
one leg 
D turns around with bent 
backbone, orienting his 
head toward his tail 
Jump in the air H jumps in the air by bending both legs at the knees 
D jumps in the air by 
raising the two forelegs 
Bow H nods head slowly 
D bows (play signal) by 
stretching both front legs 
forward and raising the hip
Lie down 
H lies on the floor on the side of 
the body with partially retracted 
legs and arms 
D lies on the floor on his 
belly 
Put the bottle in the box 
There are two plastic 0.5 l bottles 
on the floor next to a larger 
plastic container. H takes one of 
the bottles from the floor in right 
hand and places it into a 
container that is 30 cm away in 
front of the person  
D takes the other plastic 
bottle from the floor in the 
mouth and places it into a 
container that is 30 cm 
away in front of the dog  
Take the bottle to the 
owner (O) 
There are two plastic 0.5 l bottles 
on the floor next to a larger 
plastic container. H takes one of 
the bottles from the floor in right 
hand and takes it to the O who 
was sitting 3 m-s away  
D takes the other plastic 
bottle from the floor in the 
mouth and takes it to the O 
who was sitting 3 m away 
Move stick 
There are two sticks placed 
horizontally on two chairs (2 m 
apart), H takes one stick and puts 
in on the floor 
D takes the one remaining 
stick in his mouth and 
removes it from the chairs 
Jump over 
There are two sticks placed 
horizontally on two chairs, H 
jumps over them 
There are two sticks placed 
horizontally on two chairs, 
Philip jumps over them 
Give a bark H gives a short ‘bark’ D barks 
 
Table 4.2.1.1. List and description of actions that were used by the trainer training and 
testing  
 
“Do as I Do” training 
 During spring of 2002 (26 February to 30 April), Philip was trained by J.T. 
(Trainer) using operant conditioning, to perform on the command ‘Do it!’ one of an 
enlarged set of nine actions in response to functionally corresponding demonstration 
(in addition to ‘Turn around’, ‘Jump in the air’ and ‘Bow’, these were ‘Lie down’, 
‘Jump over’ or ‘Move a horizontally-placed stick’, ‘Put the bottle in the box’, ‘Take 
the bottle to the owner’ and ‘Give a bark’, Table 4.4.1).  
 At the beginning of each training trial, the Trainer made the dog stand at the 
same place (using verbal commands and hand gestures known well by the dog), 
about 2 m away and facing the demonstrator and verbally attracted the dog’s 
attention (“Philip, listen!”). This was followed by a demonstration of one of the nine 
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actions. After completing the action, the trainer took up his original standing position 
facing the dog and commanded the dog to perform the corresponding action (“Do 
it!”). If the dog remained passively in its standing position (i.e. did not act), then the 
command was repeated once at 5-s intervals, but no more than two repetitions were 
allowed. Philip received reward (a favourite toy) for some seconds only if he 
performed a correct response: the rewarded action always matched the just-preceding 
action of the trainer. Only the pre-trained three actions (‘Turn around’, ‘Jump in the 
air’ and ‘Bow’) were introduced in the first two sessions 1 and 2; then another three 
(‘Put the bottle in the box’, ‘Lie down’ and ‘Jump over’) were added in sessions 3 
and 4; a further three (‘Take the bottle to the owner’, ‘Move stick’ and ‘Give a bark’) 
were added in sessions 5 and 6. Each of the nine actions was presented 17–28 times, 
giving 191 trials in total. The dog was trained regularly once a week in a session that 
lasted on average 15 min. The criterion of success was set as 80% correct responses 
of the total trials within a single session. Philip exceeded the criterion level in the 
10th training session (when he reached 86% success). All trials were performed at 
the same location, and all objects used in any of the demonstrated actions were 
placed in the training area and were available for the dog before training commenced. 
This was done to ensure that the dog had the opportunity to do other actions in 
response to the demonstrated one if he chose to do so.  
 
Testing phase 
 
 After 10 weekly training sessions, acquisition of the trained actions and 
generalization to untrained actions was tested formally, in the same context as in 
training (30 April to 1 June 2002). The subject’s performance was both tested 
systematically by the Trainer (J.T.) and subsequently by a novel Demonstrator 
(A.M.) under identical conditions.  
 The Trainer performed all the nine actions only once in each session, for 10 
sessions, resulting in 90 trials of the match-to-sample task which were video-
recorded for later analysis. Actions were presented in a pseudo-random order 
previously determined by drawing lots and no reinforcement was given.  
 To control for the possibility of unconscious cueing of the human 
demonstrator, a novel Demonstrator then tested Philip under identical conditions. He 
was familiar to the dog but had never taught him before. Philip was tested on four of 
the trained actions (‘Bow,’ ‘Turn around,’ ‘Lie down’ and ‘Jump in the air’), 14 trials 
with each action (56 trials in all, over 7 weekly sessions, each action was presented 
twice in each session). In this testing series, ‘Control’ trials were also included (1-3 
trials in each session), in which no action was shown prior to the ‘Do it!’ command. 
In this case, the Demonstrator attracted the subject’s attention (“Philip, listen!”) and 
looked over the head of the dog for 2–3 s. Then the command (”Do it!”) was given, 
and the demonstrator waited 5 s for the subject’s reaction.  
 Over the same time period, we tested Philip’s response to demonstrations that 
had never been shown in the course of training (see Table 4.2.1.2). Untrained actions 
were demonstrated by either the Owner (7 cases) or the Trainer (9 cases). Actions 
were chosen to differ from each other on the basis of type of action (body-oriented, 
manipulative, environment–oriented) and complexity (number and length of action 
sequences). In any one session, no more than three simple actions or complex action 
sequences (in total 16 – see Table 4.2.1.2.) were shown to Philip and followed by the 
“Do it!” command. All demonstrations were shown to the dog only once. 
Importantly, all of the “untrained actions” consisted of behaviour element that are 
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already part of the dog’s repertoire (being an assistant dog, Philip was able to open 
doors, fetch objects, etc.). Therefore, these demonstrations were novel to the effect 
that the dog never met such action sequences in the ‘Do as I do’ tasks before.  
 
Short name 
(type of action): Action level description 
M= manipulative; 
B= bodily/motor
Human (H) 
demonstration 
Dogs’ (D) expected 
response False action 
Correspon-
dence scores
Move shoe (M) 
H bends body & picks 
up one of the two 
shoes by hand from 
the floor, moves shoe 
to the predetermined 
point, releases shoe 
D picks up the 
other shoe from the 
floor by mouth(1), 
goes to the same 
point(2), releases 
shoe(3)  
  6 
Throw bottle (M)
H bends body & takes 
bottle in right hand, 
throws bottle to other 
person 
D takes bottle in 
mouth(1), goes to 
other person(2), 
gives bottle to 
him(3) 
  6 
Go round human 
(B) 
H goes to other person, 
goes around him, goes 
back to starting place 
D goes to other 
person(1), goes 
around him(3), 
goes back to 
starting place(4) 
Turns around 
with bent 
backbone, 
orienting his 
head toward 
his tail(2)  
4 
Pull arm (B) 
H goes to other person, 
pulls his arm vividly 
by hand, goes back to 
starting place 
D goes to other 
person(1), pulls his 
arm vividly by 
mouth, goes back to 
starting place(4) 
Bows by 
stretching 
both front 
legs forward 
and raising 
the hip(2) 
snuffles at 
human’s right 
hand(3)  
3 
Open/close door 
(M) 
H goes to door, opens 
door by hand (using 
the door-handle), 
closes door, 
D goes to door(1), 
opens door by 
mouth (using the 
door handle) (2), 
closes door(3),  
  6 
Search in sand 
(B) 
H crouches down, 
performs scratching 
movements in the sand 
by both hands, stands 
up 
D bows(1), 
performs scratching 
movements in the 
sand(3), stands up  
Jumps in the 
air by raising 
the two 
forelegs(2)  
3 
 
Table 4.2.1.2. Schematic description of Philip’s responses (based on the agreements of the 
different observers) and his correspondence scores in the demonstrations of the 16 untrained 
actions (continued on the next page) 
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Short name (type 
of action): Action level description 
M= manipulative; 
B= bodily/motor)
Human (H) 
demonstration 
Dogs’ (D) expected 
response False action 
Correspon-
dence scores 
Take out put in 
object (M) 
H opens cupboard door 
by hand, takes out 
object, puts object into 
the bin 
D opens cupboard 
door by mouth(1), 
picks up and takes 
out object (by 
mouth)(2), puts 
object into the 
bin(3)  
  6 
Go in/come back 
(B) 
H goes through open 
door into other room, 
turns around, comes 
back 
D goes through open 
door into other 
room(1), turns 
around(2), comes 
back  
  4 
Pull cloth (M) 
H goes to shelf, picks 
up the cloth by hand, 
pulls the cloth and 
releases it 
D goes to shelf(1), 
picks up the cloth & 
pulls it by mouth(2) 
releases the cloth(4) 
Goes to the 
owner with 
the cloth in 
his 
mouth(3)  
5 
Push swing (M) 
H goes to swing, 
pushes swing by hand, 
goes back to starting 
place 
D goes to swing(1), 
pushes swing by 
nose(2), goes back 
to starting place  
  4 
Lying down on 
top of the 
cupboard (B) 
H goes to cupboard (70 
cm high), crawls on 
top, goes back to 
starting place 
D goes to cupboard 
(50 cm high)(1), 
crawls on top, goes 
back to starting 
place  
Lies on the 
floor on his 
belly(2) 
2 
Crawling into the 
cupboard (B) 
H goes to cupboard, 
crawls into cupboard, 
comes back 
D goes to 
cupboard(1), crawls 
into cupboard, 
comes back(2) 
Goes to 
cupboard 
again and 
look in3  
2 
Put the tape on 
the chair (M) 
H bends his body & 
picks up one of the two 
tapes from the floor by 
hand, moves tape to 
chair, releases tape 
D picks up the other 
tape from the floor 
by mouth(2), moves 
tape to chair(3), 
releases tape(4) 
Puts his left 
paw on the 
humans 
leg(1)  
3 
Go and turn (B) 
H goes to the far end of 
the room (3 m), turns 
around (1.5 turns), 
comes back 
H goes to the far end 
of the room -3m (1), 
turns around -1.5 
turns, comes back(2)
  3 
 
 
Table 4.2.1.2. continuation. Schematic description of Philip’s responses (based on the 
agreements of the different observers) and his correspondence scores in the demonstrations 
of the 16 untrained actions (continued on the next page) 
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Drinking (B) 
H goes to bowl on his 
hands and knees, laps 
from bowl, comes back
D goes to bowl(1), 
laps from bowl(2), 
comes back  
  4 
Push child toy 
(M) 
H bends his body, 
pushes the toy forward 
by hand 
D bows(1), pushes 
the toy forward by 
nose  
  2 
Total sum of scores 63/94 
 
Table 4.2.1.2. Schematic description of Philip’s responses (based on the agreements of the 
different observers) and his correspondence scores in the demonstrations of the 16 untrained 
actions. Action-level descriptions of the demonstrations and ‘perfect’ responses are given, 
with schematic data on Philip’s actual response. Due to species specific differences between 
motor and manipulative abilities in dogs and humans, each action of the dog that are not 
identical but functionally homologue to human demonstration were regarded as 
correspondent response (e.g. while human uses his hand; dog picks up things by mouth). 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the order of presentation by Philip.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 Two independent observers watched videotapes of each test trial for trained 
actions, and recorded whether the dog’s response corresponded with the 
demonstration or not. They were given detailed descriptions of the nine actions 
demonstrated by the trainer (see Table 4.4.1.); however, they watched just the dog’s 
action and could not see what the human demonstration was. Inter-observer 
reliability was found to be high (percentage agreement: 99%, Cohen’s kappa 
coefficient: 0.95). We assumed that chance performance would be success on 1/9 
trials because altogether nine different match-to-sample pairs were demonstrated. 
Note that this is rather conservative, given the fact that theoretically the subject had 
the possibility to perform any other action at all, rather than just those trained in that 
situation.  
 For the analysis of the untrained actions (Table 4.2.1.2) similarity between 
the demonstrated action and the dog’s behaviour was assessed by parallel coding of 
the recordings by two trained observers. They were asked to take account of two 
variables in measuring similarity: ‘Content’, i.e. whether a particular behaviour 
performed was part of the demonstrated sequence, and ‘Sequential correspondence’, 
i.e. whether it was enacted at the appropriate place of the action sequence. For 
example, a score of 2 was given if the first action in demonstration (labelled as ‘A’) 
was the first element of the subject’s response, whereas a score of 1 was given if 
action “A” was performed by the subject as the second or third element of his 
response; that is, if the action was displayed but not at the corresponding place in the 
sequence. Scores were summed for each action. All but one demonstration of 
untrained actions contains a sequence of three actions (one consisted of only two) so 
the maximum ‘Correspondence score’ for a demonstration of a three-action sequence 
could be 6 (and 4, respectively). Inter-observer reliability scores were measured 
between the two observers for the dog’s performance. Percentage agreements and 
Cohen’s kappa coefficients were calculated for both ‘content’ (91% and 0.75 
respectively) and ‘sequential correspondence’ (85% and 0.57 respectively).  
 We should note that the scores for correspondence given by the two trained 
observers might have been biased because they knew each time which one of the 
demonstrations had been shown to Philip, and therefore they were looking for some 
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resemblance between what the dog did and what they knew it had been shown. In 
order to guard against this possibility, we also used a blind observer. Video 
recordings about the behaviour of the dog in the 16 demonstrations of untrained 
actions were shown to this observer, who did not know each time what action or 
sequence of actions had been shown to the dog, and he was asked to describe what 
the dog had done. The occurrence and sequence of actions identified by the blind 
observer was compared to that of given by one of the trained observers and similar 
levels of reliability were found compared to the case of the two trained observers 
(87% and 0.66 for the contential agreement; 82.5% and 0.54 for the sequence of the 
observed actions).  
 This latter analysis suggests that the poor inter-rater reliability scores for 
untrained actions (especially in the case of sequential correspondence) allow only 
limited interpretation of the results. Therefore, in order to avoid overestimation of 
Philip’s performance in case of any kind of disagreement between the raters, the 
dog’s action was considered as “mismatching” for the analysis.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Test trials with the trainer 
 Overall performance in response to human demonstrations was markedly 
above chance (one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test T− = 0, p = 0.007). Philip 
showed “mismatched” behaviour on 27.8% of the total trials and all of those could be 
either categorised as another of the nine trained actions (16.7%) or as “no response” 
(11.1% of the total trials); we did not observe other types of action at all (Table 
4.2.1.3).  
 Analysing the nine actions separately, Philip showed no significant variation 
in level of correspondence across the actions demonstrated by the trainer (Friedman 
ANOVA, chi2 = 10.7, p = NS), and performed significantly better than chance in all 
cases (binomial tests, p < 0.001 for all actions except for ‘Bow’, where p < 0.01 was 
found). We also examined whether there was a difference between “manipulative” 
(‘Put the bottle in the box’, ‘Take the bottle to the owner’ and ‘Move stick’) and 
“body-oriented” actions (the remaining six). Philip showed similar performance in 
response to these two types of actions (correct responses: 22/30–73.3% and 43/60 – 
71.7%, respectively).  
 
Test trials with a novel demonstrator 
 Philip’s response matched the behaviour of the novel demonstrator 
significantly above chance (one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, T+ = 5, p = 
0.041) and this level was similar to that observed in the trials with the Trainer (68.6% 
versus 72.2%; Table 4.2.1.4). 
Comparing Philip’s performance in the four different tasks, we found that he showed 
more “mismatched” behaviour when ‘Bow’ was demonstrated than when ‘Jump in 
the air’ (Friedman ANOVA, chi2 = 15.3, p = 0.0016; Dunn’s post hoc comparisons: 
‘Bow’ vs. ‘Jump in the air’ p < 0.05) was shown. However, the dog performed 
significantly better than chance in all cases (binomial tests, p < 0.01 for all action 
except for ‘Bow’, where p < 0.05 was found).  
 Importantly, Philip showed no sign of “guessing” the desired in the ‘Control’ 
trials. Instead, he gave a response corresponding to the behaviour performed by the 
novel human demonstrator in these as in other trials: i.e. in 92.8% of control trials, 
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Philip performed no action in response to the command “Do it!” given by the 
(passive) demonstrator.  
 
Actions performed by the dog 
 Turn 
around
Jump 
in the 
air 
Bow Lie down
Put the 
bottle 
in 
Take the 
bottle to 
owner 
Move 
stick 
Jump 
over 
Give 
a 
bark 
Other Correct (%) 
H. demo.  
Turn 
around 6  1               3 60 
Jump in 
the air   7                3 70 
Bow   2 5  2           1 50 
Lie 
down       6  1 2       1 60 
Put the 
bottle in         6  4         60 
Take the 
bottle to 
owner 
        1 9          90 
Move 
stick       1     7      2 70 
Jump 
over               10      100 
Give a 
bark 1               9    90 
Total 72.2 
 
Table 4.2.1.3. Actions performed by the dog (Philip) in response to different human 
demonstrations (H. demo.) 
 
Actions performed by the dog 
 
Passive Bow Turn around 
Lie 
down 
Jump in 
the air Correct (%) 
Actions demonstrated by 
novel Demonstrator  
Control (no 
demonstration) 13  1    92.8 
Bow 2 6   5 1 42.8 
Turn around 2 1 8  1 2 57.1 
Lie down 2 2 1 8  1 57.1 
Jump in the air  1   13  92.8 
Total           68.6 
 
Table 4.2.1.4. Philip’s performance to demonstrations by the novel Demonstrator (A.M.) 
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Test trials with untrained actions  
 Matching performance in response to these demonstrations was found 67% 
(63 out of a total possible 94 in the correspondence score, see Table 4.4.2., and the 
Methods section for details of calculating scores). This is comparable to the dog’s 
performance in test trials with trained actions. The demonstrations of the 16 
untrained actions contained 47 separate elements (15 demonstrations with 3 actions, 
and 1 with 2 actions). According to the agreed decisions of the observers, 
corresponding behaviours were observed to most of the demonstrated actions (36/47; 
76.6%) and the majority of them (27/47; 57.4%) were performed by the dog in the 
same sequence as it was demonstrated. It is worth noting that the probability of this 
level of agreement by chance, on the null hypothesis of random performance, is very 
low.  
 We also categorized the demonstrations as “manipulative” (8 cases – see the 
descriptions in Table 4.4.2.) or “bodily/motor” (the remaining 8) and found that 
Philip performed at a marginally lower level of correspondence in response to 
“bodily/motor” actions than ‘manipulative’ ones (T− = 90, p = 0.090, which 
approaches significance). 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 Superficially, dogs do not seem ideal subjects for this experimental approach. 
In contrast to children and great apes, dogs have a very different body schema to that 
of humans. Nevertheless, we found clear suggestions of the presence of some 
imitative ability in the performance of the tervueren Philip. After a relatively short 
period of ‘Do as I do’ training, Philip was able to successfully choose the correctly 
matching action from his own repertoire, in response to a variety of actions 
demonstrated by a human. The dog was not only able to use the behaviour of a 
human demonstrator as a sample, against which to match his choice of a 
corresponding action, but seemed to grasp the idea of matching-to-sample in 
relatively short time. He showed transfer both to a new person to be observed, and 
new actions to be matched.  
 Test trials with the ‘Novel demonstrator’ shed light on the dog’s ability to 
generalize while performing ‘Do as I do’ task. Although some stimulus 
generalization is expected even in associative learning, depending on what features 
of cue stimuli the subject actually discriminates/attends to, the dog’s behaviour here 
suggest a flexible application of the “do same” rule. This was confirmed by his 
response to test trials with untrained actions. Philip transferred without explicit 
training to actions in his pre-existing repertoire that had never been used in the do-as-
I-do paradigm before. Evidently, he understood the task as one of finding a 
functional match in his behaviour to the human behaviour demonstrated. Note, 
however, that Philip was not required to perform a wholly new routine in any of the 
16 untrained action-demonstrations: all that was required for a correct response was 
selection on the basis of behavioural correspondence.  
 Although the present study with Philip is only partly comparable to other “do 
as I do” studies (because in our case “untrained actions” were not really novel), some 
aspects of Philip’s imitative performance within his physical/motor limits has shown 
similarities to that of found in great apes (Call 2001a; Custance et al. 1995; Myowa-
Yamakoshi & Matsuzawa 1999), parrots (Moore 1993) and dolphins (Herman 2002). 
Since we have observed this ability only in one dog, our conclusions cannot 
               dc_378_12
 82
immediately be assumed true of dogs in general; however recent studies (Miller et al. 
2009, Huber et al. 2009) have successfully replicated these results providing further 
support for dogs’ imitative abilities. 
 Philip’s ability to recognize behavioural correspondence between his own and 
a human’s actions extends beyond more-or-less exact correspondence (e.g. mouth 
licking) to cases of merely functional correspondence (e.g. human takes object in 
hand; dog picks up object in mouth). This feature of our data, a consequence of the 
obvious species-specific differences in the demonstrator’s and the dog’s 
manipulative capacities, fortuitously allows us to see that Philip’s ability to 
generalize behaviour operates at a non-superficial level. However, dogs, like parrots, 
have a restricted motor ability to act on themselves (body-oriented actions) or on the 
environment, in comparison to apes, which may mean that they have correspondingly 
less sophisticated abilities to mentally represent such actions.  
 
 
4.2.2. EXPERIMENT IV/2. 
 
 Although some elements of the demonstrations in Experiment IV/1 had a 
sequential character, there was no specific attempt to test the dog’s understanding of 
the sequential nature of real behaviour. In the second experiment, therefore, we 
aimed specifically to test the dog’s ability to match a sequence of human actions, on 
the basis of observation. In the course of a 9-week period, a tester repeatedly 
demonstrated the same action sequence to Philip (transferring an object from location 
A to B), each time with different constituents, commanding the dog to do the same 
action (“Do it!”). Importantly, in this experiment, Philip received no training and 
none of his actions was rewarded or punished discriminatively.  
 Our question was whether the dog would show a spontaneous preference for 
repeating the particular sequence of actions of the human partner. We begin from the 
argument that, in order to understand everyday means–ends relationships and the 
intended outcomes of actions by human partners, the dog may possess some way of 
encoding the different relationships that exist between those behavioural actions and 
objects in the world (Byrne & Russon 1998). For instance, suppose a dog observes a 
human take an object and put it in a box. Although the actions themselves may be 
familiar ones in the dog’s repertoire, in order to understand the human’s behaviour 
sufficiently to copy it, the dog needs to distinguish the roles of agent, object and 
result of the observed action. Thus, the task of copying a sequence of human actions 
can be seen as a measure of the dog’s understanding: in particular, if Philip’s 
behaviour correctly matches the semantic roles of the objects and actions, then it 
suggests the possibility that he has at least some rudimentary understanding of some 
“semantic relationships” that hold among the constituents of the action (Byrne et al. 
2004).  
 
METHODS  
 
Experimental procedures 
  
 Testing was carried out over a 2-month period, in a large room in the owner’s 
flat. During the 2 years break since Experiment IV/1, the dog had had regular 
opportunity to practice the ‘Do as I do’ task with the original nine trained actions and 
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with demonstrations given by both the Owner and the Trainer. Neither of them had 
used the “Do it!” command in other situations.  
 Two identical litter bins and two identical open wooden boxes were placed in 
line on the floor (Figure 4.2.2.1). The cover of each litter bin could be opened by 
pressing a lever on the bin; the wooden boxes were open and lay on one side, turned 
away from the dog. Both bins and boxes originally contained three identical plastic 
bottles, and there were also three plastic bottles at predetermined points on the floor 
on both sides of the owner and the dog. This layout allowed for six potential target 
locations to which bottles could be carried or taken, with three plastic bottles already 
in each.  
 
 
Figure 4.2.2.1. 
Experimental arrangement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 All commands were given by Philip’s owner, following a precise protocol. 
Before each trial, the owner made the dog sit at the same, predetermined place, so 
that the owner stood about 2 m away from the line of the boxes and bins, while the 
dog’s nose to the box/bin line was 1.25–1.75 m. The dog faced toward the targets 
and was thus not in visual contact with the owner who was positioned behind the dog. 
He then verbally attracted the dog’s attention (“Philip, listen!”), and then gave the 
demonstration. All demonstrated actions had basically the same structure: the owner 
picked up a bottle from one of the six places and transferred it to one of the five other 
places; thus, there were 6×5 = 30 different possible sequences. After completing the 
action, the owner took up his original position (behind the dog) and commanded the 
dog to perform the corresponding action (“Do it!”). The command was repeated 
once in every 5 s until the dog transferred one of the bottles (in most cases Philip 
responded after the first command and there were no trials on which he did not 
respond after three commands). The trial was considered complete if the dog released 
the bottle at any place in the room. After each trial (regardless of the dog’s 
performance), Philip was praised verbally and petted by his owner. As human’s 
transferring the bottle may result in a “trail of odour,” which marks the route between 
the start and goal location, we needed to eliminate the discriminative effect of human 
odour cues. Therefore, before each trial, when the owner placed the 18 plastic bottles 
in the 6 potential target places without the dog being present, he fingered all the 
bottles and passed all possible routes.  
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 The owner demonstrated each of the 30 possible sequences once, in a 
randomised order, and repeated the same procedure after a 2-week break. The first 
set of trials took 3 weeks to complete (10 trials per week, not more than 2 trials per 
day). The second set of trials took 4 weeks to complete (6, 10, 10 and 4 trials per 
week, less than 3 trials daily).  
 Note that the litter bin had to be opened by pressing the lever in order to put 
in or take out an object, whereas no action was needed in the case of the wooden box. 
As a fully trained assistance dog for his disabled owner, Philip was already used to 
tasks of this structure in his work; and, moreover, he was familiar with the basic 
behaviour patterns that made up the sequence, such as going to a box or litter bin, 
taking out an object and dropping it somewhere else. Thus, the key variables to 
which the dog needed to pay attention in order to copy the transfer sequence were 
just the location of start and finish.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 We classified the locations of the objects into five categories: ‘Start’, where 
the owner had picked up a bottle; ‘Goal,’ where the owner had put the bottle; the 
symmetrical places to each of these, which we termed ‘Start-twin’ and ‘Goal-twin’; 
and the two other locations in the experimental arena, lumped as ‘other’. In order to 
analyse the dog’s success in copying the sequence, assuming that he does indeed 
copy the basic structure of the action, we note that there are six places from where he 
could pick up a bottle, and there are also the same six places where Philip could drop 
the bottle (6×6 = 36 possible responses). Accordingly, the chance performance was 
calculated as 1/36 for the action involving bottle transfer from ‘Start’ to ‘Goal’ 
sequence and the observed frequencies of different action-sequences were compared 
to chance frequency by binomial tests.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 In every trial, Philip was successfully induced to copy the basic structure of 
the demonstrated action: that is, he took a bottle from one place to another, without 
discriminative reward. Philip tended to pick up the bottle from and take it to the same 
places as had the human demonstrator significantly more often than expected by 
chance (“same start” 28 cases out of 60 trials, binomial test, test proportion = 0.167, 
p < 0.0001; “same goal” 21 cases out of 60 trials, binomial test, test proportion = 
0.167, p < 0.0001).  
 Analysing the whole sequence of the dog’s actions shows that Philip executed 
the exact same sequence of bottle-transferring actions as demonstrated by the owner 
in 16/60 trials (Table 4.2.2.2.), which is again markedly more frequent than expected 
by chance (binomial test, test proportion = 0.028, p < 0.0001). Moreover, some of 
Philip’s errors were close to the correct response. For instance, when the bottle was 
picked up at the correct start but dropped off at the goal-twin location, the confusion 
amounts to merely a left/right confusion of goal location. This “erroneous” response 
was observed significantly more frequently than expected by chance (6/60 trials, test 
proportion = 0.028, p = 0.001). Interestingly, we also observed a precisely reversed 
sequence of the demonstrated actions more frequently than expected by chance (7/60 
trials, test proportion = 0.028, p = 0.02); in these cases, Philip picked up a bottle at 
the goal location and moved it to the start location.  
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Table 4.2.2.2. 
Number of Philip’s 
different actions as 
response to the 
demonstrations 
(picking a bottle from 
start location and 
transferring it to the 
goal location) 
Difference from 
chance level:  
 ** p=0.001,  
*** p<0.001.  
 
 Finally, we should consider the possibility that Philip was being shaped by 
unconscious cueing (given by the owner) and the dog’s performance mirrors a Clever 
Hans effect. Assuming that Philip has a sophisticated behaviour-reading ability 
regarding his owner and in the test situation his response was ‘governed’ by the 
subtle behaviour cues of the owner, we should expect a gradual improvement in his 
bottle-transferring accuracy over the course of the trials. However, comparing the 
results in the first and last 10 trials (trials 1–10 vs. trials 50–60.) we did not find 
significant differences (N1 = N2 = 10, U = 50, p = 1), suggesting that Philip did not 
learn to utilize unconscious cueing as testing proceeded.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The dog was able to organise his behaviour on the basis of the human actions, 
translating not only the basic type of familiar action (carrying an object from place to 
place) from the observed demonstration to his own behaviour but also copying the 
details of start and finish locations more frequently than chance performance.  
Although individuals can manipulate and use relational phenomena without 
understanding the cause–effect relationships involved (see e.g., tool-using in 
capuchins; Visalberghi 1993), our results raise the possibility that the dog had some 
understanding of the action sequence in terms of the initial state, the means and the 
goal. Seeing the demonstration, he not only carried out “place to place carrying” but 
tended to match the specific location at which the object was picked up, and that at 
which it was dropped. Like many humans, he showed a distinct tendency to make 
left/right confusions, and if he were “given the benefit of the doubt” on the occasions 
when he carried the object from the correct starting place to the mirror image of the 
correct finish (an improbable error, by chance), his copying of the sequence after 
only a single demonstration reaches 37%. However, he did also confuse the start and 
finish locations, though such errors occurred at a lower frequency (12%).  
 It may be helpful to view the dog’s performance in terms of a theory 
developed to describe sentences in linguistics, case grammar (Byrne et al. 2004; 
Fillmore 1968). In case of grammar, each verb (action) structures a set of semantic 
cases; for example, the verb “carry” has cases for agent (the animate actor), object 
(the object or material moved), and optionally two locations, from and to (places 
from which and to which the object is taken). Although developed for natural 
language, case grammar terms can also be used to interpret animal behaviour. A 
Place where the bottle is dropped off 
Start Goal Start-twin Goal-twin Other  
picked up   
Start 0 16 ***  0 6 **  6 
Start-twin 0 1 0 0 2 
Goal 7 **  2 2 3 1 
Goal-twin 2 0 0 0 2 
Other 2 2 0 2 4 
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wolf’s behaviour in carrying food for its puppies, for instance, may be represented in 
terms of the “carry” case frame with agent (wolf), object (meat), to-location (den) 
specified. Structuring in terms of a framework of cases can also be used to decode 
the action of others. If an animal is able to decode another’s behaviour in this way, 
then their understanding of the other individual’s behaviour would be a matter of first 
recognising the action, and then “filling in the slots” in the case frame, for each of 
the semantic categories it specifies. We find this account helpful in understanding 
Philip’s achievements in our experiments. A dog can be said to understand the 
meaning of carrying in some sense if it has the ability to perform the action, and 
since carrying is a part of the ethogram of the wolf, it is to be expected that all dogs 
have this ability. Transferring items from one place to another may be part of the 
species-specific repertoire of dogs; certainly, there was no doubt that Philip 
possessed this action routine in his repertoire before our experiment. However, 
carrying cannot be regarded as a simple movement pattern, but a structured 
framework with “cases” or “slots” for agent, object, and to-and from-locations. Thus, 
when a dog observes a human demonstrator carrying an object, it may be said to 
“understand” what the other is doing if its representation includes the specific 
contents of each slot.  
 At the time of this experiment Philip had already been trained to ‘do as I do,’ 
i.e. substituting himself for the human as agent of an observed action, so he was 
without further training able to copy (to a certain extent) the entire sequence of 
moving a specific object from one particular place to another. In contrast, “to put an 
object1 on object2” is not part of the species-specific repertoire of dogs, so without 
learning this action individually, a dog cannot be expected to understand the meaning 
of this action without specific training. Experiment IV.1 showed that, given such 
training, Philip was able to augment his repertoire accordingly to some degree, and 
indeed his training as a helper for a disabled human focuses on developing an 
appropriate, human-relevant repertoire. We suggest that such experience plays a 
substantial role either in enhancing imitative performance or in generating imitative 
ability.  
 
 
4.2.3. STUDY IV. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Extensive testing of Philip clearly demonstrated that he was able to recognize 
similarity between the observed and the replicated behaviour and use the behavioural 
actions of a human demonstrator as cues for corresponding actions. It seems that 
dogs have some imitative abilities, and they are able to map observed behaviour of 
the human demonstrator onto the corresponding motor scheme of the self. Although 
data show fair performance in copying actions and action sequences, the possibilities 
of lower level underlying mechanisms (goal emulation and simple local 
enhancement) cannot be completely dismissed. While dolphins and great apes often 
regarded as imitative generalists (Herman 2002; Nielsen et al. 2005), based on these 
findings, Philip’s imitation more closely resembles the narrower pattern 
characteristic of task specialists – with limited “case grammars”.  
 Being a specially trained service dog, someone may assume that Philip’s 
performance was based on a species-typical “transport item” routine. It seems that he 
succeeded well on transporting items to/from target locations (relevant task for an 
assistant dog and biologically relevant task for the species) and in some cases had 
more difficulty combining other actions with the transport-item routine (e.g. 
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spin/turn around at the target location, climb into/onto target location, etc.). This 
suggests the importance of working experience and species-specific skills (fetching 
objects) in the dogs’ imitative performance and points to the role of associative 
processes in mastering ‘Do as I do’ tasks. However, imitative processes in bird 
species (Zentall 2004, 2006) and the results of our dog here raise the question 
whether associative learning is sufficient to yield a capacity for such social learning 
or, alternatively, more sophisticated cognitive processes are necessary to understand 
the phenomena. This question is underlined by the present study pointing to the 
potential role of relational understanding in matching functional action sequences.  
 Results suggest that our subject may be able to detect and reproduce some 
semantic relationships among actions objects and places. Note that our view of 
imitative behaviour in the dog as a matter of mapping novel entities into pre-existing 
case slots may help explain some of the superior abilities of “enculturated” subjects 
in imitating some actions demonstrated by humans (Call & Tomasello 1996; 
Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh & Kruger 1993), since these animals will have an 
augmented repertoire of actions with which to understand human actions. Since our 
subject already knew all test entities, Philip’s behaviour in the ‘Do as I do’ tasks 
could be explained by the insertion of some known entities into case slots. Some of 
the test entities may have been novel relative to a particular routine (i.e., twirling at a 
target location vs. picking something up), but Philip’s extensive training history 
reduces the range of known entities that were possibly novel to specific routines. 
Concerning novelty, note that although Philip did not learn anything new in terms of 
his motor patterns, he was able to make clear distinction between different forms of 
human behaviour and learn to use these as samples, against which to match his own, 
corresponding behaviours, on the basis of resemblance to the demonstrated action. 
This ability has sometimes been described as imitation (e.g. Heyes & Sagerson, 
2002); however, scholars have traditionally reserved “imitation”, or “imitation-
learning” or “observational learning” for cases where a novel performance is 
acquired, at least in part, by observation (e.g. Byrne & Russon 1998). By traditional 
criteria, Philip’s performance at copying single actions did not show imitation, and 
we suggest “response facilitation” (Byrne 1994) is a clearer description, since the 
observed performance might have been caused by “priming” or “triggering” of some 
pre-existing behaviour of the dog. Although mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al. 1996) 
have not so far been detected in dogs, several researchers have noted that a mirror 
neuron system is a highly plausible mechanism for response facilitation (e.g. Bates & 
Byrne 2010; Rizzolatti et al. 2002). Philip’s partial success in copying a structured 
sequence of action (Experiment IV/2) may go beyond response facilitation, since he 
showed a significant tendency to keep distinct the semantic roles of the action, in 
particular, the potentially confusing pair of to-location and from location.  
 Although Philip failed to show any compelling evidence of action-level 
imitation, the interpretation of his copying behaviour in terms of “case grammar” is 
in some ways akin to programme-level imitation (Byrne & Russon 1998). Given the 
limited experimental data, however, the plausibility of case grammar hypothesis and 
its relevance to programme/action level imitation are unclear at present.  
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4.3. STUDY V. WILLINGNESS TO FOLLOW SOCIAL RULES - A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY ON DOGS AND HUMANS.* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Using a traditional object permanence paradigm here we investigated adult pet dogs’ 
and children’s ability to identify and use social rules that are formed by the 
interaction with the experimenter during the consecutive object hiding and search 
tasks.  
Experiment V/1 was designed to demonstrate that such social rules may have an 
independent influence on the performance of both children and dog subjects. The 
behaviours of preschool humans and adult pet dogs were compared in a modified 
version of the successive invisible displacements task (‘No object’ condition) and in 
a similar task in which, however, the location of the target object was well known by 
the subjects (‘Game’ condition). 
During the ‘No object’ condition most of the children and dogs performed a full and 
systematic search of all potential hiding places. However, results in ‘Game’ 
condition indicate that piagetian object permanence tests may be interpreted by both 
dogs and humans not only as object hiding and finding tasks, but, alternatively, as 
social-behavioural games of different sorts that may contribute to the systematic 
search performance.  
A second experiment was directly designed to demonstrate the influential effect of 
social rules on dogs’ behaviour in the object hiding and finding tasks. Results show 
that the functional opacity of the Hider’s behaviour (i.e., performing both 
functionally relevant and irrelevant actions upon hiding) enhanced the emergence of 
“obeying social rules” (i.e., dogs tended to perform search behaviour, although they 
knew the location of the target object). We suggest that during their domestication 
dogs may have been selected for certain human-like capacities such as recognising 
and following social rules in the context of interacting with humans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Based on: 
 
Topál J, Kubinyi E, Gácsi M, Miklósi Á. (2005). Obeying social rules: A comparative 
study on dogs and humans. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 3(3-4): 
213-238.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In humans rule-following behaviour is one of the mechanisms for 
synchronisation of group behaviour and at the simplest level it can be considered as a 
behavioural tool for minimising conflicts. There is a hierarchy of rules from very 
simple behavioural rules to more complex cultural rules in our species, and various 
forms of rules are tied to our linguistic communication system, i.e. they can be 
formalised in language. Following a rule is closely connected to the rank order of the 
group. Forming and keeping a rank-order is transformed to a new organizational 
level by obeying a depersonalized dominance. The dominant individual is substituted 
by a socially accepted rule (Csányi 2000). De Waal (1996) suggested that the context 
of rule learning is either agonistic, when obeying the rules minimize the negative 
consequences in social interactions or collaborative (play, cooperation, 
communication) which leads to maintaining the social interaction.  
 The social rule is a mental construction which can be formed by the 
observation of the behaviour of others and this mental-constructional skill might be 
an important factor for the development of moral systems (Flack & de Waal 2000).  
 In non-human animals, however, the term “social rule” has a different 
meaning. Social rules can be mastered by two means:  
(i) Prescriptive rules are upheld by reward and punishment as it was shown for 
instance, in the cases where dominant-submissive interactions are controlled by 
social rules (see e.g. “respect of possession” studies on macaques - Kummer & Cords 
1991; and on baboons - Sigg & Falett 1985). These rules are in most cases enforced, 
and they do not apply equally to all members to the community (i.e. they are not 
reciprocal).  
(ii) Descriptive rules, however, are formed without an exterior constraint, such as 
when females defend their offspring from the conspecifics in aggressive situations 
(de Waal 1991b). Descriptive rules describe a typical response to a specific social 
situation, while the statistical regularities of prescriptive rules are perceived, 
complied with and/or enforced by the individuals (Flack et al. 2005). In highly social 
species following social rules could lead to a more flexible and complex group-
hunting, sharing resources and picking up behavioural traditions. 
 There are three main factors in nonhuman social species that are supposed to 
have an enhancing effect on the emergence of social rules: (i) flexible motor patterns 
(trainability), (ii) dependence on social mimesis, (iii) ability of role reversal (e.g. in 
play or in cooperation) and (iv) acceptance of division of resources (e.g. food 
sharing). In line with this approach, de Waal (1996) suggested that dogs are an ideal 
subject for social rule investigations. “Canids have an excellent sense of social rules, 
which allows for order within the hunting pack and explains their trainability for 
human purposes…” (p. 94.) Moreover it is increasingly assumed that the social 
cognitive capacities of dogs, including their propensity for recognising and following 
social rules in the context of interacting with humans, have been formed by the 
cognitively challenging complex human social environment (e.g. Cooper et al. 2003; 
Miklósi 2007). 
 It has been reported, for instance, that dogs can adopt spontaneously a novel, 
arbitrary (actually pointless) behaviour as a result of interaction with their owner 
(Kubinyi et al. 2003). Namely when dogs could witness a causeless detouring 
behaviour of their owner after their usual daily walks, they gradually started to 
develop a similar habit, although the owner neither rewarded nor encouraged the 
dog’s behaviour. This phenomenon was interpreted as a form of social mimetic 
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processes that might contribute to the synchronisation of group activities and to the 
manifestation of cooperative actions between dog and owner. This suggests that dogs 
are not only skilful in forming associations between human behavioural cues and 
some motor responses, but may show an ability to understand the constituents of the 
problem situation in the form of recognizing social-behavioural rules. 
 In the present study we used a traditional object permanence paradigm 
(Piaget 1954) to investigate whether dogs’ and human subjects’ behaviour can be 
explained in terms of their ability to identify and use social rules that are formed by 
the interaction with the experimenter during the consecutive object hiding and search 
tasks.  
 When solving an object permanence task subjects’ performance could be 
based on a number of different cognitive capacities such as the ability (1) to 
represent an object mentally at least during the duration of the test; (2) to use 
appropriate deductive inferences; (3) and to use associative learning and local rules 
or cues. The presence of appropriate motivation to solve the task (4) could also be an 
important factor in the successful solution of the problem and there is an additional 
factor that may play an important role in determining subjects’ performance; (5) to 
identify and use social rules which are formed by the interaction with the 
experimenter during the testing procedure (see Topál 2009 for a review).  
 In the object permanence paradigm subjects are presented with a number of 
trials during which the experimenter hides an object behind one of the screens in 
more or less complicated ways. At the beginning of the hide-and-search trials 
subjects (children or animals) are ignorant regarding the specific goals of the 
situation (i.e. they should focus on the hiding procedure in order to get relevant 
information on the baited location). Many assume that repeated trials lead to 
subjects’ gradual learning to use relevant “local rules” or cues when search for the 
hidden bait (Gagnon & Doré 1993). However, if a subject considers the consecutive 
trials as a social situation, which involves a more or less complex game regulated by 
a social rule-system (e.g., “he hides, I search”), then not only the represented 
location of the object, but also the observed behaviour of the experimenter and the 
subject’s tendency to form expectations about the social rules of the task may 
significantly influence the observed performance. In other words, the search 
behaviour may not only be guided by the subject’s mental representations but may 
also be influenced by its ability to recognize and obey social rules.  
 The present study was therefore designed to demonstrate that social rules 
identified by the dog/human subjects during the consecutive trials of an object 
permanence test may have an independent influence on their performance in case of 
both children and dogs.  
 
 
4.3.1. EXPERIMENT V/1. 
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects  
 
 Since active and volunteer participation in trials was essential, some subjects 
were previously excluded because of insufficient motivation or attention. 6 children 
and 11 dogs proved to be resistant: they refused to search or retrieve the object 
during the introductory shaping trials. After their exclusion, our two groups of 
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subjects consisted of 24 preschoolers (14 girls and 10 boys between 4-6 years of age; 
mean age±SD: 5.4±0.6) and 19 dogs (8 females and 11 males between 1.5-7 years of 
age; mean age±SD: 3.2±1.5) of five different breeds (11 Belgian shepherds, 3 
Labrador retrievers, 4 Golden retrievers, 1 Dobermann pincher). 
 
Experimental procedures 
  
 The different conditions of the experiment were carried out in environments 
moderately familiar to the subjects: children were observed in a room of their nursery 
school, while the dog subjects were tested in an enclosure at the training school that 
they attend at weekends together with their owners. Three green plastic screens 
(frontal side: 40x60 cm) were placed along a semicircle and a plastic nontransparent 
flower-pot (20 cm deep, 15 cm in diameter) was used as a container. An 
experimenter, a cameraman, an assistant and the subject were in the room during the 
trials. The assistant was the owner for the dogs and a familiar nurse for the children 
(Figure 4.3.1.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1.1. Schematic 
representation of the 
experimental arrangement. 
 
 
 
 Both dogs and children were treated identically; preschoolers did not receive 
any specific instructions about the nature of the task before the trials of the 
experiment began. “We shall perform an experiment, please act as you feel 
appropriate!” they were told. After entering, the subjects were allowed to explore the 
environment for a minute. The assistant showed several different objects to the 
subject, trying to arouse interest in them. The target object to be used was either a 
small rubber bear, a plastic dog, a plastic baby doll or a small ball depending on 
which one of these the subject showed most interest in. Then the assistant got the 
subject to sit down in the middle of the circle. The experimenter caught the subject’s 
attention with the target object in hand and then proceeded to place the object into 
the container. The experiment consisted of three phases of trials: ‘shaping’, ‘no 
object’ and ‘game’. 
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Shaping trials (6) 
 
 During the introductory shaping trials six successive visible displacements 
were administered. Experimenter went around behind the first screen, out again, 
behind the second, out again, behind the third, out again with the object made visible 
between screens provided it was still in the container. Care was taken that the subject 
was clearly attending to and following each step of manipulation. In half of these 
trials (during the second, fourth, and sixth trials) the experimenter visited all the three 
screens sequentially but the object remained in the container throughout. In the other 
half of the trials (i.e., during the first, third and fifth trials) while walked behind the 
screens 1, 2, 3 in consecutive order, the experimenter randomly left the object behind 
one of them. When the experimenter returned, he placed the container in front of the 
subject for inspection and then the assistant called upon the subject to search for and 
retrieve the toy. If the object was retrieved, the subject was praised by the assistant. 
 
‘No object’ trial (1) 
 
 The shaping trials were followed by a modified version of the standard 
successive invisible displacements task. This was similar to the shaping trials in 
which all the three screens were visited, except that now the displacements of the 
target object were invisible: i.e., the content of the container was not revealed 
between visiting the screens. In fact, the target object was not left under any of the 
screens as the experimenter, while he was hiding the container behind one of the 
three screens, placed the toy surreptitiously in his pocket. Therefore at the end of this 
trial, not only the container presented, but also all of the three hiding screens were 
empty. When experimenter returned, the empty container was shown to the subject, 
and the assistant allowed the subject move freely without, however, giving any 
specific instructions to search for or retrieve the object. (Subjects were prompted 
with the Hungarian word “Mehetsz” - "you may go", but without any additional 
instructions or gestures to encourage search.) So the subject was allowed to search 
some or all of the containers freely for a minute or, in fact, to engage in any other 
type of behaviour, while his/her/its performance was videotaped. After a minute the 
hidden toy was presented to the subject by the experimenter. It was taken visibly 
from his pocket, so subject could realize that s/he/it was fooled. 
 
‘Game’ trial (1) 
 
 This was identical to the ‘no object’ trial, except for the fact that before the 
trial began, the experimenter gave the object clearly visibly to the assistant, who first 
caught the subject’s attention with it, and then put it in his/her pocket. So, during this 
condition the real location of the object was obvious and known to the subject 
throughout the whole procedure. Then the experimenter went on to perform the same 
series of acts of hiding behind the screens as in the no object condition, this time, 
however, with an empty container in hand.  
This control condition was designed to determine, whether the experimental 
procedure was interpreted by the subjects as an object-oriented task with the aim of 
finding and getting the target object, or as a game regulated by social rules that the 
subject needs to follow (see Table 4.3.1.1 below). The behaviour of the subjects in 
each condition was video recorded for later analysis. 
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Data collection and analysis 
 
 In the ‘Shaping’, ‘No Object’ and ‘Game’ conditions different aspects of 
subjects’ behaviour were recorded and analysed. During the ‘Shaping’ trials only the 
“Number of errors” was recorded (i.e. if the first choice was an empty screen) and 
compared. 
 Subjects’ performance during the ‘No Object’ trial was evaluated both on the 
basis of their “First choice” (i.e. the location of the screen inspected firstly) and the 
“Order of visited screens”. Subjects were scored on the basis of whether they show 
systematic/sequential search behind all the three screens (score: 1) or a 
nonsystematic search (score 0). 
 In the ‘Game’ condition, however, the “Number of subjects performing a 
search” was recorded. Moreover, in case of dogs the “Time spent with examining the 
screens” (i.e. the time spent with exploring the ground behind the screens – sec.) and 
the “Number of glances at the Owner” (i.e. number of direct head orientations 
towards the owner) were also recorded. 
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
Shaping phase 
 During the successive visible displacements, a trial was considered correct if 
the subject’s first choice was the screen containing the object or the container when 
the object remained in it (2nd, 4th and 6th trials). The search pattern of subjects was 
analyzed for the trials on which the object was hidden (1st, 3rd and 5th trials). When 
shown the empty container, the children typically glanced into it and set out to search 
the screens. The dogs also made a quick visual inspection of the container, but most 
dogs also sniffed it as well and then went on to the screens. Both dogs and children 
could find the object within 15 s in all shaping trials. Regarding their first choice, 
children committed significantly less error than expected by chance (chance 
expectation: 2 errors out of 3 trials). The difference from 0.66 chance expectancy as 
observed across individuals was highly significant (Sign test, p < 0.0001; nobody 
made more than 2 mistakes and there were only 5 ties). Dogs also made significantly 
less mistakes, however in this case, the difference from chance expectancy was not 
so highly significant (Sign test, p = 0.021; 1 dog made more than 2 mistakes and 
there were 9 ties). 
There are significant differences between dogs and children (Mann-Whitney U = 113, 
p = 0.003): dogs made more mistakes (in 29 out of 57 trials - 50.8%) during the 
shaping trials than preschoolers (in 18 out of 72 trials -25%). 
 On Trials 1, 3, and 5, all subjects searched until they eventually found the 
target object. Thus, one of the two possible errors that subjects could make on Trials 
3 and 5 was the classic A-not-B error of returning to the place in which the object 
was found on the preceding trial of screen hiding. Errors on Trials 3 and 5 were 
examined to determine the extent to which subjects were prey to this error form. Of 
the 12 errors made by children, 5 (42%) were A-not-B errors. Of the 23 errors made 
by dogs, 16 (70%) were A-not-B errors. In the latter case, the difference from 50% 
chance expectancy as observed across individuals (11 favouring, 5 not, and 3 ties) 
approaches significance (Sign test, p < 0.11).  
 Performance of subjects on Trials 2, 4, and 6 is notable. On these trials, the 
object was shown to remain in the container. None of the children and only 2 of the 
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dogs ever went on to check behind the screens once shown that the object was still in 
the container. This was a clear and sensible contrast to the motivated search on Trials 
1, 3, and 5 following disclosure of the empty container. 
 
‘No object’ condition 
 Since the subject has no information as to which one of the three screens may 
be hiding the target object, he/she/it should consider each screen as an equally 
probable hiding location and so would be expected to sequentially search behind 
each of them. 
Accordingly, a representational hypothesis predicts that a subject, who has a fully 
developed object permanence capacity, should search systematically behind all the 
three screens during this condition. Indeed, in accordance with this prediction, most 
of the preschoolers and the majority of the dogs performed a full and systematic 
search of all three screens. The percentage of systematically inspector subjects in the 
three experimental groups did not differ significantly (dogs – 68%, children: 91%, 
Fisher exact test p > 0.1) 
 Note that since the probability of each screen being the actual hiding place for 
the object is equal, the representational model provides no reason to prefer any one 
of them. However, both groups exhibited clear screen preference as their first choice 
for inspection (difference from random distribution, dogs: Chi2(2) = 7.70, p < 0.05; 
preschoolers: Chi2(2) = 9.75 p < 0.01). Most of the dogs (12/19) inspected first the 
screen that was visited last; as if they followed the local rule of ‘go to the screen last 
manipulated by the experimenter’. The preschoolers searched systematically either in 
a backward direction (13/24, i.e., similarly to dogs, starting from the last visited 
screen and proceeding backwards) or in a forward direction (10/24) starting from the 
first screen visited by the experimenter, as if they acted according to the local rule of 
‘follow the experimenter’s route’. The preponderance of both groups to begin with 
an outside (vs. the middle) screen may also reflect the influence of some evaluation 
of least effort in composing a search path.  
 
‘Game’ condition 
 Since in this condition no object was hidden into the container visiting the 
screens, based on the representational hypothesis no search behaviour behind the 
screens was expected. This should be so as long as the task is interpreted as being 
solely about finding the hidden object and assuming that the subjects are able to 
remember by the end of the trial where the object was last seen (i.e., in the 
owner/assistant’s pocket). Nevertheless, a considerable number preschoolers (12/24; 
50%) and dogs (14/19; 73.7%) performed a search behind the screens despite the fact 
that earlier they had witnessed the placing of the object into the pocket of the 
assistant.  
 However, there were important differences between certain aspects of the 
search behaviour elicited in the ‘No object’ condition versus the ‘Game’ condition, 
respectively. Thus, during the ‘Game’ condition both dogs and children inspected the 
screens systematically less frequently than during the ‘No object’ condition 
(Wilcoxon matched pairs test: Z(19) = -3, p = 0.0027 for dogs; Z(24) = -3.05, p = 
0.0023 for children). 
 Following the ‘Game’ condition the preschoolers were asked about the real 
location of the object which they could correctly recall in all cases. This indicates 
that the search behaviour observed in such cases was not aimed at get the object the 
target object. More importantly, a comparison of the dogs’ behaviour during the ‘No 
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object’ and ‘Game’ conditions, respectively, suggests that they were also aware of 
the location of the target object. Figures 4.3.1.2. & 4.3.1.3. show that compared to 
the ‘No object’ condition, during game condition searching dogs spent significantly 
less time with examining the screens (two sample t-test: t(26) = 4.05, p < 0.001) and 
during search they glanced more frequently at their owner (two sample t-test: t(26) = 
3.32, p = 0.0026) in whose pocket the object really was. Therefore it seems that the 
behaviour of both dog and human subjects in the game condition was the result of 
identifying and following a social rule of a game rather than the consequence of 
lacking appropriate representational capacity.  
 
Figure 4.3.1.2.  
Time spent with examination of 
the screens (mean+SE) in the 
dogs during the ‘No object’ and 
‘Game’ conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1.3.  
Number of glances at the owner 
(mean+SE) by the dogs during 
the ‘No object’ and ‘Game’ 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 What kind of social rule determined the subjects’ search behaviour in the 
game condition? Based on their search behaviour subjects could be categorized into 
3 main groups. In the game condition some of the subjects seem to have assumed 
that the task is about finding and retrieving the target object. These subjects (21-50% 
of all subjects – see Table 4.3.1.1) did not search behind the screens during the game 
condition, as they probably knew well that the target object was at a quite different 
location, but instead they stayed close to the ball orienting towards the 
owner/assistant. In contrast, the other subjects did search the screens; some of them, 
in fact, exhibiting systematic sequential search behind all three screens starting from 
the first screen visited by the experimenter (Rule II), while others showed a more 
diffuse search pattern (Rule III, see Table 4.3.1.). These latter subjects searched not 
only behind some of the screens, but other places in the room as well, irrespective of 
the real location of the target object.  
 It seems that in the ‘Game’ condition dog/human subjects’ search behaviour 
was guided by different hypothetical rules in comparison to the ‘No object’ condition. 
During the ‘Game’ condition none of the subjects produced the kind of systematic 
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search that starts at the last screen manipulated by the experimenter, even though 
such a search pattern was observed quite frequently both in dogs and preschoolers 
during the ‘No object’ condition (i.e., when they believed that the object was indeed 
hidden under one of the screens). This finding suggests that the “forward sequential 
search” pattern observed in the game condition was not driven by the aim of finding 
the target object, but rather, it was generated by the social rule to “follow the 
experimenter’s route”. 
 
 
 Rule I. Rule II. Rule III. 
Dogs (N = 19) 25 21 54 
Children (N = 24) 50 29 21 
 
Table 4.3.1.1. Proportion of subjects (%) following the different hypothetical rules during 
the game condition. Rule I.: “get the object” - behaviour: no inspection; Rule II.: “follow the 
experimenter’s route” - behaviour: “forward”, sequential search; Rule III: “produce search 
behaviour” - behaviour: scattered exploration 
 
 
4.3.2. EXPERIMENT V/2. 
 
 In the first experiment we found that dogs, similarly to children, tended to 
show searching even when the ball was obviously not hidden behind the screens. 
This behaviour, a “habit” having no obvious goal, has probably been developed as 
the result of the experimenter’s behaviour demonstrations (i.e. performing the same 
behaviour sequence repeatedly upon shaping trials). The question, however, that why 
a large proportion of dogs in the above experiment decided to choose an “aimless” 
search between/behind the screens instead of showing a goal oriented behaviour (i.e. 
trying to get the ball from its well known place) needs for further clarification. The 
“social rule” hypothesis described in the first experiment leads to specific predictions 
with respect to the dogs’ behaviour.  
 First, a basic precondition for the development of any “social-behavioural” 
rule in a hide-and-search task is, that the dog should focus not only on the movement 
of the object behind the screens upon hiding but on the behaviour of the human 
demonstrator too. That is, eliminating the social nature of the hide-and-search task 
(i.e. when human is not involved in the hiding process) dogs should not show search 
behaviour in a situation where the reward is not hidden (‘Game’ condition). 
 Moreover, in a social “version” of the hide-and-search task the emergence of 
rule following behaviour in the dog (i.e. willingness to search in a situation where no 
reward is hidden) can be facilitated by the repeated and stereotypic nature of the 
demonstrated hide-and-search tasks and by the increase of non-relevant elements in 
the demonstrated action sequence (i.e. intricate behaviours upon hiding the ball).  
 In the following experiment we aimed to study the aforementioned 
predictions and experimental groups were also designed to exclude the possibility 
that the emergence of search behaviour when there is no hidden reward is due to the 
dogs’ limitations in working memory. 
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METHODS  
 
Subjects  
 
 Fifty-four adult pet dogs of different breed participated in this experiment. 
The dogs and their owners were recruited on a voluntary basis in dog training 
schools. The only criterion for selection was that the dogs had to be highly motivated 
to play with a tennis ball, therefore prior to the experiment the owner was asked to 
perform 3– 4 retrieval task with his/her dog. 
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 Three screens (frontal side: 40×25 cm, green plastic) were staged in line, 1 m 
distance in between. There was a stool 3 m behind the middle screen. Dog, owner 
and experimenter stood at a distance of 5 m in front of the middle screen. A 
Panasonic DV camera stood on a tripod 5 m behind the first screen. 
 The experimental procedure consisted of two phases: Shaping trials (6) and 
Game trial (1). Groups were designed to analyse the effect of different conditions 
(Shaping trials) on the dogs’ willingness to show “social-rule following” in the 
subsequent ‘Game’ trial. The following 5 experimental groups were tested:  
 
Simple route, pretended hiding without ball (Simple – No Ball group) 
(N = 11, 7 males, 4 females, age = 2.5 ± 1.0; 5 Belgian shepherds, 1-1 German 
shepherd, Airdale terrier, Dachshund and 3 mongrels) 
 
 ‘Shaping’: During the first shaping trial the experimenter drew the attention 
of the dog to the ball, and went to the first screen while the ball was constantly 
visible in her right hand. Then she crouched behind the screen, put the ball down, 
and returned, showing that her hand is empty. The owner said: “Bring it to me!” 
(“Hozd!” in Hungarian) only once. After the dog retrieved the ball the owner gave it 
back to the experimenter. Then the experimenter hid the ball behind the second 
screen and finally the same sequence of actions was repeated for the third screen. 
The whole procedure was repeated (altogether 6 trials). 
 ‘Game’ trial: The experimenter caught the dog’s attention with the ball in her 
hand and then slowly placed it into the owner’s palm, who put it behind his/her back. 
Then the experimenter went to the first screen, constantly showing her empty hands, 
and crouched behind the screen, but did not put down her hands so the dog could 
always see them. After it she went back to the dog and the owner let the dog free 
while saying: “You can go!” (“Mehetsz!” in Hungarian). The dog was allowed to 
move freely for 30 sec while the owner remained at his/her predetermined position 
and did not give any gestural or verbal signal to the dog. 
 
Intricate route, pretended hiding without ball (Intricate – No Ball group) 
(N = 11, 6 males, 5 females, age = 2.3 ± 1.1; 5 Belgian shepherds, 1-1 German 
shepherd, Griant schnauzer, Leonberger, Golden retriever and two mongrels) 
 
 ‘Shaping’: During the first shaping trial the experimenter drew the attention 
of the dog to the ball, and before putting down the ball behind the first screen, she 
first walked round the stool behind the screens, while the ball was constantly visible 
in her middle-held right hand. Then she crouched behind the screen, put the ball 
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down, and returned, showing that her hand was empty. The owner said: “Bring it to 
me!” (“Hozd!” in Hungarian) only once. After the dog retrieved the ball, the owner 
gave it back to the experimenter. The experimenter repeated the process with screens 
2 and 3. Six such shaping trials have been performed. 
 ‘Game’ trial: The procedure was identical to that used in Simple – No Ball 
group.  
 
Intricate route, pretended hiding with ball (Intricate – Ball group) 
(N = 11, 9 males, 2 females, age = 2.9 ± 2.1; 4 Belgian shepherds, 3 German 
shepherds, 1-1 Collie, English setter, Labrador, Boxer) 
 
 ‘Shaping’: The procedure was identical to that of described in Intricate – No 
Ball group. 
 ‘Game’ trial: The procedure was identical to that described for Intricate – No 
Ball group, except that the experimenter took the route with the ball in her hand and 
gave it to the owner only after visiting the screens. 
 
Intricate route, pretended hiding with ball, 25 sec delay (Intricate – Ball – Delayed 
group) 
(N = 10, 3 males, 7 females, age = 2.4 ± 2.4; 2 Belgian shepherds, 1-1 Sheltie, 
Airdale terrier, Hungarian vizsla, Cocker spaniel, Mudi and three mongrels) 
 
 ‘Shaping’: The procedure was identical to that described in Intricate – No 
Ball group. 
 ‘Game’ trial: The procedure was identical to that described in Intricate – Ball 
group, except that the owner did not release the dog when the experimenter returned, 
only after 25 sec elapsed (that was the mean time of walking the path by the 
experimenter). 
 
Throwing the ball group 
(N = 11, 6 males, 5 females, age = 2.6 ± 1.6, 5 Belgian shepherds, 2 German 
shepherds, 1-1 Hungarian vizsla, Pumi, Mudi and a mongrel) 
 
 ‘Shaping’: An adult man sat on a stool during the experiment. The 
experimenter threw the ball to the man, who rolled it behind the first screen. The 
owner said: “Bring it to me!” (“Hozd!” in Hungarian) only once. After the dog 
retrieved the ball the owner gave it back to the experimenter. Then the ball was 
hidden behind the second screen in the same way and finally the same sequence of 
actions was repeated for the third screen. The whole procedure was repeated 
(altogether 6 trials). 
 ‘Game’ trial: The experimenter threw the ball to the man sitting on the stool 
who threw it back to the experimenter. Then she caught the dog’s attention with the 
ball in her hand and slowly placed it into the owner’s palm, who put it behind his/her 
back. After it the experimenter commanded the dog: “You can go!” (“Mehetsz!” in 
Hungarian).  
 According to the aforementioned predictions we expect that those dogs 
should show the highest tendency to perform search behaviour in the test trial (i.e., 
when the ball is not hidden) who witness an “intricate” hiding route and the 
pretended hiding is demonstrated without ball (Intricate route, pretended hiding 
without ball group). In comparison to these subjects, when the hiding route is more 
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goal-directed (Simple route, pretended hiding without ball group) or the pretended 
hiding is shown by the experimenter with the ball in her hand (Intricate route, 
pretended hiding with ball group), dogs should show a weaker tendency to perform 
search behaviour in the test trial (‘Game’ condition).  
 Moreover, in a “nonsocial” version of the hide and search task, that is, when 
no human is involved in the repeated hidings, dogs should not show search behaviour 
in the situation where the reward is not hidden (Throwing the ball group). 
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
Shaping trials 
We analysed the latency of getting the ball in the repeated trials (within subject 
factor) and the experimental group (between subject factor) with mixed ANOVA for 
repeated measures to the within subject factor. Further, we used Student-Newman-
Keuls post hoc tests (between group comparisons). The groups showed significant 
differences (dogs in ‘Throwing’ group get the ball sooner than the others; F4,49 = 
5.864, p = 0.001), but neither the repeating nor the interaction proved to be 
significant (F(4,49) = 1.53, p = 0.181 and F(5,49) = 0.282, p = 0.888 respectively). 
 Regarding the number of erroneous choices (an error was recorded if the dog 
visited a non-baited screen or the stool before the baited screen) we found significant 
differences between groups. Dogs in the Throwing the ball group made significantly 
less errors than subjects in the Simple – No Ball and Intricate – No Ball groups 
(Kruskal Wallis test with DUNN’s post hoc test: chi2 = 21.165, p = 0.0003). It seems 
that dogs could focus on the visible displacement task better when the ball was 
thrown between the target locations instead of transferring it by the human. 
 
‘Game’ trial 
The focal question regarding subjects’ behaviour in the ‘Game’ trials was whether 
dogs leave their owner (who holds the ball) and perform search behaviour around the 
experimental area or remain in the close vicinity of the owner. Subjects leaving the 
vicinity of the owner (< 1 m) within 5 seconds after the command (“You can go!”) 
and starting the search were categorized as “Searchers”. We should note that in the 
6th shaping trial each dog (in all groups) was categorized as “Searcher” (i.e., left the 
owner and retrieved the ball). In the ‘Game’ trial, the majority of dogs (64%) in the 
Intricate – No Ball group were categorized as “Searcher”. In this case the number of 
“Searcher” individuals in the ‘Game’ trial did not differ significantly from the 
frequency of searchers in the 6th shaping trial (McNemar test, p = 0.125). 
 The same comparisons show, however, that subjects’ behaviour significantly 
changed in all of the other groups as the majority of them did not leave the owner 
(i.e., the ball). That is, when the hiding route of the human demonstrator was goal-
directed (Simple – No Ball group), only 27% of the subjects were categorized as 
“Searcher” in the ‘Game’ trial (comparison with the last shaping trial: McNemar test: 
p = 0.008). 
 Similarly, when the pretended hiding in the ‘Game’ trial was demonstrated 
with the ball in hand (Intricate – Ball group), only one third of the dogs (36%) 
performed searching behaviour in the ‘Game’ trial (McNemar test: p = 0.016) and 
this ratio was only 10% when the dog had to wait 25 seconds after the demonstration 
(Intricate – Ball – Delayed group; comparison with the last shaping trial – McNemar 
test: p = 0.004). This latter observation suggests that dogs could keep the location of 
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the ball in their working memory. Moreover, when the hiding process was nonsocial 
(Throwing the ball group) none of subjects searched in the ‘Game’ trial (i.e., all dogs 
stayed next to the owner – McNemar test: p = 0.001) 
 All of these suggest that dogs left the owner (and the ball) more frequently 
when previously they had been trained for a hide-and-search task using a more 
sophisticated way of object hiding, provided that the experimenter accomplished the 
test trial without the ball in her hand. It seems that the ball in the hand during the test 
trial (pretended hiding) maintained the dogs’ attention on the ball and therefore dogs 
preferred the “get the object” strategy (waiting for the ball near the owner orientating 
to her/his) when they were allowed to choose. Searching when the reward is not 
hidden behind the screens was not due to working memory problem as dogs could 
recall where the reward had been seen even after 25 sec (i.e., 90% of the dogs in the 
Intricate – Ball – Delayed group did not leave the owner in the test trial).  
 As predicted, when the social-behavioural component of the hide-and-search 
task was removed (Throwing the ball group), dogs seemingly favoured the “get the 
object” strategy versus “social-behavioural” rule following (i.e., search behaviour) in 
the game condition. 
 
 
4.3.3. STUDY V. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Object permanence, as one of the major achievements of early cognitive 
development, has been assessed by a variety of experimental methods (Piaget 1954) 
and performance on such tasks has been measured on a standardized scale (Uzgiris & 
Hunt 1975). Success in the invisible displacements tasks by two-year-old infants and 
older human subjects has typically been interpreted as indicating a mature mental 
capacity to represent the permanent and independent existence of objects and an 
ability to use deductive inference to mentally reconstruct the invisible changes in a 
displaced object’s spatial position. However as Piaget, himself, repeatedly pointed 
out, solving the invisible displacements task does not necessarily imply the use of a 
mental representational model generated by deductive inference (Piaget 1954). In 
fact, as recent studies using different nonhuman species demonstrate, the problem 
can be successfully solved by non-representational means as well such as associative 
learning and the reliance on local rules or cues (for a review see Gomez 2005). 
 In this study we have hypothesized that successful performance on such tasks 
may also be influenced by an additional factor, namely, the subjects’ propensity to 
obey social rules of a task that is interpreted as a behavioural game. According to this 
view, the subsequent trials of different hiding procedures can be construed by the 
subjects as a social game regulated by a behavioural rule system that they infer from 
the experimenter’s actions. The present study was designed to demonstrate the effect 
of such social rules on the performance of dogs as well as humans in an object 
permanence task. The paradigmatic element of our experiments is that we used a 
shaping procedure involving a series of visible object displacements (i.e., hide-and-
search tasks) to familiarize dogs and children with the experimental situation. In 
accordance with former studies (e.g. Wood et al. 1980; Gagnon & Doré 1992) we 
found that not only preschoolers but also dogs fulfilled the standard criteria for 
successive visible displacements tasks showing results significantly above chance 
performance in the shaping trials. However, as the findings in “Game” condition 
indicate, systematic sequential search is not a sufficient criterion for demonstrating 
representational understanding of object permanence, as such a search pattern 
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(‘forward’ sequential search - see Table 4.3.1.1.) has also been observed in a 
significant number of subjects even when no object was hidden under the screens and 
the subjects were demonstrably aware of the actual location of the target object. We 
suggest, therefore, that systematic search in the game condition can be seen as 
subjects’ susceptibility to interpret the hide-and-search tasks as a situation involving 
rules of a social game. 
 The observed differences in the behaviour shown in the ‘No object’ and 
‘Game’ conditions (Experiment V/1.) gives further support for the assumption that 
dogs and children are sensitive to the ‘game-like’ nature of the situation. While even 
dogs have shown some degree of representational understanding of object 
permanence in the ‘No object’ trial, they performed less goal-directed behaviour in 
the ‘Game’ condition (‘aimless’ search despite the fact that the location of the reward 
is well-known). 
 Although the first experiment of this study has shown that both humans and 
dogs created and followed some sort of a social rule in the context of the object 
permanence test, but did not reveal the underlying mechanisms. Human subjects 
could give follow-up comments on their own behaviour, but these explanations did 
not point out exactly, what kind of factors urged them to produce search behaviour. 
Usually all they said was that they thought they should search because of the 
behaviour of the demonstrator. The forward sequential search pattern observed in the 
‘Game’ condition suggests that the way of hiding behaviour (in the Shaping trials) is 
probably the key-component for the emergence of the “aimless” search behaviour 
(i.e., obeying social rule) in the subsequent ‘Game’ trial. 
 Unlike human subjects dogs of course could not give verbal explanation for 
their behaviour, therefore we decided to reproduce the findings using a simplified 
shaping procedure, where we could systematically manipulate and observe the effect 
of the special hiding methods. According to this, and in line with the approach 
proposed by de Waal (1991b) for studying the nature of social rules, the plausibility 
of ‘social rule’ hypothesis in dogs can be studied through the direct analysis of its 
specific predictions. One of these is that the elimination of the social component 
should lead to at least two consequences regarding the dogs’ behaviour performance.  
 First, dogs should perform better in the ball-retrieving task because they do 
not divide their attention between the (intricate) behaviour of the human 
demonstrator and the actual position of the target object.  
 Second, in the ‘Game’ condition, there is no reason to perform search 
behaviour around the screens provided that the dog can recall that the ball is in the 
hand of its owner. Our findings supported these assumptions: dogs did not visit the 
non-baited screens during the shaping trials, and did not leave the owner in the 
‘Game’ trial if the human demonstrator was not involved in the hiding procedure.  
 Furthermore, Experiment V/1. has raised another issue. Namely, the human 
demonstrator performed several salient, but functionally not relevant behaviours 
during the shaping period. She visited each screen in the same sequence no matter 
which one was baited actually and in the ‘Game’ condition, she performed a 
complete hiding ritual without the ball in her hand. This could lead to the prediction 
that the functionally non-relevant behaviours of the human demonstrator (in shaping 
and pretended hiding trials) could be a further important factor for the emergence of 
rule following behaviour in dogs. Results of the second experiment support the 
aforementioned predictions. The tendency to perform “aimless” search behaviour 
was highest among those groups, which could see a more intricate hiding route 
during the shaping trials and ‘hiding with empty hands’ in the subsequent trial. One 
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may assume that this was due to the dogs’ limitations in working memory, however, 
results (with the ‘delayed’ group) do not support this possibility. These findings 
coincide with our earlier observations (Kubinyi et al. 2003), where after seeing a 
systematically recurring exposition of a functionally non-relevant, aimless, but 
stereotype detour by the owner, dogs tended to take over the habit. 
 In sum: it seems that the sequential visible and invisible displacement tasks, 
that were originally designed to demonstrate a representational understanding of 
object permanence, may be interpreted by subjects not only as object hiding and 
finding tasks, but, alternatively, as social-behavioural games of different sorts that 
may contribute to the subjects’ systematic search performance. Therefore, successful 
performance on such tasks may be based on qualitatively rather different underlying 
mediating mechanisms, and so it should not be interpreted exclusively as indicating a 
representational understanding of object permanence, and an ability to make 
deductive inferences.  
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4.4. THE SYNCHRONIZATION DOMAIN OF DOG BEHAVIOUR 
COMPLEX: SUMMARY OF RESULTS. 
 
 Synchronization between group-mates can be manifested at different levels 
(physiological, motivational/emotional and behavioural alignments) and is supposed 
to be essential for group cohesion. Interactional synchrony at the behaviour level is 
the most obvious one. Dogs’ ability to use human behaviour as a cue for selecting 
functionally similar behaviour (imitative learning – see STUDY IV; as well as Miller 
et al. 2009; Huber et al. 2009) is an important underlying mechanism by which 
interactional synchrony between dogs and humans can be achieved.  
 In this chapter we have also pointed out that dogs’ behaviour can - at least 
partially - be explained in terms of rule following when in an object permanence task 
(STUDY V). For the dog, the function of human demonstration (hiding an object 
repeatedly) is probably not transferring knowledge per se but transferring those 
behaviour actions that can lead to effective behavioural synchronization. Dogs seem 
to be sensitised to the recurring, but cognitively and causally opaque behaviour of 
humans. This skill can be seen as a behaviour adaptation to a complex human 
environment which might contribute to the emergence of a close relationship with a 
different species. The willingness to follow social rules in dogs could serve as the 
scaffolding on which many forms of complex social behaviour between dogs and 
humans can develop. The apparent flexibility of dogs’ behavioural responses to a 
stranger’s approach in STUDY III further supports the notion that dogs have some 
ability to show emotional and behavioural response in accordance with the human’s 
attitude. Such behavioural-emotional synchronization is supposedly a bi-directional 
process. Interactional synchrony is most likely to develop if the human attends 
carefully to the dog’s emotional and attentional state. 
 Taken together, it seems that dogs have considerable ability to obtain 
information of varying complexity by observing their human companion. The 
accumulation of such social information could play an important role in 
synchronisation of group activities as members of the group can act on the basis of 
the same knowledge. This could make interactions between companions more easy-
going and more efficient. 
 It is also worth mentioning that synchronisation between dog and human can 
also take place “under the surface”. There is a growing literature indicating that the 
mere presence of dogs or interaction with them has an effect on the emotional state 
of humans (see Hart 1995 for a review). As bodily contact in the form of ‘social 
grooming’ is a dominant behaviour for expression empathy in humans, dogs could 
have been selected for similar tendencies. It seems that establishing a positive 
feedback system, oxytocin plays an important role in the formation of human-dog 
relationship. This anxyolitic neuropeptid is released in response to physical contact 
(Uvnas-Moberg 1997) or other social cues (e.g. gaze) and plays an important role in 
modification of behavioural response to stress situations. Mutual gazing with the dog 
increases the owner’s urinary oxytocin levels, which is an indirect signal of the 
increased production of this hormone in the brain (Nagasawa et al. 2009). Others 
found that dog-owner social interaction significantly increases the plasma oxytocin 
concentrations in both partners thus supporting the mutual relaxing effect of petting 
(Odendaal & Meintjes 2003). These findings open the door to understanding of 
physiological, emotional and behavioural synchronization between individuals of 
such evolutionary distant species like man and dog and give some further support for 
the idea that dogs have undergone selection for living in human groups. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
 
CONSTRUCTING COMMUNICATION 
 
 
 The above two chapters (3 & 4) provided an overview of the available 
evidence concerning parallels between the Dog- and Human Behaviour Complexes 
in cases of increased sociality, multi-level synchronization and we also presented 
some additional empirical findings about these two domains of social cognition in 
dogs. The present chapter, however, will focus on a different aspect of the dog social 
cognition: the constructive character of interspecific communicative behaviour. 
 Generally speaking communication involves complex constructive activities 
for both participants (signaller and receiver). This is also true for such ‘low-level’ 
nonverbal forms of communication like gestural exchange between dogs and humans. 
During the past decade numerous investigations have revealed that, similarly to 
mother infant exchange of information, dog human communicative interaction can be 
described as a step-by-step constructive process based on a set of specific skills in 
both participants. Namely, for the effective communication the ‘initiator’ has to 
provide cues expressing its communicative intent toward the potential recipient (e.g. 
via establishing eye contact). Next, the recipient should be able to identify the 
context as being communicative interaction, and should focus its attention on the 
signaller. Then the informant has to specify what (s)he is informing about (e.g. using 
gaze shifts or pointing) and has to manifest the message (knowledge) in a manner 
and form that makes obvious for the receiver what is the relevant information about 
the referred object (e.g. fetch it!). Finally, both parties have to adjust their behaviour 
to cases when the communication fails, and should aim by different means to achieve 
their goal of communicating.  
 It has been reported that, dogs show special responsiveness to human 
communicative signals (Miklósi & Soproni 2006). Dogs like 18-month-old infants, 
and unlike wolves and apes, are skilful users of various forms of human directional 
gestures (e.g., Lakatos et al. 2009). These findings, in agreement with other studies, 
raise the possibility that dogs’ understanding of human ostensive referential 
communication is more flexible than was formerly thought and shows functional 
similarities to the human infants’ corresponding skills. Our aim in this chapter is 
therefore to provide further insight into the characteristics of human infant-analogue 
social competence in dogs. 
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STUDY VI. SENSITIVITY TO CUES THAT SIGNAL THE HUMAN’S 
COMMUNICATIVE INTENT AND UNDERSTANDING THE 
REFERENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF VISUAL ATTENTION* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Dogs’ ability to recognise cues of human visual attention was studied in two 
different experiments. The first one was designed to test the dogs’ responsiveness to 
their owner’s tape-recorded verbal commands (Down!) while the Instructor (who 
was the owner of the dog) was facing either the dog or a human partner or none of 
them, or was visually separated from the dog. Results show that dogs were more 
ready to follow the command if the Instructor attended them during instruction 
compared to situations when the Instructor faced the human partner or was out of 
sight of the dog. However, dogs showed intermediate performance when the 
Instructor was orienting into “empty space” during the re-played verbal commands. 
This suggests that dogs are able to differentiate the focus of human attention.  
 A second experiment was aimed at studying the question whether dogs’ 
responsiveness to human directional gestures is associated with the situational 
context in an infant-like manner. Borrowing a method used in infant studies, dogs 
watched video presentations of a human actor turning toward one of two objects and 
their eye-gaze patterns were recorded with an eye tracker. Results show a higher 
tendency of gaze following in dogs when the human’s head turning was preceded by 
the expression of communicative intent (direct gaze, addressing). This is the first 
evidence to show that eye-tracking techniques can be used for studying dogs’ social 
skills and the exploitation of human gaze cues depends on the communicatively 
relevant pattern of ostensive and referential signals in dogs. Our findings give further 
support to the existence of a functionally infant-analogue social competence in this 
species. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Based on: 
 
Virányi Zs, Topál J, Gácsi M, Miklósi Á, Csányi V. (2004). Dogs respond 
appropriately to cues of humans’ attentional focus. Behavioural Processes 66: 161-
172. 
 
Téglás, E., Gergely, A., Kupán, K., Miklósi, Á., Topál, J. (2012). Dogs’ gaze 
following is tuned to human communicative signals. Current Biology, 22: 1-4. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 The dogs’ sensitivity to human gestural cues involving cues of visual 
attention has been reported in many independent studies using food choice tasks (see 
Miklósi & Soproni 2006; Miklósi 2007, for reviews). Additionally, dogs learn very 
fast to utilise eye cues only in such tasks (e.g., Miklósi et al. 1998). These studies 
suggest that dogs are able to use broad range of human given cues—even novel 
ones—in social situations and they are more skilful in this respect than primates. 
When using human visual cues to find hidden food, the superior performance in dogs 
has been confirmed by direct (Hare et al. 2002) and indirect (Soproni et al. 2001; 
Povinelli et al. 1999) comparisons. These studies concluded that unlike dogs, 
chimpanzees were not sensitive to the referential and attention components of the 
cues; their choice was based on the observable discriminative stimuli presented by 
the human informant.  
 Dogs’ sensitivity to others’ attentional cues has been investigated in some 
additional situations, one of which is the fetching tasks in which dogs seemed to 
discriminate “attentive” and “inattentive” behaviour of humans (Hare et al. 1998; 
Gácsi et al. 2004). As a further elaboration of these observations, Call et al. (2003) 
found that dogs are sensitive to whether a human is watching them or not in a 
situation, where dogs compete with a human over food. Dogs picked up the food 
more frequently when the human competitor was inattentive (eyes closed, back 
turned or distracted) in comparison to the trials when the human showed cues of 
visual attention toward them (facing the food/dog). 
 All experiments cited have observed how dogs respond to human cues of 
attention in feeding or playing contexts, in which subjects aimed to get some 
desirable food or play by interacting with a cooperative or a competitive human 
partner. However, it has not been investigated whether dogs can take into account 
that a human is attending to them or another human subject when communicating in 
a social situation where no food or toy is involved. Moreover, while recent research 
has provided important evidence about dogs’ social communicative skills, it is still 
unclear whether dogs’ gaze following is tuned to cues that signal the human’s 
communicative intent (e.g. eye contact, verbal addressing). 
 In the first experiment dogs were commanded to perform a mildly aversive 
action (to lie down on command). The question was whether dogs are more disposed 
to omit fulfilling the command if the owner is inattentive with them than if she is 
looking at them. Further on, to test whether dogs have a more sophisticated 
sensitivity going beyond discriminating between a human’s attentive and inattentive 
states, a third party was involved into the communicative situation. We wanted to see 
whether dogs are able to discriminate between the attentional focuses of a human in a 
triadic social situation when there are two “competing” agents present as possible 
targets for the command. We hypothesized that if dogs are able to perceive the focus 
of human visual attention and to “comprehend” the referential nature of looking, they 
should behave differentially in situations when their owner’s verbal command is 
accompanied by different head and bodily orientation.  
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5.1.1. EXPERIMENT VI/1 
 
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects  
 
 Thirty-one adult pet dogs and their owners were recruited on voluntary basis 
at a dog training school. Eight dogs were excluded from the experimental group after 
the pretest trial because they did not respond to the owner’s command and/or they 
displayed definite signs of stress when they were taken on leash in the experimental 
room (see below). After their exclusion our sample consisted of 23 adult dogs (11 
males, 12 females, mean age±SD 5.7±2.6 years; 14 Tervuerens, 3 Groenendaels, 2 
Boxers, 1-1 Great Dane, Mudi, Schnauzer, Collie). 
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 Trials were recorded in a room (4m × 5m) that was unfamiliar to the dog. A 
big (width: 1.2 m, height: 2m) vertical screen was positioned near one side of the 
room. The dog, the owner (Instructor) and the experimenter (Partner) were in the 
room during the observations. Each condition was video-recorded and analysed later. 
The dogs were led into the room by the Instructor and allowed to explore the room 
for a few minutes. During it the Instructor and the Partner were talking to each other 
while they were standing at their predetermined points in the middle of the room 3m 
apart and facing each other. At the beginning of all trials the Instructor put the dog on 
leash and tethered it at a predetermined point in the corner. In this way the Instructor, 
the dog and the human Partner were standing so that they formed an isosceles 
triangle. By gently touching its body the Instructor got the dog to stand orienting 
towards the middle of the room, and went back to his/her predetermined position in 
the room. The human participants continued to talk to each other taking apparently 
little notice of the dog. (If the dog changed its position during the discourse, the 
Instructor re-positioned the dog.) After 10–20 s, when the dog was orienting towards 
them, they suddenly stopped talking, the Instructor took up the predetermined body 
orientation (see below) and gave a verbal command (Down!—’Fekszik!’ in 
Hungarian). In the pretest trial the owner gave the instruction live but in the four 
experimental trials the command was given by playing back the pre-recorded verbal 
command of the Instructor (see below). The Partner kept on facing the Instructor 
without moving in all trials. Having finished instructing the dog both human 
participants stayed in their positions for further 5 s then the Instructor turned back to 
the Partner and resumed talking. The trial was terminated when the Instructor turned 
back to the Partner. The dog did not get any feedback (praise/scolding) at all. The 
behaviour of the dogs was observed in the pretest trial and in each of the four 
different conditions. The dogs started with the pretest trial and the order of the four 
subsequent playback conditions was chosen at random. There were 2–3 min breaks 
between the trials when the dog was allowed to move freely in the room. 
 
Pretest trial: ‘Face to face/live/’ 
 
 This condition served to test the dogs’ reaction to the experimental situation 
and whether they obey the ‘Down!’ command given by the owner. The content of the 
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verbal command was discussed with the Instructors in advance and was the same for 
all dogs. In the beginning of the pretest trial the Instructor and her Partner stood in 
the predetermined position (Figure 5.1.1.1a) and were talking while facing each other. 
Before giving the verbal command the Instructor turned towards the dog and looked 
directly at it. ‘Down!’ command was uttered only once but the Instructor’s non-
verbal gesturing was not restricted. Only those dogs (23) that lay down within 5 s 
after the command were involved to experimental trials. 
 
Recording and replaying of the verbal instruction 
 
 Because we wanted to avoid the variation of the repeated command to 
influence the behaviour of the dogs in the different experimental conditions (see 
below), we have standardised the verbal cues by recording them on tape and this 
record was used in all further conditions. Verbal commands were tape-recorded after 
the pretest trial in the absence of the dog. The Instructors were told to give the 
‘Down!’ command in the same way as in the pretest trial and to repeat it two times 
with noting the dog’s name before the last command (‘Down!’ …’Down!!’….’dog’s 
name + Down!!!). In this way commands had the same verbal structure for each dog 
with the obvious difference regarding the dog’s name. The Instructors were asked to 
increase the imperative mode of the utterance as they proceed with approximately 3 s 
pauses between the repetitions. So the total duration of the verbal instructions ranged 
between 8 and 10 s for each dog. The tape recorder was remote controlled by the 
Partner in all conditions and was stopped after the command after which the dog lay 
down (e.g. if the dog lay down after the first command had been given, neither the 
second nor the third commands were played back). The loudspeaker was positioned 
so close to the face of the Instructor as it was possible and it was directed between 
the dog and the Partner’s usual place. The loudness was adjusted to the human ear. 
 
 
Figure 5.1.1.1. 
Schematic representation of the different 
conditions (drawn not to scale, view from 
above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
partner 
dog 
instructor
a). FACE TO FACE b). VISUAL SEPARATION 
c). FACE TO HUMAN d). LOOK AWAY 
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Experimental conditions /playback/ 
 
Face to face 
 This condition was identical to the pretest trial (Figure 5.1.1.1a), except that 
now the tape-recorded command, described above, was given. 
 
Visual separation  
 The position and the behaviour of the human participants in this case were the 
same as in the ‘Face to face’ condition with the only difference, that an opaque 
screen was placed between the dog and the Instructor in the beginning of this trial, so 
the dog could not see the Instructor’s body orientation (Figure 5.1.1.1.b). 
 
Face to human partner 
 The starting position of the participants was identical to that in the ‘Face to 
face’ condition. After stopping their talk the Instructor, however, turned away from 
the Partner to the right for 2–3 s. When the command was started to replay she turned 
left with a definite movement in the same way as in the ‘Face to face’ condition but 
as a result of this turning now she oriented towards the human Partner (Figure 
5.1.1.1.c). 
 
Look away 
 In the beginning of this trial the Partner changed his position by stepping 3m 
sideways away from the dog. The Instructor and the Partner looked at each other and 
talked in this position. Before commanding the Instructor turned left toward the 
Partner’s original place. In this way the orientation and the movements of the 
Instructor were exactly the same as in the ‘Face to human partner’ condition but she 
faced at empty space when the command was replayed (Figure 5.1.1.1.d). 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 Great care was taken to make the non-verbal gestural behaviour of the 
Instructor similar across all condition. This was essential to do since in three 
experimental conditions (‘Visual separation’, ‘Face to human partner’, ‘Look away’) 
the uttering of the command took place in a quite unnatural situation for the 
Instructors. The Instructors were instructed that they should try to behave as they 
usually do and in a standard way in all conditions. To account for any of the potential 
gestural influence on the part of the Instructors, their behaviour was recorded for 
statistical analysis according to the following variables.  
A. Head-turning towards the predetermined direction.  
B. Body orientation towards the predetermined direction. 
C. Nodding when the command is given. 
D. Bending forward of the upper torso when the command is given. 
E. Hand-gesture (stretching out the arm and making a movement directed to down). 
 The presence (1) or absence (0) of these gestural cues was recorded for each 
repeated command in each of the experimental conditions. The average frequency of 
the occurrence of a given gesture was calculated for each dog–Instructor pair in each 
experimental condition dividing the number of occurrences by the number of 
command-repetitions. 
 In order to compare the dogs’ reaction to commands uttered in the different 
conditions the ‘Response score’ was established as follows:  
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 Score 1: The subject responded to the first ‘Down!’ command (i.e. started to 
lie down before the first repeat and finished the action before the trial was terminated 
(before the Instructor turned back to the Partner to resume talking (see procedure))). 
 Score 2: The subject started to lie down after the beginning of the second 
command (“Down!!”) but before that of the third one (“name+Down!!!”) and 
finished it before the trial was terminated.  
 Score 3: The subject started to lie down when the last command (“name + 
Down!!!”) had been given and finished the action within 5 s (i.e. before the 
Instructor turned back to the Partner to resume talking). 
 Score 4: The dog was resistant, namely it did not lie down within 5 s after the 
last command had been given. Interobserver agreement was assessed by means of 
parallel coding of 50% of the total sample by two trained observers. Cohen’s kappa 
for the response score was found to be 0.89. 
 Friedman ANOVA was used to compare the behaviour of individual dogs 
across conditions and similar tests were used for analysing the behaviour of the 
Instructors. Within-group differences were further analysed by planned comparisons 
(Wilcoxon tests). 
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
Behaviour of the Instructors 
 Analyses of the non-verbal behaviours of the Instructor by Friedman 
ANOVA across the five experimental conditions failed to show any significant 
differences (head-turning, body orientation, nodding, bending the upper torso, hand-
gesture; p > 0.05 in each case). That is, Instructors showed similar patterns of non-
verbal gesturing in each of the experimental conditions, which suggests that the 
behaviour of Instructors cannot explain the possible condition-specific differences in 
dogs’ responsiveness.  
 
Dogs’ response scores 
 Although dogs were pre-selected on the basis of their responsiveness in the 
pretest trials (i.e. only dogs that fulfilled live command were involved) there might 
have been differences in the quality between the pre-recorded command and the 
commands uttered by the Instructor live. Therefore, in order to analyse the effect of 
the application of the playback method on the dogs’ reaction first we made 
comparison between the response scores in ‘Face to face/live/’ and ‘Face to 
face/playback/’ conditions. Importantly, while all dogs were ready to obey in the 
“live” condition (response score = 1), 6 out of the 23 dogs failed to lie down even 
after the repeated command in the ‘Face to face/playback/’ situation (scores = 3, and 
4) which difference approaches significance (Wilcoxon, Z(23) = 1.88, p = 0.059). It 
seems that these six individuals had severe difficulties with the playback method, 
which is further supported by the fact that they failed to show any corresponding 
reaction in the other playback conditions. In order to concentrate the analysis on the 
direction of human attention on the dogs’ responsiveness, the six non-responding 
subjects in the play back situations were excluded from further analysis. 
 The overall comparison of the response scores in the four experimental 
conditions resulted in highly significant differences (Friedman ANOVA, chi2(3)= 
24.16; p < 0.001, Figure 5.1.1.2).  
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Figure 5.1.1.2. 
The dogs’ response score in the 
different experimental conditions 
(median, quartiles and extreme 
values). Different letters indicate 
significant differences between the 
conditions (p < 0.05). Score 1: 
prompt fulfilment after the first 
command; Score 2: lie down after 
the second command was uttered; 
Score 3: lie down after the third 
command (name of the 
dog+Down!!!); Score 4: command 
ignored. 
 
 
 
 
 Although all of the 17 dogs lay down in the ‘Face to face’ condition the 
majority of them proved to be resistant in the situation where the Instructor faced the 
human Partner or was visually separated while the command was replayed (12 and 
11 out of 17). The number of dogs ignoring the command in the ‘Look away’ 
condition (7 out of 17) shows intermediate responsiveness (Table 5.1.1.1). Pair-wise 
comparisons showed higher responsiveness in the ‘Face to face’ condition than in 
‘Visual separation’ (Z(17) = 3.25, p < 0.001) and in the ‘Look away’ (Z(17) = 2.97, p 
= 0.003) conditions. Moreover, verbal instructions were more likely ignored when 
Instructor oriented to the Partner than to an empty space (‘Face to human partner’ 
versus ‘Look away’ conditions: Z(17) = 2.15, p = 0.032). However, we failed to find 
significant difference between the ‘Face to human partner’ and the ‘Visual 
separation’ conditions (Z(17) = 0.85, p = 0.395). 
 
 
Response Face to face Look away Visual 
 separation 
Face to human
 partner 
Lie down promptly  
Response score = 1 
 
N = 6 
 
N = 3 
 
N = 1 
 
N = 0 
Lie down after the first repeat).  
Response score = 2 
 
N = 11 
 
N = 3 
 
N = 3 
 
N = 3 
Lie down when its name was 
given. Response score = 3 
 
N=0 
 
N=4 
 
N=2 
 
N=2 
Command ignored. 
Response score = 4 
 
N=0 
 
N=7 
 
N=11 
 
N=12 
 
Table 5.1.1.1. The number of dogs that behaved according to their owner’s verbal command 
(Down!) in the different experimental conditions 
 
 The findings of the present experiment suggest that in situations where the 
command is replayed by a tape recorder, the dogs’ behaviour is influenced by the 
behavioural cues (head and body orientation, presence/absence) relating to the actual 
visual attention of the Instructor. Importantly, dogs are able to differentiate situations 
where the human visual attention is unambiguously directed to them (they fulfil the 
command) or to a human Partner (they ignore the command). Moreover, in a more 
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ambivalent situation in which the focus of the owner’s attention was not unequivocal 
(e.g. in the ‘Look away’ condition the Instructor looked at a direction where there 
was nobody) the behaviour of the dog reflects a kind of hesitation (intermediate 
responsiveness). The focus of human attention was similarly unidentifiable for the 
dog when a screen was positioned between the dog and the ‘Instructor’ (‘Visual 
separation’). In this case, however, the dogs tended to avoid responding to the 
command. This was probably so, because dogs either needed to see the visual cues 
provided by the Instructor (e.g. gestures) in order to understand the situation, or 
alternatively, they were non-responsive because loosing the visual contact with the 
owner in this strange, restrictive situation made them stressful. 
 
 
5.1.2. EXPERIMENT VI/2 
 
 It is widely accepted that infants’ social-communicative skills represent 
human specific evolutionary adaptations that allow infants to participate in dyadic 
communicative interactions (Csibra & Gergely 2009). Cue-based responses to 
ostensive-communicative and referential signals are assumed to be linked together in 
a specific manner which can enable even preverbal infants to benefit from referential 
communication directed to them.  Shared attention and reflexive gaze following 
has been reported to be modulated by such social contextual factors as the facial 
emotional expressions of the demonstrator in both human (Hori et al . 2005) and non-
human (monkeys – Goossens et al. 2008) subjects. However, recent evidence 
suggests that preverbal infants’ gaze following can be triggered only if an actor’s 
head turn is preceded by the expression of communicative intent (Senju & Csibra 
2008). Such connectedness between ostensive and referential signals may be 
uniquely human, enabling infants to effectively respond to referential communication 
directed to them.  
 In the light of the above results (Experiment VI/1) an intriguing question is 
whether dogs’ responsiveness to human-given gaze cues is associated with the 
situational context in an infant-like manner.  
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects  
 
 Sixty-one pet dogs of different recognized breeds (33 males, 28 females; 
mean age±SE = 48 ±4.4 month) were recruited to the study. Dogs were tested at the 
Department of Ethology, Eötvös University in a testing room specifically for dog 
studies. In order to be selected for this study the subject had to be naïve to the task, 
and older than a year. At the time of testing all owners were unaware of the 
hypotheses and goals of the study. Thirty-two dogs were excluded from the 
experiment because of inattentiveness (N = 12) or unsuccessful calibration (N = 20). 
The final sample consisted of those 29 dogs that provided sufficient data for the 
analysis of eye gaze in the cueing phase.  
 Sixteen dogs (8 males, 8 females; mean age±SE = 37.1±7.9 month) were 
assigned to the ‘OC & NO’ group; they participated in both OC and NO conditions 
(see below). This group was made of seven different recognized breeds (2 Yorkshire 
terriers, 1-1 Beagle, Border collie, Cavalier King Charles spaniel, Golden retriever, 
Hungarian vizsla, Labrador retriever) and eight mongrels.  
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 The Baseline Control (BC) group (5 males, 8 females; mean age±SE = 
33.2±6.2 month) was made of six different recognized breeds (2 Poodles, 1-1 Beagle, 
Schipperke, French bulldog, Basset hound, English bulldog) and six mongrels. 
 
Experimental procedures 
 
Warm up trials 
 
 Before the experiment dogs participated in a 10-trial warm-up session that 
served to elicit the dog’s interest in the plastic pots shown in the experimental trials. 
During this the experimenter put a piece of dog chow in a plastic container in full 
view of the dog and then hid it behind her back. After some seconds she brought the 
pot and offered it to the dog by holding it up (1 m above ground level) either in her 
left or right hand (5-5 trials in a counterbalanced order) while making noise by 
shaking the container. In the first trial the experimenter gave the food to the dog 
immediately after the dog looked at the container. In the later trials, however, the 
experimenter gradually increased the dog’s looking time toward the container (up to 
5 seconds) by increasing the delay interval between showing and shaking the 
container and giving the food. 
 
Test trials 
 
 Subjects were presented with a series of movies in which a human female 
turned her attention toward one of two identical containers either in an ostensive-
communicative (OC) or in a non-ostensive (NO) manner. 
 The gaze data was collected at 50 Hz by a Tobii X50 Eye Tracker (Stockholm, 
Sweden). The eye tracker had 0.5-0.7 degree accuracy, 30 x 16 x 20 cm freedom of 
head movement. The stimuli were presented on a 17-inch LCD monitor positioned 
behind the eye tracker. The owner made the dog to stand, sit, or lay down in order to 
get optimal eye gaze data (at a distance of approx. 60 cm). She/he was sitting behind 
the dog looked down while avoided verbal interactions. The eye gaze recording was 
preceded by a five-point calibration phase following the infant calibration protocol of 
Clearview 2.5.1. Same software presented the video clips in the test trials. Dogs 
participated in the test trials only if contributed to minimum 4 calibration points.  
 In the Ostensive-Communicative condition (OC) the human actor overtly 
expressed her communicative intent whereas in the non-ostensive condition (NO) we 
removed the ostensive signal from the stimulus. Dogs (N = 16) that were exposed to 
both O and NO conditions received two blocks of 6 trials, where the blocks were 
composed either of video materials containing ostensive cues (Figure 5.1.2.1 A-B-D), 
or non-ostensive cues (Figure 5.1.2.1 A-C-D). The blocks were presented in 
counterbalanced order and the direction of the model’s gaze was also 
counterbalanced (in RLLRLR or LRRLRL order) with at least 1 week break between 
the two sessions. 
Subjects assigned to Baseline Control group (N = 13) received only one block of six 
trials (Figure 5.1.2.1. A-D, but without attention getter in phase C).  
 Each trial presented video recordings that started with an introductory phase 
during which the model that had two pots on each side was facing down in a still 
position for 2 seconds (Fig. 5.1.2.1.A).  
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Figure 5.1.2.1  
Selected frames from 
the stimuli in the 
Ostensive-
Communicative (A-
B-D) and Non-
Ostensive (A-C-D) 
condi-tions. GC 
indicates the gaze-
congruent and GIC 
the gaze-incongruent 
regions of interest 
(ROI). 
 
 
 
 
 The second phase was an addressing phase that lasted for 3 s and differed 
according to the experimental conditions. In the OC (Ostensive-Communicative) 
condition (Fig. 5.1.2.1.B) the model raised her head, looked straight at the dog and 
addressed the subject (“Hi dog!”) in a high pitch voice. In the NO (Non-Ostensive) 
condition with her head facing down the model was addressing the dog using low 
pitch voice (“Hi dog.”) while a salient moving image was overlaid on the head (Fig. 
5.1.2.1.C). This attention getter was present for 2 s and served to create attentional 
demand similar to that in the ostensive condition. The verbal signal in the two 
conditions had similar duration and intensity but differed in pitch.  
 In the cueing phase (6 s) the model turned her head towards one of the two 
containers (1 s) and remained motionless (5 s) while showing neutral facial 
expression (Fig. 5.1.2.1.D).  
 
Data collection and analysis  
 
 The screen was divided on the horizontal axis in 3 equal areas: left, middle, 
and right (see Fig. 5.1.2.1.D). Our statistical analysis was based on the eye gaze 
collected from the lower half of the lateral (left and right) areas (10.5° x 12° visual 
angle) that were defined as regions of interest (ROI) during the cueing phase. Trials 
were accepted as valid only if they provided more than 200 ms eye gaze data from 
the ROI. This criteria was implemented in order to exclude short transitions of the 
gaze that just happened to pass the ROIs. While during the cuing phase eye gaze was 
recorded from the regions of interest in 69% of the trials, taking these criteria into 
consideration dogs provided 27% valid trials in the OC and 34% in the NO 
conditions. For dogs participated in BC condition eye gaze was recorded from the 
target regions of interest in 60% of the trials out of which 35% were valid trials. 
 Scoring: The gaze following was tested along two measures: cumulative 
accuracy and first look toward the gaze congruent object. These indexes correspond 
to those presented by Senju and Csibra (2008). For each of these measures difference 
scores were calculated. For instance, trials in which dogs looked only to the side 
congruent with the model’s gaze were coded as correct (c), if the dog did not look at 
the correct side the trial was coded as incorrect (i). When dogs looked at both sides, 
the trial was classified according to the longer look. Thus, the difference score (d) for 
the cumulative accuracy was calculated by subtracting the incorrect from the correct 
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trials and dividing the result by the total number of trials were participant provided 
valid ROI data [d=(c-i)/(c+i)]. The first look was analyzed in a similar fashion, but 
instead of the time spent in one or the other ROI only the first gaze record toward 
these ROIs were considered. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 We obtained valid data for analysis from 13 dogs in the OC and 14 dogs in 
the NO condition, however, only 11 of them provided valid data in each of these 
conditions (for the validity criteria see Data Analysis). In the addressing phase dogs 
spent similar amounts of time gazing toward the human actor in the two conditions 
(mean ±SE = 1088.8 ±181.1 ms in OC and 980.9 ±267.8 ms in NO conditions, p > 
0.05, ns) and invested a comparable amount of time scanning the region containing 
the actor’s face relative to the whole body: mean ±SE = .46 ±0.09 in the OC 
condition and .55 ±0.10 in the NO condition (paired t-test t(10) = -0.88 p = 0.39) 
showing that in the addressing phase the human actor evoked the same level of visual 
attention in both conditions. 
 Next we analysed whether dogs looked longer at the gaze-congruent area (Fig. 
5.1.2.1.D) as compared to the gaze-incongruent area (cumulative accuracy). In 
accordance with infant eye-tracking studies (e.g. Senju & Csibra 2008), difference 
scores were calculated for this variable. We found that subjects looked longer to the 
gaze-congruent area than to the gaze-incongruent area after having seen ostensive 
addressing (one sample t-test, t(12) = 2.382; p = 0.034). However, this was not the 
case for the non-ostensive condition in which the difference score did not differ from 
zero (one-sample t-test, t(13) = -0.756; p = 0.46), indicating no tendency to follow 
the human’s gaze in the absence of communicative addressing (Figure 5.1.2.2).  
 
Figure 5.1.2.2.  
Difference scores 
calculated in OC, NO and 
BC conditions for 
cumulative accuracy. **p 
< .05, Error bars represent 
SE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This differential sensitivity to human referential gestures is strikingly similar 
to that of found in a study of 6.5 month-old human infants (Senju & Csibra 2008). A 
similar analysis on dogs’ first look did not reveal any significant bias towards the 
gaze-congruent area neither in OC nor in the NO conditions (one-sample t-test, t(12) 
= 1.167; p = .266; t(13) = -.105; p=.91, Figure 5.1.2.3). 
 Given the absence of a difference in first looks we analyzed also the latencies 
of first saccades toward the gaze-congruent region of interest. While the comparison 
did not reach significance, there was a numerical difference in this measure in favour 
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of the ostensive communicative condition (MeanOC = 1397 ms, SE = 524.01; MeanNO 
= 1757 ms, SE = 431.39; p>0.05, ns) 
 A within subject analysis of the difference scores for cumulative looking time 
in the two experimental conditions was run on the eleven subjects that gave valid 
data in both conditions. This analysis further confirms the notion that dogs were 
more likely to follow the model’s gaze in a gaze-congruent manner in the OC than in 
the NO condition (t(10) = 2.49; p = 0.03. Moreover the effect was independent of 
presentation order: If we analyze the cumulative looking time in an 2x2 ANOVA 
with order of presentation as between subject and experimental condition as within 
subject factors gave neither main effect of order (F(1,9) = 2.548; p = 0.14) nor 
interaction of order with the experimental conditions F(1,9) = 0.867; p = 0.376. Thus 
we concluded that the order of presentation played no role in our study. However, no 
difference was found between conditions for the first look (t(10) = -1.21; p = 0.25) . 
 
Figure 5.1.2.3.  
Difference scores 
calculated in OC, NO and 
BC conditions for first look. 
Error bars represent SE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We also explored the spatio-temporal pattern of eye movements during 
cueing phase, investigating how the gaze points move away from the midline of the 
display and approach the target objects. Gaze points were averaged into 1 s bins and 
were projected to the X axis of the display (Figure 5.1.2.4). The averaged eye 
movements showed a greater proximity to the target object only in the ostensive 
condition.  
 Thus, we may conclude that dogs’ context-dependent responsiveness to 
human head turning mirrors the specific effect of human ostensive communication 
on dogs cognitive processing. While the stimuli in the two conditions were equally 
successful in orienting dogs’ attention toward the actor’s head in the addressing 
phase, only the ostensive cues led to gaze following.  
 However, in order to elicit a comparable saliency of the addressing phases in 
the two conditions in the NO condition we displayed a moving attention getter on the 
model’s forehead (see Fig. 5.1.2.1C) similar to the infant study (Senju & Csibra 
2008). Importantly, however, this raises the possibility that not the absence of 
ostensive cues but the artificial nature of this stimulus has contributed to the reduced 
gaze following in the NO condition. To exclude this we measured the gaze following 
behaviour of 13 additional experimentally naïve dogs in a baseline control condition 
(BC) in which (i) the human actor turned her head without providing any ostensive 
cues (eye contact and addressing), (ii) the salient attention getter was removed from 
the addressing phase and (iii) the verbal addressing was replaced with neutral beep 
sound of similar duration and intensity in order to keep the auditory marking of this 
sequence comparable, while attracting the dogs’ attention to the screen.  
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Figure 5.1.2.4. 
The temporal dynamic of the eye movements 
during the cueing phase in OC and NO 
conditions. The gaze data recorded from the 
lower half of the screen capture the main trends 
of eye movements (with gaze coordinates 
projected to X axis; res. X=1280 pixels) as the 
mean gaze points move away from the midline 
of the display towards the gaze congruent (GC) 
or gaze-incongruent (GIC) region. After the 
actor’s head movement there is a peak that 
differs significantly from the central axis of the 
display only during the ostensive condition (*p 
< .05, Error bars represent SEM, 1° visual angle 
is approx. 40 pixels, Y axis represents time) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The data showed that gazing toward the region containing the actor’s face 
relative to the whole body in the addressing phase (12 dogs provided sufficient data 
in the addressing phase of this condition; Mean ±SE = 0.60 ±0.07) was comparable 
to that of found in OC (0.46 ±0.09) and NO (0.55 ±0.10) conditions. 
 However, dogs looked longer toward the body of the protagonist in both OC 
and NO conditions than in BC (400.2 ±106.9 ms; 2-sample t-tests: OC vs. BC t(21) = 
-3.44, p = 0.002; NO vs. BC t(21) = -2.187, p = 0.04). Thus, the combination of 
visual and audio components of the stimuli available in the addressing phase of OC 
and NO conditions (direct gaze and infant directed speech or visual grabber and adult 
directed speech) attracted more attention toward the human actor. Importantly, 
however, the accuracy indexes calculated for the cueing phase did not capture gaze 
following in BC (cumulative accuracy: one-sample t-test, t(12) = -.433, p = 0.67; 
first look: t(12) = 0.695, p = 0.5, see Figures 5.1.2.2 & 5.1.2.3).  Furthermore, dogs 
followed the actor’s gaze significantly less in the BC compared to the OC condition 
(cumulative accuracy, 2-sample t-test, t(24)=-2.107, p=0.045). These data suggest 
that the lack of gaze following, when there are no ostensive signals, cannot be 
accounted for by the confounding effect of “artificial” salient attention getter used in 
the NO condition also providing further support for the significant role of ostensive 
signals in dogs’ gaze response. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 These results indicate striking similarities between adult pet dogs and 
preverbal infants as regards their context specific responsiveness to human 
referential signals. Dogs seem to be receptive to human communication in a manner 
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that was previously only attributed only to 6-month-old human infants and they can 
read our intention to communicate in a preverbal, infant-like manner. 
 This conclusion is supported by the dogs’ bias to look longer towards the 
gaze-congruent area in the cuing phase of the ostensive - but not in the non-ostensive 
conditions. However, first look measures did not show significant context-specific 
differences despite the fact that this test variable is usually reported to be one of the 
strongest indexes to capture human gaze following in presence of ostensive-
communicative cues. The discrepancy between the two measures seems to suggest 
that while being overall sensitive to the ostensive signals, dogs, in contrast to 6.5 
month-old infants (Senju & Csibra 2008), might be less responsive to the actual 
onset of these cues. At an earlier age, even human infants show similar pattern: 
although 5 month-olds generally prefer to fixate gaze congruent objects, this bias is 
not reflected in their first gaze shifts (Gredeback et al. 2008). In line with data from a 
recent study (Williams et al. 2010) one may also argue that dogs are generally less 
accurate in their first fixations. Finally, it is also possible that our subjects by being 
allowed to move freely might have produced discontinuous eye gaze recording that 
introduced more noise in the first look analysis. 
 
 
5.1.3. STUDY VI. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 The results of the present experiments are in line with other observations on 
dog–human communicative interactions (e.g., Soproni et al. 2001; Call et al. 2003; 
Kaminski et al. 2009a; Kaminski 2009) showing that dogs are sensitive to the 
attentional cues of humans and respond sensitively to cues that signal the human’s 
communicative intent (see also STUDY VII). 
 The interesting aspect of the first experiment is that the dogs’ performance 
shows more advanced features as being restricted only to discriminate between 
others’ states being attentive and inattentive with them. Instead of the “all or none” 
response relying upon whether the human is facing to the dog or not, dogs displayed 
different responsiveness when the Instructor oriented to a human partner versus to 
empty space. This differentiation was significant, despite that the position, the head 
and body orientation and the verbal and non-verbal cues of the Instructor were the 
same in both conditions (‘Face to human partner’ versus ‘Look away’) and the only 
difference was that the human Partner was either in or out of the Instructor’s focus of 
attention. These results raise the possibility that dogs do not only engage in gaze 
following but are capable of visual perspective taking what can be defined as 
differential responsiveness to humans as a function of the human visual access to 
some object, subject or critical event (see Emery 2000).  
 Gaze-following behaviour among humans is an early emerging pervasive 
response (Butterworth 1991) and is frequently considered as a window into social 
cognition of different non-human species (Emery 2000). The results of the second 
experiment suggest that independently from the actual underlying mental 
mechanisms dogs display analogue functioning in terms of performance to preverbal 
infants in ostensive-communicative situations. Besides the susceptibility to human 
ostensive cues, dogs’ gaze following behaviour may also be considered as a socially 
facilitated orientation response with aspects linked to associative understanding of 
the net utility of the co-orientation with others. 
 It is also important to note that gaze cues (eye contact, gaze shift) were used 
in combination with ostensive addressing in the experiments thus the question about 
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the contribution of individual ostensive cues to dogs’ tendency to follow human gaze 
is still unanswered. Whether these cues act independently or in combination, and 
whether they can be ranked according to their efficiency in eliciting the 
communicative understanding of certain social interactions should be a target for 
further investigations.  
 The results of this study provide further support for the notion that dogs 
might have evolved a special, functionally infant-analogue “cognitive mindset”, 
which facilitates the emergence of communicative interaction with people as a result 
of proper socialization to human environment. Such socially motivated “cue-driven” 
gaze following displayed by preverbal infants and dogs is a necessary but probably 
not a sufficient precondition for a deeper understanding of the intentional-
communicative nature of referential signals. Altogether, these observations underline 
the importance of dogs in studying the evolution of social cognitive skills outside the 
primate line.  
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5.2. STUDY VII. THE INFLUENTIAL ROLE OF HUMAN 
COMMUNICATIVE SIGNALS  
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Many argue that socially provided information is particularly effective in influencing 
the behaviour of dogs even when the human’s action demonstration conveys 
inefficient or mistaken solution of task. In this study three experiments were 
designed to test how the social communicative signals affect the dog’s behaviour in 
simple object hide-and-search tasks. In the first experiment we explored whether 
adult pet dogs (N=35) are able to show inferential reasoning when searching for their 
toy. Visual cues (sight of the toy or sight of the empty container) and social 
communicative signals (directional gesture and gaze cues) were combined in six 
different experimental conditions. Results show that dogs are able to use inferential 
reasoning by exclusion (i.e. they can find the hidden toy if they have seen where the 
toy was missing). However, dogs were able to solve a reasoning task only when they 
could not rely on social-communicative cues and/or could not use any other simple 
discriminative stimuli (movement of a container) for making decisions.  
Results of the second experiment also support the primary importance of social 
cueing: dogs (N=25) preferred to choose the “socially-marked” container to the 
remotely moved one when they had no visual information about the location of the 
toy.  
The third experiment aimed to explore how the communicative nature of the 
demonstration context and the presence of the human demonstrator affect the dogs’ 
(N=60) and 18-month-old infants’ (N=57) object-choice behaviour. Beside species-
specific differences results showed a significant main effect of the presence or 
absence of the human communicative signals, and we also found some evidence for 
the response-modifying effect of the presence of the human demonstrator during both 
the dogs’ and human infants’ choice. These findings point to a special form of social 
influence in both dogs and human infants. 
 
 
 
 
 
*Based on: 
 
Erdőhegyi Á, Topál J, Virányi Zs, Miklósi Á. (2007). Dogs use inferential reasoning 
in a two-way choice task – only if they cannot choose on the basis of human-given 
cues. Animal Behaviour, 74: 725-737. 
 
Kupán K, Miklósi Á, Gergely Gy, Topál J. (2011) Why do dogs (Canis familiaris) 
select the empty container in an observational learning task? Animal Cognition 
14(2): 259-268. 
 
Kupán K, Krekó K, Király I, Gergely Gy, Topál J (submitted manuscript). Imitation 
versus emulation: communication signals and the demonstrator’s presence during 
re-enactment affect infants’ response. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Dogs are evolutionary distant relatives of humans, but have been subjected to 
very similar (“human-like”) adaptational demands during domestication. This could 
account for the dogs’ sophisticated social cognition (see Chapter 2 above for review). 
Dogs are not only able to make inferences about the communicative meaning of 
human gestural cues, as in indicating the location of reward, but they seem to 
understand the communicative cues in complex “triadic” situations where a human 
alternately interacts either with them or with an other human as well (see e.g. 
STUDY VI for more details).  
 On the other hand, some results from understanding means-end connection 
show that dogs are not able to process sophisticated forms of physical causality 
(Osthaus et al. 2005) and lend support to the speculations that this “inability” is the 
indirect consequence of the domestication process (i.e. the selection for physical 
intelligence was relaxed when dogs were domesticated - Frank 1980). In contrast, 
others suggest that dogs’ poor performance in tasks based on physical causality may 
be affected by pre-existing biases for social cues. Studies based on object 
permanence paradigm suggest that the ability to understand causal relationships as 
well as responsiveness to social cues influence the dogs’ performance in simple hide-
and-search tasks (see STUDY V & STUDY VIII for more details). Others (Szetei et 
al. 2003; Bräuer et al. 2006) have argued that in particular situations dogs, unlike 
apes, are more willing to rely on human communicative and behavioural cues to find 
a reward, than on perceptual cues of the physical world or on causal cue. For 
example, in two-way choice tasks in which dogs have a possibility to choose one of 
the possible hiding locations, subjects are biased to select the location mistakenly 
indicated by the human’s ostensive–communicative referential cues even if they had 
been unambiguously informed about the location of the reward (Szetei et al. 2003). 
These results are of great importance because in line with other studies (e.g. Hare & 
Tomasello 2005), they point to the strong impact of human communicative cues on 
dogs’ behaviour and suggest the hypothesis that dogs may also show evidence for 
infant-like context-dependent “efficiency blindness” in observational learning 
situations. 
 One of the striking characteristics of 12- to 24-month-old human infants’ 
social learning is that they are ready to imitate unusual inefficient actions and 
replicate unnecessary aspects of the observed behaviour even if they themselves 
could use an obvious, more efficient method for reaching the same goal (Meltzoff 
1988). Some studies argued that this “efficiency blindness” reflects the immaturity of 
causal understanding in infants (Dijksterhuis & Bargh 2001). In addition to causal 
opacity, another factor that is thought to be important in the emergence of “efficiency 
blindness” is whether the human demonstrator presents his/her action in an 
ostensive–communicative–referential manner (see e.g., Bekkering et al. 2000; 
Carpenter et al. 2002a; Gergely et al. 2002). Converging evidence indicates that 
infants are prone to show special sensitivity and preference for a basic set of 
ostensive–communicative and referential signals (such as direct eye contact, being 
addressed in motherese, gaze-shift etc. – see Csibra & Gergely 2009 for a recent 
review). Clearly, such early sensitivity to communicative cues may provide a 
necessary cognitive prerequisite that supports preverbal infants’ early emerging 
competence to engage in different types of social interactions. 
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 The present experiments aimed to test the hypothesis that dogs show evidence 
for infant-like context-dependent “efficiency blindness” in two-way object choice 
tasks.  
 In the first experiment dogs were provided with direct and indirect visual cues 
about the location of their favourite toy in order to see whether their choice 
behaviour could be interpreted in terms of inferential reasoning and/or “blind” 
responsiveness to social-communicative cues. In the two-way object hide-and-search 
task the visual cues (i.e. sight of the toy or sight of the empty container) and the 
attention-getting (social influencing) effect of human manipulation (i.e. touching, 
moving and looking at the container) were combined independently in the different 
experimental conditions.  
 
 
5.2.1. EXPERIMENT VII/1 
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects 
 
 Forty two adult pet dogs and their owners were recruited on voluntary basis. 
The only criterion for selection was that the dogs had to be highly motivated to play 
with a toy. Three dogs were rejected during the first few trials because they lost their 
interest in finding and retrieving the ball and an additional four subjects were 
excluded from the final analyses due to significant side preference (i.e. regardless of 
the actual place of the toy they approached the same container at least 10 times out of 
the 12 test trials - binomial test for side bias: p<0.04). The remaining 35 dogs (23 
males, 12 females; mean age±SD = 4±2.28 years) included 15 different recognized 
breeds (7 Parson russell terriers, 5 German shepherds, 2-2 Malinois, Labrador 
retrievers, Golden retrievers, Rottweilers, German pointers, 1-1 Miniature pinscher, 
Springer spaniel, Jack russell terrier, Border collie, Pumi, Doberman, Dogo 
Argentino, Mudi) and five mongrels. All participants were unaware in regards to the 
hypotheses and goals of the study.  
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 The experiments were recorded in a room (5 m x 2.5 m) where two identical 
containers (turned upside down) were placed 1.5 m apart to hide the toy. Containers 
were composed of an outer part (a brown plastic flower pot, 22 cm in diameter) and 
an inner one, a smaller brown plastic flower pot (20 cm in diameter). These were 
telescoped so, that they could be lifted together or one at a time, by the means of two 
strings (Figure 5.2.1.1).  
 
 
Figure 5.2.1.1. Possible 
ways of lifting the 
containers. 
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Pre-test trials 
 
 The owner made the dog to stand at a predetermined point in the room. The 
experimenter nicknamed the dog and placed the two containers equidistant from the 
dog (2m). Next she caught the dogs’ attention with the toy in her hand and then placed 
it under one of the containers while she alternated her gaze 3 times between the dog 
and the baited container. After baiting, she lifted up the baited container to about 40 
cm to reveal the ball under the container for 3 seconds, meanwhile she alternated her 
gaze 3 times between the dog and the manipulated container. Finally, the 
experimenter replaced the container, took up her initial position, turned her back to 
the dog and the subject was allowed to choose. If the dog chose the baited container it 
was allowed to play with the toy for some/a few seconds. The trial was repeated once 
more, but instead by hiding the toy under the other container. In trials 3 and 4 the 
same procedure was repeated with the exception that after the baiting the 
experimenter lifted only the outer part of the container (in the same way as described 
above). All dogs (but/except those who were excluded due to motivational problems 
– see Subjects) met the criterion of 3 or 4 correct choices. 
 
Test trials 
 
Each trial consisted of the following three phases:  
(1) Baiting: Having been called and shown the ball, the dog was prevented from 
witnessing the concealment by a green plastic barrier. The experimenter manipulated 
the left and then the right container and left the ball under one of them. Then she 
took up her initial position between the containers and the visual barrier was 
removed. 
 
(2) Providing information: The experimenter called the dog and administered one of 
the six following conditions.  
 
Both 
 The experimenter showed the content of both containers: first she stepped to the 
container on her left hand side and lifted it up (both the inner and the outer parts) 
revealing its content for 3 seconds. In parallel she alternated her gaze 3 times 
between the dog and the manipulated container. Next she went to the other container 
on her right and repeated the same procedure.  
 
Baited Only 
 The experimenter showed only the content of the baited container. She went 
to the baited container and lifted it up to reveal its content for 3 seconds and 
alternated her gaze between the dog and the baited container. She did not approach 
and touch the empty container.  
 
Balanced Baited 
 The experimenter showed only the content of the baited container (revealing 
its content for 3 seconds and gaze alternations between the dog and the baited 
container). She also lifted the outer part of the empty container and made gaze 
alternations between the dog and the empty container). 
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Empty Only 
 The experimenter showed the content of the empty container. She went to the 
empty container and showed its content accompanied by gaze alternations between 
the dog and the container but she did not approach and touch the baited container. 
 
Balanced Empty 
 The experimenter showed only the content of the empty container but lifted 
also the outer part of the baited container accompanied by gaze alternations between.  
 
Control 
 The experimenter manipulated both containers while she altered her gaze 3 
times between the dog and the hiding places. She did not provide information about 
the content of the containers because she lifted only their outer parts. 
 
(3) Selecting a container: After these demonstrations the experimenter returned to her 
starting position, turned her back to the dog and the owner released the dog to allow 
it to make a choice. If the dog chose the baited container it was allowed to play with 
the ball for a few seconds. 
 Each dog received two trials per condition (one left and one right baiting) in a 
single session (12 trials in all). Order of the conditions and reward positions (left vs. 
right) was predetermined and semi-random, with the restriction that the ball did not 
appear more than two times in succession on the same side. The whole session was 
videotaped and the choice behaviour of the subject was analysed later. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 A container was regarded as chosen by the subject if the dog turned it over, or 
touched it with its paw/muzzle or at least approached it (its paw/muzzle was closer 
than 10 cm to the container). In order to assess inter-observer agreement, a second 
person blind to the conditions, scored a randomly selected sample of 20 %. Cohen’s 
kappa value was 1 (100% agreement) showing extremely high level of reliability. 
 The number of correct choices (0, 1 or 2) was compared between the different 
testing conditions using nonparametric statistical methods (Friedman ANOVA, 
Wilcoxon rank sum test and Wilcoxon matched pairs test with false discovery rate 
correction (FDRbl adjustment, see Benjamini et al. 2001) at the group level.  
 It is also important to note that subjects could choose between the two 
possible target places on different decision making processes which can be 
formulated into “choice-rules”. These local rules (Natale et al. 1986) may be effective 
in helping subjects to recover the target object. In line with this, we also tested the 
relevance of two possible “choice-rules” for the description of the dogs’ performance.  
 First it is possible that in those conditions, when the experimenter 
manipulated both containers the sequence of human cueing cause a bias in dogs’ 
choice behaviour (having a stronger aftermath of human cueing in case of the last 
manipulated container). A second possible “choice-rule” can be formulated as “Go to 
the container under which the toy was hidden during the previous trial!” It seems 
reasonable to suppose that the sight of the reward under one of the containers (and 
getting the toy from under it) could cause the selection of the same container 
independently of the informing cues in the subsequent trial. Although the willingness 
to perform such perseverative actions often leads to erroneous choice behaviour 
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(Watson et al. 2001), in principle, the dog’s behaviour can be influenced by this in 
each condition. 
 The explanatory value of these rules in each condition for each dog was 
defined as the number of trials (0, 1 or 2) in which the choice behaviour of the dog 
was in accordance with the choice resultant from the rule. In line with this scoring 
subjects can be categorized into three main groups. Their choice behaviour 
corresponds with the rule in both trials (full correspondence) or only in one of the 
trials (no preferential use of the rule) or in neither of the trials (ignoring the rule). 
Using this categorization we have analysed whether subjects relied on any of the 
choice-rules based upon their decision or showed explicit ignorance of that rule 
(Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests with FDRbl adjustment).  
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
Testing the relevance of the choice-rules for the description of the dogs’ performance  
 Dogs did not follow the “Go to the container which was last manipulated by 
the experimenter!” rule in any of the conditions. In the Balanced Baited condition 
only 4 dogs showed full correspondence with the rule, 28 subjects performed no 
preferential use of the rule and 3 ones ignored it (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: p > 
0.05 ns). The distribution of subjects was similar in the other conditions (Balanced 
Empty: 9-16-10; Control: 9-16-10; Both: 1-34-0, p > 0.05 ns in each). The “Select 
the container rewarded previously!” rule was also not preferred in four conditions 
(Balanced Empty: full correspondence with the rule - 7 dogs, no preferential use of 
the rule - 22 dogs, ignoring the rule - 7 dogs; Empty Only: 11-18-6; Baited Only: 6-
12-17; Control: 10-16-9, p > 0.05, ns in each). Moreover dogs showed significant 
ignorance of the rule in the two experimental conditions (Both condition: full 
correspondence with the rule - 3 dogs, no preferential use of the rule - 7 dogs and 
ignoring the rule - 25 dogs; Balanced Baited: 3-14-18, p < 0.01).  
In summary, we found that dogs did not rely on simple choice rules even in the 
control condition when neither direct (sight of the toy), nor indirect (sight of the 
empty container) informing cues were given. 
 
Number of correct choices 
 The performance of the dogs was strongly influenced by the types of the test 
trials (chi2(5, 35) = 110.74, p < 0.001; Figure 5.2.1.2).  
 In line with our expectations dogs’ performance in non-informing (Control) 
condition was at chance level (T-(35) = 85.5, p = 1, ns). Moreover the number of 
correct choices was significantly above chance level when dogs were provided direct 
visual information about the location of the toy (correct responses: Both condition  – 
99.5%; Baited condition – 99.5%; Balanced Baited condition – 90%, T-(35) = 0, p < 
0.001 in each). In these three conditions the number of correct choices was 
significantly above the performance level shown in the Control trials (Both 
condition: T-(35) = 9.5, p < 0.01, Baited Only condition: T-(35) = 0, p < 0.01; 
Balanced Baited condition: T-(35) = 8.5, p < 0.01; Balanced Empty condition: T-(35) 
= -26.0, p < 0.05). 
 Regarding those two conditions when dogs were exposed to indirect visual 
information (i.e. they were shown the content of only the empty container) there 
were significant performance differences. Dogs performed significantly better than 
chance when they were shown the content of only the empty container, although both 
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had been manipulated by the experimenter (Balanced Empty: T-(35) = 8.5, p < 0.001). 
In contrast, when the experimenter had manipulated only the empty container 
showing its content (Empty condition), the dogs chose the baited one below chance 
level (T+(35) = 10.5, p < 0.001) and their performance was significantly lower 
compared to that shown in the Control condition T+(35) = 45.0, p < 0.01). 
 
 
Figure 5.2.1.2. 
The number of correct 
choices in the different types 
of test trials in the “social” 
task (median, quartiles and 
extremes). Significant 
differences from control are 
indicated by *: p < 0.05, **: 
p < 0.01 (N=35, Wilcoxon 
matched pairs tests with 
FDRbl adjustment). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 These results show that, not surprisingly, dogs were able to solve the search-
for-the-toy task when they had been informed about the location of the toy by direct 
visual cues (sight of the toy). However in those conditions in which a human gave 
indirect visual cues (sight of the empty container) the dogs’ performance was 
strongly influenced by the accompanying cues. When human manipulation was 
unbalanced (i.e. only the non-rewarded container was moved and marked by the 
human socially) dogs showed clear preference for the obviously empty container 
suggesting that these perceptual cues could supersede the reasoning abilities in dogs. 
In contrast, when dogs could observe communicative cues (looking at and touching) 
and movement for both target places in a balanced fashion, they were able to choose 
the rewarded container even if only the content of the empty one had been shown. 
This suggests that dogs can still infer the location of their toy relying on inference by 
exclusion. 
 Unconscious cueing of the human participants or smell of the reward did not 
influence the dogs’ choice behaviour as their performance was at chance in the 
control condition. Results suggest that dogs are able to perform simple inferential 
reasoning, but in fact they are often prevented from showing this competence by pre-
existing biases for such salient cues as movement of the container and social marking 
of some hiding locations. However, in this experiment these two types of perceptual 
information could not be separated from each other and the relative importance of 
“social marking” versus moving of the container could not be established. 
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5.2.2. EXPERIMENT VII/2 
 
 Results above have shown that human manipulation (social-communicative 
component: approach, gaze alternations, directional gestures toward the container) 
and/or the movements of the containers (non-social attention-capturing component) 
make that location attractive for the dogs despite the fact that the manipulated 
container is shown to be empty. Therefore the next experiment was designed to 
answer the following questions: 
 Does human manipulation of the empty container override the effect of direct 
visual information (sight of the reward in the non-manipulated container)?  
 Which component, the social-communicative or the non-social discriminative 
ones, can be regarded as the more important factor in the dogs’ choice?  
Using a novel apparatus (see Figure 5.2.2.1) we could separate the following factors 
from one another upon cueing: (I) social cues (approach, touching, gaze-alternation), 
(II) the movements of the container, and (III) showing the content of the container.  
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects 
 
 Twenty-six adult pet dogs (15 males, 11 females; mean age±SD = 3.2±1.92 
years) participated in this experiment and the only criterion for selection was that the 
dogs had to be highly motivated to play with a toy. None of them participated in the 
first and the second experiments. One female dog was excluded after the first few 
trials due to motivation problems. Thus the experimental group consisted of 25 dogs 
of eight different breeds (4 Border collies, 2-2 Parson russell terriers, Malinois, 1-1 
Jagd terrier, Airedale terrier, Golden retriever, Groenendael, Jack russell terrier) and 
12 mongrels. All participants were unaware in regards to the hypotheses and goals of 
the study. 
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 Experimental observations were recorded in the same room as in Experiment 
VII/1. In this case however, the experimenter could show the content of the boxes 
without any direct manipulation by hand (control was achieved remotely by a thin 
nylon string – see Figure 5.2.2.1 and Figure 5.2.2.2).  
 
 
Figure 5.2.2.1.  
The container in “closed” (a) 
and in “open” position (b). 
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 The two boxes were attached to a wooden frame with two pairs of strings 
which were used for moving the boxes either vertically or horizontally. The upper 
side of the frame was covered by a black screen so that the experimenter could lift 
the front side of the boxes or could move the boxes horizontally by using the strings 
in an unobtrusive manner. Each box could be positioned either at the point labelled 
P1 (close to the frame position) or at P2 (distant position). At the beginning of the 
trials, the dog was held by its owner at a distance of 2 m from the experimenter 
whilst the experimenter was standing behind the screen equidistant from the boxes 
and was facing the dog. 
 
 
Figure 5.2.2.2. 
Experimental apparatus. Six 
hooks are labelled as R1-3 
and L1-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-test trials 
 
 The procedure for the pre-test trials was basically the same as in Experiment 
VII/1. except that the experimenter made the ball visible by lifting the inner box by 
the string. In the four consecutive trials, all dogs except for one individual, met the 
criteria of at least 3 correct choices. 
 
Test trials 
 
 Test trials consisted of the same steps as in Experiment VII/1 (Baiting; 
Providing information; Selecting a container) and the basic procedure were identical 
to that described above. After baiting, the experimenter called the dog by its name and 
administered one of the following conditions. 
 
String / Baited Only 
 Boxes were placed near to the frame (P1 -see Figure 5.2.2.2). The 
experimenter stood behind the screen seemingly motionless and elevated the inner 
part of the baited box to reveal the ball by using the string (R1 or L1). She was 
wearing black sunglasses in order to avoid any unconscious cueing. After 3 seconds 
the inner box was lowered and the dog was allowed to make a choice.  
 
               dc_378_12
 129
String / Both 
 Arrangement of the boxes and the way of informing the dog was the same as 
in String / Baited Only condition, however, the experimenter showed the contents of 
both containers by using the strings (R1 and L1). 
 
Human / Baited Only  
 Boxes were placed near to the frame (P1), the screen was removed and the 
experimenter did not wear the dark sunglasses. The way of informing was identical 
to the Baited Only trial in Experiment VII/1. The experimenter stepped to the baited 
box and lifted its inner part revealing the content of the box for 3 seconds. In parallel 
she alternated her gaze 3 times between the dog and the manipulated container. Then 
she returned to her starting position, turned her back to the dog and the owner 
released the dog to make its’ choice. 
 
Human / Both 
 The position of the boxes and the method of informing was the same as in 
Human / Baited Only condition with the exception that the experimenter showed the 
contents of both containers. 
 
Visual cue vs. Human-given cues 
 The two boxes were close to the frame. One after the other, the experimenter 
showed the content of the baited box by using the string (R1 or L1) similarly as in 
String/Baited Only condition, and manipulated the empty box as well without 
showing its content: the experimenter put her palm on its top and alternated her gaze 
3 times between the dog and the manipulated container. Finally, she returned to her 
starting position (behind the screen) and put her sunglasses on.  
 
Visual cues vs. Box-Movement 
 The rewarded box was placed close to the frame (P1) while the empty box 
was at a distant position (P2). The experimenter remained behind the screen 
throughout the trial wearing dark sunglasses. She showed the content of the baited 
box by the string (R1 or L1 - as described above) and pulled the empty container 
from P2 to P1 position by the help of the horizontal string (R3 or L3).  
 
Human-given cues vs Box-Movement 
 The experimenter showed the content of neither the baited nor the empty box. 
One of the boxes was placed close to the frame (P1) while the other one was in 
distant position (P2).The experimenter put her palm on the top of the first box and 
alternated her gaze between the dog and this box three times. Then she returned to 
her starting position (behind the screen) and put her sunglasses on. The other box 
was remotely moved from P2 to P1 position using the horizontal string (R3 or L3). In 
one of these two trials the human-manipulated box was baited, in the other trial the 
string-moved box contained the toy. 
 
Control 
 Both hiding places were located close to the frame (P1). The experimenter did 
not provide information about the content of the boxes: she stood motionless wearing 
the sunglasses behind the screen for 10 seconds and then the dog was allowed to 
make a choice. 
 
               dc_378_12
 130
 Each dog received two trials with each condition in a single session (16 trials 
in all). Similarly to Experiment VII/1, all conditions were presented in semi-random 
order and the position of the reward (left vs. right) was also randomly determined 
with the restriction that the ball did not appear more than two times in succession on 
the same side. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 The number of correct choices was recorded and compared to chance level 
(Wilcoxon signed rank tests) and Wilcoxon matched pairs tests with FDRbl 
adjustment used to make pair-wise comparisons between conditions.  
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
Performance in conditions involving direct visual information 
 Dogs were significantly above the 50% chance performance in those 
conditions when they had received direct visual information about the content of 
either the baited box only or both the baited and the empty ones (String / Baited 
Only: T-(25) = 0, p < 0.001; String / Both: T-(25) = 0, p < 0.001; Human / Baited 
Only: T-(25) = 0, p < 0.001; Human / Both: T-(25) =0, p < 0.001). Moreover dogs 
performed above chance level also in the two testing conditions when the direct view 
of the reward and the social cues or the movement of a box were presented on 
conflicting sides (Visual cues vs. Human-given cues: T-(25) = 0, p < 0.001; Visual 
cues vs. Box-movement: T-(25) = 0, p < 0.001). Accordingly in all of these conditions 
(where direct visual information regarding the whereabouts of the toy was given) the 
dogs’ performance was significantly better than in the Control trials (Wilcoxon 
matched pairs tests with FDRbl adjustment: p < 0.01 in each case). It seems evident 
that when the bait was directly seen under the baited box, neither the social cues 
(human manipulation) nor the movement of the empty box were sufficient to distract 
the dogs’ choice.  
 
Performance in non-informing conditions 
 The number of correct choices were at chance level in the Control condition 
where no cues were given at all (T+(25) = 13.5, p = 0.547, ns). In this condition, dogs 
chose from among the boxes randomly and they did not even show any side bias 
(testing was based on the number of dogs choosing the right side against the 
hypothetical median of 1 and did not show significant difference; T+(25) = T-(25) = 
68, p = 1, ns).  
 In the Human-given cues vs. Box-movement condition where dogs were also 
not informed about the location of the toy, subjects showed preference for the 
human-manipulated box, that is, dogs chose the human-manipulated box more often 
than the moving box (T-(25) = 50, p = 0.039). 14 out of the 25 dogs repeatedly chose 
the human-manipulated box whereas only 5 of them chose the moving box twice and 
6 of them chose the human manipulated box and the moving box once each during 
the two trials. 
 In agreement with our observations in the first experiment, these results 
underline the dominant role of the direct visual information (sight of the toy) when 
dogs are allowed to see where the toy is and to select one of the two containers after 
it. Furthermore, our results suggest that social-communicative cues (approach, 
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touching, gaze-alternation) can be considered as the more important factor for the 
dogs’ choice in comparison with nonsocial-discriminative stimulus (movement of the 
container). When dogs had no direct information about the location of the toy but 
could witness the seemingly self-propelled moving away of one of the boxes and 
human communication cues (tapping, looking at) towards the other one, subjects 
showed significant preference for the human-manipulated target place. That is, more 
individuals chose repeatedly the “socially-marked” container than the remotely 
moved one. 
 The results from these two experiments support the notion that dogs’ 
reasoning ability is suppressed by a prevailing bias to attend movements and human 
ostensive-communicative manipulation and this behaviour can be regarded as 
functionally analogous to that shown by human infants. Ostensive–communicative 
and referential cues can guide the infants’ attention and influence their inferences 
and interpretations about the action demonstration so that they will be more willing 
to re-enact unusual and less efficient actions (see STUDY VIII for more details). 
Moreover, many argue that in some of the cognitive tasks, human infants show 
similar patterns of success and error suggesting that children’s competence is often 
hidden by bias which is a simple heuristic whose usefulness and prevalence declines 
with age (Mitchell 1996).  
 
 
5.2.3. EXPERIMENT VII/3 
 
 Reviewing the recent literature, it is unclear, however, how the two 
potentially interacting factors, the ostensive–communicative signals of the 
demonstration context and the presence of the human instructor during the choice 
contribute to the emergence of the aforementioned efficiency blindness in the dog as 
compared to human infants. Therefore, in this study, we investigated how the 
different combinations of these two factors affect the behaviour of dogs and 18-
month-old infants in a two-way choice observational learning task. In the 
demonstration phase subjects could see how a tennis ball can be retrieved from under 
an opaque container by the manipulation of a distant and obviously empty 
(transparent) one. Importantly, the situation was conflicting as subjects could either 
rely on the observed action (selecting the human-manipulated empty container) or 
emulate the goal by performing a more efficient alternative solution (selecting the 
baited container).  
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects 
 
 Dogs: 87 adult pet dogs and their owners were recruited from various dog 
training schools. Participation in the tests was voluntary and the only criterion for 
selection was that the dogs had to be highly motivated to play with a toy. Seven dogs 
were excluded from the final analyses due to technical reasons (inaccurate 
demonstration — 4 dogs; problem with the recording — 1 dog; the owner did not act 
in line with instructions — 2 dogs). There were twenty dogs that were unwilling to 
participate in the test (totally lost interest in the task and did not make any choice). 
The sixty dogs of 24 different breeds and 18 mongrels (31 males and 29 females; 
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mean age ±SD = 3.8±2.4 years, range: 1–14 years) that were included in the final 
analyses were participated randomly in five experimental groups (see Table 5.2.3.1).  
 Infants: 81 toddlers (47 boys, 34 girls, mean age = 18 months, range: 17.1–
18.9 months) with their parents participated. Twenty four infants were excluded from 
the analysis because of different reasons: parental interference — 8 infants; failed 
demonstration — 4 infants; technical problems with the recording — 1 infant; did 
not make any choice (refused to participate) — 11 infants. Each subject was tested 
only once. 
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 Dogs were tested either at the Department of Ethology, Eötvös Loránd 
University, Budapest (N = 53) or at the Department for Behaviour, Neurobiology 
and Cognition, Vienna University (N = 23). Infants were observed in a room at the 
Institute of Psychological Research, Hung. Acad. Sci. The same experimental setup 
and apparatus were used in each case.  
 A transparent and an opaque plastic container of similar shape and size (16 
cm high and 16 cm in diameter) were placed 0.6 m apart. Both were turned upside 
down and placed on a black platform (20 x 20 x 6 cm). The white opaque container 
was used to hide the target object (a tennis ball). The platform was slightly aslope so 
that the tennis ball rolled down if the baited container was elevated. The two 
containers were connected by the means of a string, which was led through 2 pulleys 
that were fixed to the ceiling. An orange curtain covered the pulleys, and this was 
also used to prevent the dogs from witnessing some of the manipulations with the 
containers (see below). This apparatus makes the demonstrator possible to lift the 
opaque (baited) container by means of moving the empty transparent one 
horizontally (see Figure 5.2.3.1).  
 
 
Figure 5.2.3.1.  
Schematic representation of the 
experimental apparatus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The procedure included two phases. First, the human repeatedly (three times) 
demonstrated a less efficient solution of the task (i.e. she obtained the target object 
by means of manipulating the empty container - demonstration phase) and finally the 
subject was allowed to explore the experimental set up (Test trial). 
 
Demonstration phase  
The dog was led by the owner to a predetermined point, at a distance of 3 m 
from the apparatus, and held it there by its collar. The parent was asked to sit down 
Baited 
container 
Empty 
container
Tennis ball 
Connection
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on a chair facing the containers (at 3 m distance) and was asked to hold the infant on 
his/her lap. The demonstrator got the ball and placed it under the opaque container, 
while the curtain prevented the dog/infant from witnessing the baiting procedure.  
Subjects witnessed the demonstrations in one of the following contexts (see Table 
5.2.3.1): 
 
 Communicative demonstration (Com)  
The demonstrator (a 25-year-old woman) who was standing between the two 
containers pulled back the curtains and looked at the dog. She addressed the subject 
( “Subject’s Name]! + Watch!”), and when the dog/infant looked at her face, she bent 
her upper body and touched the two containers simultaneously. Then, she took an 
upright position and addressed the subject again („Look at this!”). At the moment, 
the demonstrator could make eye contact with the dog/infant she crouched grasping 
the transparent empty container by both hands and placing it to the ground ahead of 
the platform (Figure 5.2.3.2a). Thereupon, the baited container elevated and the 
tennis ball rolled out towards the dog/infant. The demonstrator turned her head 
towards the ball shifting her gaze conspicuously from the subject to the ball. Finally, 
she picked the ball up and dropped it to the ground two times, but she did not give it 
to the subject. She closed the curtain and replaced the ball under the opaque 
container. 
 
 Non-communicative demonstration (NonCom) 
The procedure was identical to that described in the communicative demonstration 
condition, except for that the demonstrator performed the actions without ostensive–
communicative signals (Figure 5.2.3.2b). That is, she did not look at the dog/infant 
and never addressed it. During the whole procedure, the demonstrator was mumbling 
a short poem. This was to attract the subject’s attention to the demonstration non-
communicatively, without giving any direct instruction to the dog/infant. The 
position of the baited container (left or right hand side) was counterbalanced between 
subjects in each group. 
 
Figure 5.2.3.2.  
Photo illustration of the a 
Communicative demonstration 
(Com) and b Non-Communicative 
demonstration (NonCom) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test trial 
 
 
 Immediately after the third demonstration, the demonstrator closed the curtain 
and placed the ball under the opaque container. Then, she pulled back the curtains 
again and either left the room (Demonstrator absent condition) or remained there 
(Demonstrator present condition). In the latter case, she was standing motionless at a 
predetermined point (on the left side of the dog/infant). Once the demonstrator left or 
took her predetermined position, the owner (mother) released the dog (infant) and 
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encouraged it (saying “You can go!” It’s yours!”) to explore and manipulate the 
apparatus. The trial was terminated after 20 s (for dogs) and 90 s (for infants). During 
the test trial, the demonstrator did not talk to and did not look at the subject. 
 The whole session was videotaped by two cameras (one facing the subject 
and one facing the experimental apparatus), and the behaviour of subjects was 
analysed later.  
 
Group Demonstration  phase: Test phase: 
Dogs:  
males & females 
(mean age ±SD) 
Infants  
boys & girls 
Com-
D/present 
Demonstrator 
present 
11 & 6 
(4.3±3.5) 7 & 8 
Com-
D/absent 
Communicative 
demonstration 
Demonstrator 
absent 
8 & 7 
(4.2±1.9) 7 & 7 
NonCom-
D/present 
Demonstrator 
present 
6 & 8 
(2.5±1.9) 6 & 8 
NonCom-
D/absent 
Non-communicative 
demonstration Demonstrator 
absent 
6 & 8 
(4.5±3.1) 7 & 7 
 
Table 5.2.3.1. Summary of the experimental conditions and subjects 
Com-D/present Group: 2 Border collies, 1-1 Airdale terier, Appenzeller, Golden retriever, 
Malenois, Russian terrier, Kelpie, Parsons russel terrier, Sheltie and 7 mongrels 
Com-D/absent Group: 4 Border collies, 1-1 Basset hound, Groenendael, Malenois, Pincher, 
Mudi, Hovawarth, Labrador retriever, German shepherd and 3 mongrels 
NonCom-D/present Group: 2 Golden retrievers, 1-1 Briard, Border collie, Dachshund, 
German shepherd, Hungarian vizsla, Labrador retriever, Transylvanian hound and 5 
mongrels 
NonCom-D/absent Group: 2-2 Border collies, Golden retrievers, 1-1 Briard, Malenois, 
Springer spaniel, Labrador retriever, Staffordshire terier, Foxterrier, English bulldog and 3 
mongrels 
 
Data collection and analysis  
 
 A container was regarded as chosen if the dog turned it over or touched it 
with its paw/muzzle or at least approached it (its paw/muzzle was closer than 5 cm to 
the container), and if the infant turned it over or touched it with his/her hand. There 
were two infants who clearly selected a container without touching it (approached 
and pointed at it). In these cases this response was coded as choice behaviour. To 
assess inter-observer agreement, a second person blind to the demonstration 
condition scored a randomly selected sample of 63% (dogs) 90% (infants). Cohen’s 
kappa values were 0.904 (dogs) and 0.927 (infants) showing a high level of 
reliability.  
 We recorded the subjects’ ‘First choice’ (i.e. whether the dogs/infants 
inspected first the baited or the empty container) and we also coded the subjects’ 
‘Shift between the locations’ (i.e. whether subjects proceeded to the baited container 
after the empty one had been visited). The effects of demonstration context 
(communicative vs. non-communicative), and the presence of demonstrator during 
the test trial on the dogs’ first choices was analysed by Generalized Linear Model for 
binary data (SPSS, version 17). For the analysis of the dogs’ and infants’ first choice, 
we also employed binomial tests to see whether there was significant bias towards 
the empty or baited location within the groups. Due to multiple comparisons levels of 
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significance (p) were corrected (FDRbh adjustment, see Benjamini & Yekutieli 
2001). 
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
 The GLM analysis of the subjects’ first choice as a function of both 
independent variables (presence or absence of the human’s communicative action; 
presence or absence of the demonstrator during choice) showed significant effect of 
the demonstration context for both dogs (Com vs. NonCom; chi2(1) = 7.585, p = 
0.006) and human infants (chi2(1) = 9.599, p = 0.002). In contrast, the presence of 
the demonstrator was not significant (D/present vs. D/absent; dogs: chi2(1) = 1.163, 
p = 0.281, infants: chi2(1) = 0.964, p = 0.326). The interaction of the two factors 
proved to be significant for infants (chi2(1) = 6.225, p = 0.013) but not for dogs 
(chi2(1) = 1.163, p = 0.281).  
 A group by group analysis of the firstly selected container showed that the 
presence or absence of the demonstrator during choice had no influence on dogs’ 
first choice in the non-communicative demonstration contexts (subjects preferred to 
choose the baited container in both NonCom-D/present and NonCom-D/absent 
conditions; binomial test, p < 0.01 for both). However, after having watched a 
communicative demonstration, dogs showed the same selection bias only when the 
demonstrator was absent (binomial test, p < 0.05) but not when she was present 
(binomial test, p = 0.332). In the case of human infants this analysis provides a 
somewhat different picture: Infants showed a significant tendency to choose the 
empty container in the in the communicative demonstration contexts (Com-
D/present: p < 0.05; Com-D/absent: p < 0.01) and a significant tendency to approach 
and inspect the baited container first in the NonCom-D/absent condition (p < 0.05) 
(Figure 5.2.3.3).  
 
 
Figure 5.2.3.3.  
Percentage of dogs and 
infants approaching and 
inspecting the baited 
container first in the 
different demonstration 
contexts. **p < 0.01; *p < 
0.05; in comparison with the 
success rate expected by 
random search (binomial 
tests). 
 
 
 
 
Shift between the locations 
 During the test trial, subjects had a possibility to approach and inspect both 
containers, or they could select only one of these. Based on these possibilities dogs 
and infants were categorized in one of the three response categories (i.e. “empty 
only”, “baited only” and “empty then baited”). Table 5.2.2.3 indicates that infants 
predominantly gave ‘empty only’ response in the two communicative demonstration 
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contexts (Com-D/present & Com-D/absent) as well as when after having seen non-
communicative demonstration the human demonstrator remained present (NonCom-
D/present). Infants choose an emulative solution (i.e. selecting the baited container) 
only when they saw non-communicative demonstration and the human was not 
present in the test phase.  
 
 
 Container inspected by the subject 
 Empty 
Only 
Empty  
then Baited 
Baited 
Only 
Empty 
Only 
Empty 
then 
Baited 
Baited 
Only 
Groups DOGS INFANTS 
Com-D/present 35.3% 29.4% 35.3% 66.7% 13.3% 20% 
Com-D/absent 6.7% 20% 73.3% 78.6% 14.3% 7.1% 
NonCom-
D/present 
0% 7.2% 92.8% 42.9% 28.6% 28.6% 
NonCom-
D/absent 
0% 7.2% 92.8% 7.1% 7.1% 85.7% 
 
Table 5.2.3.2. Proportion of dogs and infants inspecting ‘only the empty’; ‘only the baited’; 
or ‘first the empty and then the baited’ containers during the test trials. 
 
 Dogs, however, selected the baited container in all but one condition. Only 
those dogs who were tested in the presence of the demonstrator after having 
witnessed ostensive–communicative demonstrations (Com-D/present group) showed 
infant-like (“imitative”) response pattern. In this condition the majority of those dogs 
who inspected first the empty container (6 out of 11 individuals) seemingly ignored 
the toy object as they did not proceed to the baited container after the empty one had 
been visited. In the other three conditions there were only 6 dogs (out of 43 
individuals) that approached first the empty container and almost all of them (5) 
proceeded to the baited container within few seconds.  
 Dogs’ and infants’ performance in the non-communicative & demonstrator 
absent condition clearly indicates that the unusual and causally opaque 
demonstrations (i.e. remote manipulation of the baited container) in general cannot 
distract the subjects’ attention from the goal and cannot inhibit the subjects from 
approaching the baited container directly. It seems however, that the accompanying 
ostensive-communicative signals and the presence of the human demonstrator during 
the test trial affect subjects’ choice behaviour. 
 Infants’ predominantly “imitative” responses in the communicative 
demonstration contexts are in line with earlier findings (Király et al. 2004; Nielsen 
2006; McGuigan et al. 2007) and this is also congruent with the natural pedagogy 
account (Csibra & Gergely 2009). That is the context-dependent performance of 18-
month-olds may stem from selective encoding of the social learning situation in 
which the presence of the demonstrator has an important modulatory role on 
interpretation of the task. The ostensive-communicative demonstration can be 
interpreted as teaching manifestation that triggers a less efficient “imitative” 
response, whereas the non-communicative demonstration focuses infants’ attention 
to the goal that can be best achieved by emulation.  
 Although in general dogs preferred the simpler, evident solution (direct 
approach) over the less efficient demonstrated one, there was a combination of the 
situational factors that led to a reduced tendency of goal directedness. Namely, when 
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human manipulated the empty container expressing her overt communicative 
intention towards the dog and she was still present during the testing phase (Com-
D/present), subjects did not show significant bias to the baited container.  
 One possible explanation of dogs’ infant-like efficiency blindness in the 
strongest ostensive-communicative condition is based on a motivational account. 
Recent evidence suggests that in social learning situations ostensive–communicative 
cues may trigger higher levels of arousal and activity in dogs (Range et al. 2009a). 
Thus, one may assume that the change in the dogs’ search pattern lies in the 
differential motivational effect of the different demonstration conditions. That is, 
dogs were better motivated to participate in the task (they were more willing to 
approach and inspect the apparatus as a whole) in the communicative demonstration 
conditions and this, incidentally, led to a higher probability of visiting the empty 
container. This account, however, is not supported by our observations showing that 
dogs made their choice shortly after having released (within 3–5 s on average) in 
each condition, and there were only three dogs out of the 57 (2 in Com-D/present and 
1 in NonCom-D/present groups) that did not make their first choice within 10 s. This 
suggests that although dogs were similarly motivated to participate in the task, there 
could be specific differences in their decision-making processes across contexts.  
 Another explanation can be raised on the basis of the dogs’ attention and 
memory processes. Recently, it has been shown that attention is an important 
variable when testing dogs in social situations (Range et al. 2009b). In line with this, 
one may suppose that signals expressing the demonstrator’s communicative intent 
focused the dog’s attention to the steps of demonstration and therefore enhanced the 
capacity of the dog to encode the human’s actions during the observation and display 
more effective recall during choice (see also Pongrácz et al. 2004). Moreover, the 
presence of the human demonstrator in the testing phase probably acted as a 
“reminder cue”, which facilitated recalling the demonstration. It follows from these 
that the presence of the human demonstrator in the test phase and the communicative 
signals as a part of the demonstration could have had an independent (additive) effect 
leading to a decrease in goal-directed search behaviour (selecting the baited 
container). Importantly, our results do not seem to support this account as we could 
find only marginal effect of the human’s presence during the test phase on the dogs’ 
choice behaviour. 
 Third, we can offer a social communicative account, for the findings we 
found. In this experiment, human demonstration might have two possible roles: acted 
as triggering and facilitating either a preference for obtaining the desired object in the 
most efficient way or rather to act in line with the human demonstration. In the 
former case, the demonstration could be perceived as not having communicative 
flavour and moving of the empty container simply informed the dog about the goal 
of the task (“there is a ball under the opaque container”). Results show that dogs in 
the non-communicative demonstration contexts mainly utilized this kind of 
emulative meaning of the observed demonstrations and they preferred the effective, 
species-specific solution (approaching the baited container directly). However, the 
human’s demonstration could also be perceived as communicative manifestation that 
acted as not only making the subject to recognize the location of the reward but 
manifesting a specific behaviour. This raises the possibility that the demonstration of 
this causally opaque, inefficient action was regarded as a communicative 
manifestation of an “episodic imperative” by the human (“Go to the empty 
container!”).  
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5.2.4. STUDY VII. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 As a summary of the above experimental observations we can conclude that 
those conditions in which demonstrations were accompanied by the human’s 
communicative signals, especially if the human demonstrator remained present 
during test trials, dogs showed some tendency of using the human referential cues to 
specify the spatial location where the act was required to be performed, and as a 
consequence, they selected the baited container less frequently in comparison with 
other demonstration contexts.  
 The first experiment of this study provides one of the few experimental 
evidences for inferential reasoning in dogs (see also Kaminski et al. 2004). 
Interestingly however, our results suggest that this ability is often masked by their 
bias for cues of human communication. Namely, human cues are much more 
important for the dogs than the sight of the empty container and based the results of 
the second experiment it seems that human-given cues can even be more important 
than salient discriminative stimuli, such as the moving of the hiding places. 
 Dogs’ tendency to carry out a counterproductive response in object choice 
situations if one location is misleadingly indicated by the human communicative cues 
fits well with some earlier observations (Szetei et al. 2003; Prato-Previde et al. 2008). 
Our findings are also in line with the social-dog, causal-ape hypothesis (Bräuer et al. 
2006) suggesting that dogs, unlike chimpanzees, would rather use the human 
communicative (pointing, looking at) and behavioural cues (trying to open a box or 
trying to reach something) while they fail to use the causal cues (e.g. the presence or 
absence of the noise or the smell of the food) to find the hidden reward in 
observational learning situations. Accordingly it can be speculated that the restricted 
manifestation of dogs’ reasoning abilities is not due to the effect of domestication in 
the reduction of problem solving abilities (Frank 1980) but it is being masked by bias 
in following social cues. This would be in line with our dependency argument (see 
Topál et al. 1997). The notion that dogs prefer to use the human demonstrator as a 
“social tool” to reproduce the desired result is gained further support from the finding 
that only a few (2–6) dogs obtained the reward on their own in the different 
demonstration conditions of the third experiment as if they were waiting for the 
human’s help in spite of the fact that retrieving an object from under an opaque 
container is motorically not a demanding task for a dog.  
 In addition to providing further support for the importance of the social 
communicative signals in observational learning situations, the results of the present 
study raise the possibility that like in infants (see also Király 2009), the presence of 
the human demonstrator also plays some behaviour modulating and constraining role 
in observational learning situations when it comes to learning about causally opaque 
and less efficient (compared to what comes natural to the dog) action demonstrations. 
In certain situations, dogs’ behaviour is probably driven by a motivation to satisfy 
ostensively signalled human imperatives in the “here-and-now” (see also STUDY 
VIII) and the ostensively communicated human action demonstrations can be 
functionally interpreted as imperatives by dogs with the function of performing the 
observed action in the presence of (and “for”) the human demonstrator.  
 In agreement with the studies showing specific sensitivity to human’s 
communicative signals in dogs (e.g., Kaminski et al. 2009b; Riedel et al. 2008), our 
results suggest that for the dog, the function of human demonstration is not (only) 
transferring knowledge but disposing behaviour actions. Supposedly, this form of 
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social influence has been evolved to evade conflicts in the group and to co-operate in 
common actions without any deeper insight into the knowledge content of other’s 
mind. Nevertheless, future studies are needed in order to reveal, whether the 
influential effect of communicative signals of the demonstration context on dogs’ 
choice actually reflected their willingness to follow a specific order or 
communicative cueing and other contextual factors simply distracted them from the 
more effective, emulative solution.  
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5.3. STUDY VIII. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO HUMAN COMMUNICATIVE 
SIGNALS AS AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE PIAGETIAN A-
not-B ERROR.* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Having repeatedly retrieved an object from a location, human infants tend to search 
the same place even when they observe the object being hidden at another location. 
This perseverative error is usually explained by infants’ inability to inhibit a 
previously rewarded search response or to recall the new location. In the first 
experiment we show that the tendency to commit this error is substantially reduced 
when the object is hidden in front of 10-month-old infants without the experimenter 
using the communicative cues that normally accompany object hiding in this task. 
This result clearly shows that communicative cues from the experimenter contribute 
to the emergence of this perseverative search error.  
In a second experiment we replicate these results with adult pet dogs, who also 
commit more search errors in ostensive-communicative than in non-communicative 
or non-social hiding contexts.  
In the next experiment we test whether simple learning processes and/or confounding 
effects of procedural factors play an important role in dogs’ perseverative error. The 
results of this experiment support the hypothesis that the dogs’ A-not-B error may 
reflect a special sensitivity to human communicative cues.  
A further comparative investigation indicates that human-reared wolves do not show 
dog-like context-dependent differences of search errors. This finding supports the 
notion that shared sensitivity to human communicative signals stems from 
convergent social evolution of the Homo and the Canis genera.  
However, the results of the fifth experiment show some species-specific differences 
suggesting that communicative signals serve different functions for dogs and infants. 
In sum, these findings provide an alternative theoretical perspective on the nature of 
infants’ and dogs’ perseverative search errors.  
 
*Based on:  
 
Topál J., Gergely Gy., Miklósi Á., Erdőhegyi Á., Csibra G. (2008).  Infants’ 
perseverative search errors are induced by pragmatic misinterpretation. Science, 
321 (5897), 1831-1834. 
 
Topál, J., Gergely, Gy., Erdőhegyi, Á., Csibra, G., Miklósi, Á. (2010). Differential 
sensitivity to human communication in dogs, wolves and human infants. Science, 325 
(5945), 1269-1272.  
 
Topál, J., Miklósi, Á., Sümegi, Zs., Kis A. (2010). Response to comments on 
“Differential sensitivity to human communication in dogs, wolves and human 
infants.” Science, 329 142d 1624 doi:10.1126. 
 
Kis, A., Topál, J., Gácsi, M., Range, F., Huber, L., Miklósi, Á., Virányi, Zs. (in press). 
Does the A-not-B error in adult pet dogs indicate sensitivity to human 
communication? Animal Cognition 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Subjects’ abilities for understanding the physical world are often tested in 
hide-and-search tasks, including the standard A-not-B task (Piaget 1954). A classic 
phenomenon of this experimental paradigm is the perseverative search error 
(sometimes called the A-not-B error), a well-known and robust mistake that infants 
close to one year of age and some other nonhuman species normally commit (see 
Gomez 1995 for a review). 
 In the standard A-not-B task, a demonstrator repeatedly places an object 
under one (A) of two opaque containers (‘A’ and ‘B’) in full view of the subject. 
After each hiding event, the subject is allowed to retrieve the object. This is followed 
by test trials where the demonstrator places the object under container ‘B’ and allows 
the subject to search for it. Despite just having seen the object being hidden at the 
new location, infants between 8 and 12 months of age frequently look for it under 
container ‘A’ where it had been previously hidden. 
 During the past decades, a wide range of explanations have been proposed to 
account for this response bias and the phenomenon continues to be of theoretical 
interest for researchers of infant cognitive development (see e.g., Wellmann et al. 
1987 for a review). The A-not-B error is usually ascribed to a deficit in inhibitory 
control over a previously rewarded motor response (Diamond 1985), or to constraints 
on short-term memory (Bjork & Cummings 1984), or to an attentional bias to the 
location where the previously observed manual responses have been directed 
(Ruffman & Langman 2002). Others suggest that observing repeated hiding events at 
location ‘A’ leads to automatic motor simulation (covert imitation) of the action 
through the activation of the mirror neuron system (Longo & Berthental 2006). 
 In contrast to the focus of such accounts on infants’ repeated responses 
directed at container A, we have examined the perseverative error from a different 
perspective by exploring the potential role of the communicative demonstration 
context of the task. The A-not-B task normally involves face-to-face interaction, in 
which object hiding is accompanied by the demonstrator’s ostensive and referential 
signals (such as eye-contact, infant-directed speech, addressing the baby by name, 
pointing at and/or looking back-and-forth between the hiding location and the infant, 
see Csibra & Gergely 2006).  
 Convergent findings indicate that human infants pay special attention to 
various non-verbal communicative signals directed at them (such as eye contact, 
gaze-shifts, and pointing – Gergely et al. 2007; Senju & Csibra 2008; Yoon et al. 
2008). Recent evidence suggests that signals conveying manifestation of intention to 
communicate induce a learning attitude (a receptive ‘pedagogical learning stance’ - 
Csibra & Gergely 2009) in infants, which enables them to acquire knowledge from 
observation of adults’ demonstrations. That is, ostensive-referential communicative 
signals can play an interpretation-modulating role leading to selective encoding of 
different aspects of action demonstrations in social learning tasks (e.g., Brugger et al. 
2007; Nielsen 2006).  
 In line with these findings the hiding events in the standard A-not-B task can 
be interpreted not only as indicating episodic information about the referent’s current 
location (“the target object is now under container A”), but as communicating 
information about some generalizable property of the referent kind (e.g., “this type of 
object is usually found in container A”) or as “imperatives” with the function of 
performing the observed action (e.g., “produce search behaviour at location A”). 
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5.3.1. EXPERIMENT VIII/1 
 
 In the first experiment we hypothesized that in the A-not-B paradigm the 
human infant’s built-in interpretive bias of generalizability may result in a pragmatic 
misinterpretation of the object hiding actions as potential teaching demonstrations. 
As a result, after having witnessed the ostensive-communicative hiding actions 
during the ‘A’ trials, the infant would tend to commit the perseverative search error 
during ‘B’ trials because they infer and learn some generalizable information such as 
“this kind of object is to be found in container A” or “we keep toys in container A”. 
To test this hypothesis, we examined infants’ object search behaviour in the A-not-B 
task in conditions varying the presence or absence of the social-communicative 
context of the hiding events. We predicted that in a non-communicative action 
observation condition, which lacks ostensive signals but provides experience with 
repeated motor search responses directed at container ‘A’, the perseverative search 
error should be significantly reduced. 
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects  
 
 Forty-two 10-month-old infants participated in the experiment (22 boys, 20 
girls; mean age±SD = 308±16.3 days). They were assigned to the ostensive-
communicative (N = 14, 9 boys, 5 girls; mean age 309.6 days), non-communicative 
(N = 14, 8 boys, 6 girls; mean age 308 days) and non-social (N = 14, 5 boys, 9 girls; 
mean age 306.1 days) hiding contexts so that the distribution of age and gender 
would not differ by condition. Six additional infants failed to pass the reaching 
criterion in the ‘A’ trial phase (see Procedure) or totally lost interest in the task by 
the end of the ‘A’ trials, and 4 infants were excluded from the final sample because 
of parental interference. Infants were recruited from a database at the Research 
Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and were given a small 
gift for participating. The parents of all participants gave informed consent. 
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 The experiments took place in a room (4 x 4 m) at the Institute for 
Psychological Research. Only the mother, the infant and the experimenter were 
present during the procedure, which was video-taped for later evaluation. The object 
hiding tasks were presented on a rectangular (60 x 120 cm) table with a cardboard 
sheet (80 x 20 cm) on it. Two identical brown plastic flower pots (15 cm high, 12 cm 
diameter) served as hiding containers. In most trials, we used a yellow toy baby-
phone (5 x 8 cm size) as the target object, which could be clanked by pushing a 
button. However, if the infant lost his/her interest in this toy, we continued the task 
with other attractive objects of similar size. 
 Two identical containers were placed upside down on the cardboard sheet 40 
cm apart. The infant sat on the mother’s lap at one side of the table, equidistant (70 
cm) from the two containers. The task included two phases: hiding the target object 
repeatedly under the container on the infant’s right-hand side (‘A’ trials), and then 
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hiding it under the other container (‘B’ trials). Before each trial, the mother was 
instructed to close her eyes. Infants witnessed the hiding events in one of the three 
conditions: Ostensive-Communicative, Non-Communicative, and Non-Social contexts 
(Figure 5.3.1.1 a-c). 
 
Ostensive-Communicative (OC) context 
 
 The experimenter, sitting opposite to the infant, placed the target object at the 
starting position, just right (from the infant’s point of view) of container A. She 
attracted the infant’s attention to it verbally (“[Name]! + Look”) and by making a 
conspicuous noise with the target object (ringing the baby-phone, or tapping the toy 
on the table). Then she started to move the object slowly towards container ‘A’, 
lifted the container with her other hand, and lowered it onto the toy. At this point she 
established eye-contact with the infant and addressed him/her in motherese 
(“Look!”) while looking back-and-forth twice between the object and the baby. 
During this procedure the experimenter made sure that the infant was following the 
object. If it was necessary (e.g., if the baby looked away), she interrupted the hiding 
action and started the trial again. 
 After lowering the container, the experimenter waited for 4 s before she 
pushed the cardboard sheet with the containers towards the infant. When the 
containers arrived within the infant’s reach, the mother was allowed to open her eyes 
but was not allowed to interact with the infant. We considered the infant’s first touch 
of either container as his/her choice. If the infant selected the correct (baited) 
container, the mother gave him/her the toy for a short play. During this time, the 
experimenter withdrew the cardboard sheet and the containers to their original 
position. The mother then took the object away from her infant and replaced the toy 
at the starting point. If, however, the container touched by the baby was the empty 
one, its content was shown to her/him and then the experimenter withdrew the 
cardboard sheet with the containers. If the infant did not touch any of the containers 
within 20 seconds the trial was terminated. In such cases (i.e. when selecting the 
empty container or nothing) the experimenter took the toy out of the baited container 
in full view of the infant and placed it at the starting position. 
 The experimenter presented 4 consecutive ‘A’ trials. If the subject made more 
than one incorrect search response (touched first the ‘B’ container or did not touch 
any of the containers within 20 seconds), they were presented with two additional 
‘A’ trials. Two infants received these additional trials in the OC context. The infants 
who failed to select the baited container more than twice during the ‘A’ trials (6 in 
total) were excluded from the analysis. 
 The ‘B’ trials followed immediately the ‘A’ trials. In these trials, the 
experimenter attracted infants’ attention to the toy at the starting position as in the 
‘A’ trials, and then started to move it towards container ‘A’. However, in contrast to 
the ‘A’ trials, she did not use any communicative signals (eye-contact, gaze-shifts, or 
infant-directed speech) when lifting container ‘A’. The target object was moved 
uninterrupted across the table towards container ‘B’, passing under container ‘A’, 
after which the container was lowered back onto the cardboard. When the target 
object was halfway between the two containers, the experimenter made it emit a 
conspicuous noise (by making it ring or tapping the table with it) to attract the 
infant’s attention to the object. Then the experimenter lifted container ‘B’, moved the 
object under it, and lowered the container onto the toy. Note that throughout the 
object-hiding procedure in the ‘B’ trials the experimenter focused on the target object 
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and never looked at the infant. After lowering container ‘B’ onto the target object, 
the experimenter withdrew her hands and surreptitiously dropped a pen from her lap 
onto the floor. The infant could not see the pen, but heard the noise it made when 
landing on the floor. This served to orient the infant’s attention away from the 
container. Post-test inspection of the videotapes revealed that only in 2 out of the 42 
‘B’ trials did the infant keep focusing on container ‘B’ during the delay period. After 
the 4-s delay, the experimenter slid the cardboard with the containers toward the 
infant and waited for a search response as in the ‘A’ trials. 
 
Non-Communicative (NC) context 
 
 Infants in this group witnessed the same object manipulations as above, but 
the experimenter performed the actions without ostensive-communicative signals. 
That is, she did not make eye contact or gaze shifts between the toy and the infant, 
and never talked to the infant. She attracted the infants’ attention to the target object 
only by the sound effects described above (ringing the phone, etc.), and broke the 
infants’ fixation with the containers by dropping a pen. (In 41 out of the 42 ‘B’ trials, 
this manipulation worked in the NC group.) In addition, the experimenter sat at the 
table turning 90o away from the infant, and observed what the infant was doing in a 
window that reflected the setting as a mirror. This way, the experimenter could adjust 
her manipulations according to the infants’ attention. When hiding the toy under 
container ‘A’ or ‘B’, the experimenter turned towards the table, but she did not raise 
her eyes to the infant. Six infants in this group received 2 additional ‘A’ trials 
because they searched under the in the ‘B’ container more than once during the first 
4 ‘A’ trials. 
 
Non-Social (NS) context 
 
 The experimental procedure was the same as in the NC context, except that 
the infant could not see the experimenter, who acted from behind a curtain. The 
curtain was mounted on a wooden frame on the table between her and the containers. 
The experimenter slid the target object under the curtain so that most of it was visible 
to the child. She operated the containers by fine nylon cords, and pushed forward and 
withdrew the containers by the cardboard sheet from behind the curtain. The 
experimenter’s hands were never visible to the infant throughout the hiding 
procedure. When the infant did not retrieve the object, the experimenter withdrew the 
containers by the cardboard sheet, lifted the baited container by the nylon cord and 
removed the object in full view of the infant. As in the NC context, she monitored 
the procedure and infants’ behaviour by the image reflected in the window. In 
response to the dropping pen, infants looked away from container ‘B’ in 39 out of the 
42 ‘B’ trials in this group. Because they made more than one mistake during the first 
4 ‘A’ trials, 3 infants received 2 additional ‘A’ trials in this group. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 From the video recordings, we coded, as infants’ choice, the first container 
that they touched. If there was no such response for 20 seconds, or if the infant 
touched both containers simultaneously, it was judged as “no choice”. Two observers 
scored infants’ responses independently in the ‘B’ trials. The inter-observer 
reliability was excellent (Cohen’s kappa = 0.97). We also measured response latency 
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in each trial, i.e., the time elapsed between the moment when containers arrived 
within the infant’s reach and the first response. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.1.1.  
Experimental arrangement in 
the three hiding contexts. In the 
ostensive-communicative 
context (OC) (Figure a-a1), the 
demonstrator established eye 
contact with the baby, smiling 
at and addressing him/her in 
infant-directed speech (saying 
‘Hello baby, look here!’). Then 
she repeatedly hid a toy object 
under container ‘A’ while shif- 
-ting her eye-gaze back-and-forth between the infant and the container to direct and share the 
infant’s attention towards the object hiding action. In the non-communicative context (NC) 
(Figure b-b1), the demonstrator’s face and torso was oriented 90 degrees away from the 
infant and she never looked at or communicated with the infant in any way while hiding the 
object. In the non-social context (NS) (Figure c-c1), the demonstrator acted from behind a 
curtain and only the object’s movements were visible to the infant. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 We analyzed the proportion of correct responses in both the ‘A’ and the ‘B’ 
trials, and the number of infants who committed the A-not-B error (searched more 
than once at location ‘A’ in the ‘B’ trials) as a function of the hiding context. We 
found that the magnitude of the A-not-B error was considerably smaller in the non-
communicative and non-social conditions than in the traditional ostensive-
communicative context (Figure 5.3.1.2).  
 A two-way ANOVA on the proportion of correct responses with phase (‘A’ 
vs. ‘B’ trials) and hiding context (OC, NC, NS) as factors showed more correct 
responses in the ‘A’ than in the ‘B’ trials (F(1,39) = 49.376, p < 0.0001) and a 
significant interaction between these factors (F(2,39) = 8.041, p = 0.001). This 
interaction was due to the fact that the change of the proportion of correct searches 
from the ‘A’ to the ‘B’ trials differed across contexts. While in the OC context the 
initial success rate of 0.88 in the ‘A’ trials dropped to 0.19 in the ‘B’ trials (t(13) = 
8.917, p < 0.0001), the drop was much smaller in the NC context (0.80 to 0.52, t(13) 
= 2.536, p = 0.025) and was not statistically significant in the NS context (0.78 to 
0.59, t(13) = 1.96, p = 0.072). In addition, while the infants were similarly successful 
during the ‘A’ trials in all contexts (F(2,39) = 1.525, p = 0.23), their search 
performance differed significantly across contexts in the ‘B’ trials (F(2,39) = 6.660, 
p = 0.005). In this latter case, post-hoc pair-wise comparisons (Tukey-Cramer test) 
showed that infants searched the least correctly in the OC context (OC vs. NO: p < 
0.05, OC vs. NS: p < 0.01). 
 
 
 
 
a 
a1 b1 
b c
c1 
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Figure 5.3.1.2. Proportion 
of correct searches 
(mean+SE) in ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
trials as a function of the 
hiding context. The 10-
month-old infants received 
four ‘A’ trials, followed by 
three ‘B’ trials. ***: p < 
0.0001; *: p < 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Comparison of the number of infants committing the A-not-B error (Table 
5.3.1.1) indicated a significant difference between demonstration conditions (chi2(2) 
= 8.265, p = 0.016). After having witnessed ostensive-communicative hiding 
demonstrations during the ‘A’ trials, 86 % of the infants displayed the perseverative 
error during the ‘B’ trials. In contrast, the majority of infants in the other two 
contexts (NC: 57% and NS: 64%) did not show a perseverative response pattern. 
 
Context 0 or 1 error 2 or 3 errors 
Ostensive-Communicative 2 12 
Non-Communicative 8 6 
Non-Social 9 5 
 
Table 5.3.1.1. Number of infants in the three different hiding contexts (14 in each group) 
committing at most one or more search errors (searching at location ‘A’) in the three ‘B’ 
trials. 
 
Performance in the 1st ‘B’ trials 
 Restricting the measure of the search performance to the first ‘B’ trials (i.e., 
to the first trial after location change) revealed similar results to those reported in the 
main text. In the OC condition, 12 out of 14 infants reached for the ‘A’ container in 
the first ‘B’ trial. This proportion is significantly different from chance by binomial 
test (p = 0.013). In contrast, infants in the other two contexts were equally likely to 
search the ‘A’ or ‘B’ containers in the first ‘B’ trials (NO: 8 of 14, NS: 6 of 14 
reached for the ‘A’ container). 
 
Reaching latency 
 Infants touched one of the containers on average within 5 seconds in both the 
‘A’ and ‘B’ trials (Table 5.3.1.2). Comparisons between the three contexts showed 
similar latencies in both the ‘A’ (F(2,39) = 1.349, p = 0.271) and the ‘B’ trials 
(F(2,39) = 0.92, p = 0.407). Within group analyses also failed to show significant 
differences in the mean reaching latency between ‘A’ and ‘B’ trials (OC: t(13) = 1.1, 
p = 0.285; NC: t(13) = 0.59, p = 0.566; NS: t(13) = -0.2, p = 0.845). 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
A Trials B Trials A Trials B Trials A Trials B Trials
Ostensive
Communicative
Non-Communicative Non-Social
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 C
or
re
ct
 S
ea
rc
he
s 
(m
ea
n+
SE
)
****
               dc_378_12
 147
 Context 
 Ostensive-
Communicative 
Non-Communicative Non-Social 
‘A’ trials 4.1±4.0 2.4±2.0 3.1±1.9 
‘B’ trials 2.8±2.6 1.9±2.2 3.3±3.2 
 
Table 5.3.1.2. Mean latency (s) ±SD of first reaching as a function of experimental context 
and phase. 
 
 These results strongly support the notion that infants’ tendency to commit A-
not-B error reflect “predilection for learning general rules” rather than originating 
from motor, inhibitory, or memory limitations. It is important to mention, however, 
that an alternative account can also be offered in terms of attentional processes. This 
suggest that the role of communication signals was simply to increase infants’ 
attention, that is, infants may have paid more attention to the experimenter’s 
activities when they were accompanied by communicative signals. In order to test the 
plausibility of this explanation we have analyzed infants’ gaze direction in the 
ostensive-communicative (OC) and non-communicative (NC) conditions. A frame-
by-frame encoding of infants’ gaze direction in the ‘A’ trials from the point when the 
toy started to move to the point of total occlusion under the container provided 
almost exactly the same total looking time (averaged across infants) to the object in 
the communicative (mean ±SD = 9.24 ±2.24 s) as in the non-communicative (mean 
±SD = 9.31 ± 2.57 s) context. These data confirm that “just attracting attention” is 
not sufficient to facilitate perseverative search errors. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The robust association between the ostensive-communicative context of the 
hiding actions and the perseverative search error supports the ‘‘natural pedagogy’’ 
hypothesis Csibra & Gergely 2009), according to which the perseverative error is in 
large part due to a pragmatic misinterpretation of the experimenter’s hiding actions 
as constituting a communicative “teaching” demonstration rather than being just a 
hide-and-search interactive game. This account proposes that ostensive-referential 
signals have a special interpretation-modulating role in early social learning. The 
action demonstrations of the A-not-B paradigm can be interpreted either as a hide-
and-search game presenting the infant episodic (here and now) information about the 
whereabouts of the object (correct interpretation), or as a kind of teaching session 
that conveys generalizable information about properties of the objects (toys or 
containers) for the infant to learn (incorrect interpretation). We propose that it is this 
latter kind of - mistaken - interpretation established during the ostensively 
demonstrated ‘A’ trials that remains dominant during the ‘B’ trials leading to the 
erroneous perseverative search responses. We should note however, that this 
conclusion does not invalidate the contribution of other cognitive factors to the A-
not-B error identified by earlier studies (e.g., Diamond 1990; Diamond et al. 1989; 
Keen et al. 2003). 
 
 
5.3.2. EXPERIMENT VIII/2 
 
 However, humans are not the only species that show special sensitivity to 
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human ostensive-referential signals. Recent results indicate a functionally similar 
sensitivity and preference in dogs for certain nonverbal cues of human ostensive and 
referential communication (see also STUDIES VI & VII). Unlike great apes 
(Hermann et al. 2007), dogs exhibit some understanding of human referential 
intentions expressed in communicative gestures, such as pointing, as shown by their 
success in solving the so-called object choice tasks (Miklósi & Soproni 2006; Riedel 
et al. 2008). 
 To investigate the functional nature of dogs’ sensitivity to ostensive-referential 
cues in a comparative manner, here we utilized the same A-not-B object search 
paradigm that had been used in Experiment VIII/1 above. We tested whether 
communicative signals would have a significant effect on dogs’ tendency to 
perseverate in a search task.  
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects  
 
 Dogs for the experiments were recruited from the Family Dog Research 
Database at the Department of Ethology, Eötvös University. In order to be selected 
for this study the subject had to be motivated to retrieve a toy object naïve to the task, 
and older than a year. At the time of testing all owners were unaware of the 
hypotheses and goals of the study.  
 Thirty six adult pet dogs of different recognized breeds (5 Border collies, 3-3 
Belgian tervuerens, Labrador retrievers, 2-2 Hungarian vizslas, Mudis, Springer 
spaniels, Malenois, 1-1 Australian shepherd, Bulldog, Cavalier, Cocker spaniel, 
German shepherd, Irish setter, Jack russel terrier, Jagd terrier, Parson russel terrier, 
Miniature pincher, Rottweiler, Siberian husky, Welsh terrier) and three mongrels 
participated in this experiment (16 males 20 females; mean age ±SD = 3.9±2.3 years). 
They were assigned to the Ostensive-Communicative (N = 12; 5 males and 7 
females; 9 different breeds; mean age 5.1 years), Non-Communicative (N = 12; 5 
males and 7 females; 9 different breeds; mean age 4 years) and Non-Social (N = 12, 
6-6 males and females; 10 different breeds; mean age 2.9 years) hiding contexts 
quasi-randomly so that the distribution of age and gender did not differ by condition.  
 
Experimental procedures  
 
 The experiment took place in a room (5.0 m x 3.0 m) where two opaque 
plastic screens (30 cm wide x 40 cm high 10 cm deep) were placed 0.6 m apart to 
hide the toy. The owner made the dog to stand facing the screens equidistant (2m) 
from the two hiding locations. He/she was standing behind the dog and restricted the 
animal’s movements by holding its collar. The target object was either a tennis ball 
or a rubber squeezable toy of similar size depending on the preference of the dog and 
its motivation to grab it. The target object was placed on the floor 0.6 m from the left 
screen (from the dog’s point of view) in the line of the screens (Figure 5.3.2.1). Only 
the owner, the dog and the experimenter were present during the procedure, which 
was video-taped for later evaluation.  
 The experimental procedure included pretraining and test trials. Test trials 
consisted of 4 ‘A’ trials when the hiding occurred at the location on the subject’s left 
side (behind screen ‘A’), and 3 ‘B’ trials during which the hiding occurred at the 
other location (screen ‘B’).  
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Figure 5.3.2.1. 
Schematic representation of the 
experimental arrangement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pretraining trials 
 
 The purpose of the pretraining trials was to familiarize the subject with the 
retrieval task and with the experimental situation. By gently touching its body, the 
owner got the dog to stand orienting towards the screens (at 2 m distance), and the 
experimenter, who was standing in between the screens, showed the toy object to the 
dog. Then she placed it under full view behind one of the screens, and the dog was 
released and allowed to search for the toy. This procedure was repeated once for each 
screen. These trials were repeated once if the subject did not approach the baited 
screen. Only those animals were included in the next phase that did not show any 
sign of distress and were motivated to fetch the toy from behind both screens.  
 
Test trials 
 
 The task had the same structure in all experimental conditions: Hiding the 
target object four times behind the screen ‘A’ (‘A’ trials) and then hiding the object 
three times behind the other screen (‘B’ trials). Each dog participated in one of the 
following three conditions: 
 
 In the Ostensive-Communicative (OC) condition, the hider attracted the dog’s 
attention by ostensive addressing signals (“[dog’s name] + Watch!”). Then she 
picked a rubber ball from the floor while establishing eye-contact and addressing the 
dog (“Watch!”), and walked to screen ‘A’ with the toy in her hand being constantly 
visible to the dog. As she placed the ball behind screen ‘A’, she displayed gaze shifts 
looking back and forth between the hiding location and the dog. Finally, the 
experimenter returned to the dog walking behind screen ‘B’. Having arrived close to 
the dog, the experimenter presented her empty hands to the dog for a few-second 
inspection. Then she stood behind the subject and the owner, who held the dog’s 
collar up till now when she released the dog prompting it verbally (“You may go!”), 
but without using any additional instructions or gestures to encourage searching (‘A’ 
trials).  
 ‘B’ trials were similar to the ‘A’ trials, except that now the experimenter did 
not leave the toy behind screen ‘A’. Having left screen ‘A’, the experimenter showed 
up the toy object in her hand conspicuously, and established eye contact with the dog. 
Then she placed the toy behind screen ‘B’ by bending her upper body. 
 
 In the Non-Communicative (NC) condition, the experimenter performed the 
DOG
OWNEREXPERIMENTER
TOY SCREEN ‘A’ SCREEN ‘B’
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same object-hiding manipulations as in the OC condition with her back turned 
towards the dog. Thus, neither eye contact nor facial cues were displayed while the 
experimenter held the object in her hand clearly visibly to the subject. In addition, 
she did not talk to the dog but attracted the dogs’ attention by clapping her hand (at 
the start of each trial) and making a conspicuous noise with the toy before placing it 
behind the screen in both ‘A’ and ‘B’ trials. 
 
 In the Non-Social (NS) condition, dogs observed the toy moving without any 
visible human manipulation. The experimenter remained still next to the dog while 
another experimenter, who was invisible to the dog, made the ball move behind the 
screens by pulling a transparent string (invisible to the dog) to which it was attached. 
No communicative signals were displayed towards the dogs.  
 
Data collection and analysis  
 
 The screen first inspected (i.e. touched and/or watched behind it) by the 
subject was considered as chosen. Dogs received score 1 or 0 depending on whether 
they chose the baited or the empty location in the trial. If a subject inspected the 
hiding locations in a way that it could have equal visual access to the content of both 
(e.g., it passed along the midline in between the screens) the trial was judged as 
ambiguous choice and subject received score 0.5. After choosing the baited screen, 
the subject was allowed to play with the toy for a few seconds, and was praised 
verbally. If the subject visited the empty screen first, it did not get the toy, the owner 
ordered it to come back and praised it verbally in the same manner as in the case of 
“correct choice”. Then the experimenter placed the object to the starting point, while 
the dog was prevented from witnessing this manipulation by placing a large (1 x 1 m) 
green plastic opaque occluder between the dog and the screens. Inter-observer 
agreements for subjects’ choice behaviour were assessed by means of parallel coding 
of the 80% of the total trials by two observers. Inter-observer reliability was 
excellent (Cohen’s kappa = 0.85).  
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
 Dogs fetched the object reliably during the ‘A’ trials in all three conditions 
(mean percentage of correct choices: 94% in OC; 98% in NC and NS groups). 
However, during the ‘B’ trials, we found striking context-dependent differences in 
the number of dogs committing the A-not-B error (Generalized Linear Model for 
binary data, chi2 = 26.857, p < 0.0001, Table 5.3.2.1.).  
 
                                            Number of Perseverative Errors  
Condition  Zero  One  Two  Three  
Ostensive-Communicative  0  3  3  6  
Non-Communicative  5  3  1  3  
Non-Social  8  2  2  0  
 
Table 5.3.2.1. Number of dogs in the three different hiding contexts (12 in each group) 
performing different numbers of search errors (searching at location ‘A’) in the three ‘B’ 
trials.  
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 After having witnessed the hiding demonstrations during the ‘A’ trials, all 
dogs in the OC group selected the empty (A) location at least once (A-not-B error), 
whilst in the other two hiding contexts many subjects (NC: 41.7% NS: 66.7%) did 
not display the perseverative search error at all (Fischer’s exact tests, OC vs. NC p = 
0.0373, OC vs. NS p = 0.0013).  
 A one-way ANOVA on the response scores also showed highly significant 
differences (F(2,33) = 10.436, p < 0.001). Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons (Tukey-
Cramer test) revealed that dogs in the OC condition searched at the baited screen (B) 
less often than those in the NC condition (p < 0.05) or in the NS condition (p < 
0.001). In addition, dogs in the OC condition displayed a search bias towards the 
empty (A) screen, as they performed well below the success rate expected by random 
search (t(11) = 3.576, p = 0.004). In contrast, dogs in the NS condition were 
significantly more successful than chance during the ‘B’ trials (t(11) = 3.867 p = 
0.003) (Figure 5.3.2.2). 
 These results clearly indicate that, similarly to human infants (see Experiment 
VIII/1 above), the communicative context induced in dogs a tendency to 
perseveratively (and erroneously) search for a hidden object at a previously 
repeatedly baited location (A) even when they observed the object being hidden at a 
different location (B). This error, however, has been eliminated when the hiding 
events were not accompanied by communicative signals. Thus it seems that, contrary 
to previous accounts (Watson et al. 2001), the perseverative search tendency found in 
dogs cannot be explained as stemming from an inability to locate hidden objects. 
Moreover, if the social-communicative signals simply had a distracting effect, one 
would expect random search and not an explicit bias to the empty location (A), 
which we found in the OC condition. Therefore we propose that search error in dogs 
and infants may be indicative of their shared social competence that involves 
preparedness for learning from others through communication. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.2.2. Scores of 
correct responses (mean 
+SE) in the ‘B’ trials as a 
function of the hiding 
context. The dogs (n=12 for 
each condition) received 
four ‘A’ trials, followed by 
three ‘B’ trials. OC 
condition: the human 
experimenter repeatedly hid 
a toy object behind screen 
‘A’ and then behind screen 
‘B’ using ostensive- 
communicative signals. NC condition: the experimenter performed the same object-hiding 
manipulations as in the OC but without ostensive-communicative signals. NS condition: The 
experimenter remained still next to the dog while the object moved behind the screens 
without any perceivable human manipulation. **: p < .01 in comparison with success rate 
expected by random search (0.5 x 3 ‘B’ trials). 
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5.3.3. EXPERIMENT VIII/3 
 
 Although it is possible that the context-specific errors made by dogs are 
caused by similar processes as in infants, simpler learning processes or confounding 
effects of procedural factors can also account for them. In the next experiment, 
therefore, we address questions related to hypotheses derived from these alternative 
accounts. 
 First, independently from the presence of ostensive-communicative cues, the 
A-not-B error made by dogs can be caused by the fact that during the ‘B’ hidings, 
instead of moving on a straight route, the reward is following a roller-coaster 
trajectory visiting first location ‘A’ and only then ‘B’ (see the procedure of 
Experiment VIII/2 above). This ‘sham-baiting’ of the ‘A’ location in the ‘B’ trials 
raises the possibility of strong proactive interference increasing the chance that dogs 
mix up earlier memory traces of the toy being at location ‘A’ in the ‘A’ trials with 
the more recent input of seeing the toy disappearing at location ‘B’ in the ‘B’ trials 
(Fiset 2010). In order to examine whether the attentional demands of this distractive 
component of the hiding contribute to the dogs’ A-not-B error, we tested whether 
dogs show a reduced tendency to commit the error if location ‘A’ is not sham-baited 
in the ‘B’ trials (‘Alleviated B trials’ group – see below in Procedure). 
 Second, as often suggested in infant studies (e.g. Smith et al. 1999), dogs may 
commit the error in the ‘B’ trials because they cannot inhibit the prepotent motor 
behaviour of searching at location ‘A’ after doing so several times in the ‘A’ trials. 
This hypothesis has not yet been tested in dogs. Thus, in a group of dogs, by 
modifying the ostensive-communicative (OC) hiding procedure of Experiment VIII/2, 
we examined whether dogs commit fewer errors if they only watch repeated hidings 
at location ‘A’ but are not allowed to search there actively (‘Only watching during A 
trials’ group) 
 Third, it is also possible, that the dogs’ A-not-B error stems from the 
“unbalanced” cuing procedure of the social communicative hiding context and does 
not indicate unique susceptibility to human communication. That is, whilst in the ‘B’ 
trials of the non-communicative (NC) context the experimenter used sound stimuli 
(by squeezing the toy) both before the toy is hidden behind ‘A’ and ‘B’ screens 
subjects were not provided communicative signals adjacent to the ‘B’ barrier in the 
OC condition of Experiment VIII/2. This means that the cuing procedure in the OC 
condition was more unbalanced because the experimenter did not recall the dogs’ 
attention using any conspicuous noise. We therefore observed the search behaviour 
of dogs in two novel versions of the OC condition of Experiment VIII/2 (‘ComA-
SoundB’& ‘SoundA-SoundB’ groups – see in Procedure) 
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects 
 
 Adult pet dogs (N = 106) of different breeds participated in the study (51 
males, 43 females; mean age±SD = 4.3±2.4 years). They were assigned to four 
different groups quasi-randomly so that the distribution of age and gender did not 
differ across groups. Fourteen dogs were excluded from the experiment either 
because they failed to fulfil the criteria in the pre-training trials (N = 9), lost interest 
in the task in midstream (N = 3) or their owners disobeyed the experimenter’s 
instructions (N = 2). 
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Experimental procedures 
 
 The experimental arrangement, behavioural coding and analysis and the steps 
of the experimental procedure was the same as described in Experiment VIII/2 (see 
above). However, depending on the group they were assigned to, subjects witnessed 
one of four different hiding procedures. 
 
 ‘Only watching during A trials’ group (Watch-A, N = 26) 
(13 males, 13 females; mean age±SD: 4.1±2.5 years; 4 Australian shepherds, 3 
Border collies, 2 zwergpudels, 1-1 Flat retriever, Labrador retriever, Rottveiler, 
Newfoundland, Malenois, Königspudel, Pincher, Malteser and 9 mongrels) 
 
 In this group we aimed to investigate the effect of the motor response in the 
‘A’ trials. Therefore the procedure used in this condition was the same as in the OC 
condition (see Experiment VIII/2 above) except that subjects were not allowed to 
search for the toy in the ‘A’ trials. Instead, after having arrived at the location close 
to the dog, the experimenter pulled out the toy remotely from behind screen ‘A’ by a 
string fixed to the ball. After the toy had been retrieved in this way, the dog was 
allowed to play with it for a few seconds without leaving its place. In the ‘B’ trials, 
subjects were allowed to search for the toy as in the OC condition. 
 
 ‘Alleviated B trials’ group (Allev-B, N = 34)  
(19 males, 17 females; mean age±SD: 4.4±2.4 years; 7 Border collies, 1-1 Australian 
shepherds, Cairn terier, Dalmatian, Foxterier, German shepherd, Golden retriever, 
Hungarian vizsla, Labrador retriever, Malenois, Munsterlander, Pyrenees, Rottveiler, 
Weimaraner, Zwergpinscher and 15 mongrels) 
 
 This group was designed to control for the ‘sham baiting’ that occurred in the 
‘B’ trials of the OC condition (in Experiment VIII/2). In this condition, dogs 
witnessed the same hiding procedure as dogs in OC, with the only exception that 
during the ‘B’ trials the experimenter did not ‘sham bait’ the toy behind screen ‘A’. 
She walked up to screen ‘B’ following the same track as in the OC, while holding the 
toy visibly in her hand at the height of her eyes and looking continuously at the dog. 
 
 ‘ComA-SoundB’ (N = 16)  
(7 males, 9 females; mean age±SD: 4.2±2.7 years; 1-1 Border collie, Cocker spaniel, 
Dachshund, Dogo canario, German pointer, German shepherd, Golden retriever, 
Groenendale, Havanese, Sharpei, Schipperke, Parson russels terrier and 4 mongrels) 
 
 In this condition, similarly to the procedure of OC condition in Experiment 
VIII/2, we used strong communicative cues adjacent to ‘A’ barrier in both ‘A’ and 
‘B’ trials (ComA). However, in this case we used conspicuous non-social sound 
signals before hiding the object behind ‘B’ barrier in the ‘B’ trials (SoundB). That is 
in the ‘B’ trials, before hiding the toy at ‘B’, the experimenter recalled the dog’s 
attention by squeezing the toy (with her back turned toward the dog). 
 
 ‘SoundA-SoundB’ (N = 16)  
(9 males, 7 females; mean age±SD: 4.1±2.6 years; 2-2 Golden retrievers, Labrador 
retrievers, Hungarian greyhounds, Hungarian vizslas, 1-1 Dachshund, Poodle, 
Rhodesian ridgeback, Lurcher, Bologense, Tibetian terrier and 2 mongrels) 
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 In this condition dogs participated in the very same procedure as in the 
ComA-SoundB except for that during the ‘B’ trials experimenter used the same non-
social cuing at location ‘A’ and ‘B’.  
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
 Dogs fetched the object reliably from behind screen ‘A’ during the ‘A’ trials 
in each groups; the proportions of correct searches were between 94.8-98.5%. During 
the ‘B’ trials, however, subjects displayed perseverative search bias to the empty (A) 
location performing well below the success rate expected by random search both in 
the ‘Watch-A’ (24% correct, one-sample t-test: t(25) = - 3.635, p = 0.0013) and 
‘Allev-B’ (25% correct, t(33) = -4.082, p = 0.001) groups (Figure 5.3.3.1). Choice 
behaviour in the first ‘B’ trials (Binomial test, test proportion: 0.5) showed a similar 
below chance performance in the ‘Allev-B’ (p = 0.001) and ‘Watch-A’ (p = 0.001) 
conditions. 
 The high tendency of the subjects to commit the A-not-B error in the 
attentionally less demanding condition (‘Allev-B’) indicates that sham baiting at 
location A, a potentially important factor for proactive interference, is of little 
importance in dogs’ search bias towards the empty ‘A’ location. Dogs also showed a 
perseverative response pattern in ‘B’ trials if they did not have the possibility to 
actively search in the preceding ‘A’ trials. Based on these results, we can conclude 
that neither an inability to inhibit previously rewarded motor response nor 
insufficiencies in their working memory and/or attention skills can explain dogs’ 
perseverative response bias. 
 Further results show that in contrast to the non-social sound stimuli by which 
the experimenter recalled the dogs’ attention before hiding the toy behind screen ‘B’ 
and thus made the ‘B’ location salient (ComA-SoundB condition) dogs tended to 
commit the A-not-B error (i.e. they performed below the success rate expected by 
random search: 29.3% correct, t(15) = -2.248, p = 0.04). If, however, after social-
communicative ‘A’ trials the experimenter enhanced both ‘A’ and ‘B’ locations 
equally (SoundA-SoundB condition), dogs selected randomly (correct choices: 50%, 
t(15) = 0.0 p = 1.0). (Figure 5.3.3.1). 
 
Figure 5.3.3.1.  
Scores of correct responses 
(mean + SE) in the ‘B’ 
trials in the modified 
versions of the social 
communicative condition. . 
*: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Choice behaviour in the first ‘B’ trials (Binomial test, test proportion: 0.5) 
showed a below chance performance in the ‘ComA-SoundB’ (p = 0.021) but not in the 
SoundA-SoundB  (p = 0.454, ns) conditions. 
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 This finding provides further support for the notion that social and non-social 
cues are not equally effective in inducing A-not-B error in dogs. Therefore it seems 
that what matters is not the mere amount, but the informational selectivity of 
attention. That is, dogs might have extracted different kinds of information to be 
learnt from the communicative versus non-communicative demonstrations and this is 
modulated by social cognitive processes. In sum, dogs’ perseverative search bias 
may stem from their propensity to follow human social cues rather than from 
inhibitory control problems or interference effects in working memory.  
 
 
5.3.4. EXPERIMENT VIII/4. 
 
 A further intriguing question is whether dogs’ sensitivity to human 
communicative signals is the evolutionary consequence of domestication. It is 
increasingly assumed that, during their evolution in an anthropogenic environment 
(and paralleled by the divergence from the wolf), dogs have become selected to 
display increased sociality (see above in STUDIES I & II), cooperability (STUDIES 
IV & V), and communicability (STUDY VI & VII). This preparedness enables the 
dog become sensitized to human communicative cues (Brauer et al. 2006) if the 
individual is properly socialized to humans (Udell et al. 2008).  
 This account predicts that only dogs but not human-reared wolves would 
respond differentially to communicative versus non-social hiding contexts in a search 
task. We tested this prediction in this experiment, in which we compared the 
performance of a different group of naïve pet dogs to that of extensively socialized, 
hand-reared wolves (for more details on socialization of wolves see STUDY I) in the 
OC and NS conditions. 
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects 
 
 Twelve adult pet dogs (8 males 4 females; mean age±SD: 3.9±3.5 years) of 
different breeds (1-1 Border collie, Labrador retriever, Hungarian vizsla, Malenois, 
Argentin dog and 4 mongrels) and ten hand-reared adult tame gray wolves 
participated (7 males, 3 females mean age±SD: 3.0±1.8 years; details about rearing 
conditions in STUDY I/Methods section). Three additional dogs and three wolves 
were excluded from the experiments because they failed to fulfil the criterion in the 
pre-training trials (see Procedure) or lost interest in the task by the fourth ‘A’ trial. 
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 After pretraining, dogs and wolves participated in both the 
ostensive/communicative (OC) and non-social (NS) hiding conditions (for procedure, 
see above in Experiment VIII/2.). The order of the conditions was counterbalanced 
across subjects in both the dog and the wolf groups (within-subject design). Since 
wolves could not be motivated to search for toy objects, in this experiment we used a 
white plastic pot as target object (10 cm in diameter, 7 cm in height), baited with a 
piece of raw meat or cold cut for both dogs and wolves. 
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RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
 Dogs and wolves selected the baited location reliably during the ‘A’ trials in 
both conditions (mean percentage of correct choices: 95% and 88% for wolves, and 
94% and 92% for dogs, in the OC and NS conditions, respectively). However, the 
performance during the ‘B’ trials differed markedly between species and contexts 
(Figure 5.3.4.1). A two-way ANOVA on the response scores for hiding context and 
species as factors revealed more correct responses in the NS than in the OC condition 
(F(1,20) = 15.003, p = 0.001), more correct responses by the wolves than by the dogs 
(F(1,20) = 4.675, p = 0.043) and a significant interaction between these factors 
(F(1,20) = 13.027, p = 0.002). This interaction was due to the fact that, similarly to 
the above results (see Experiment VIII.2), dogs selected the baited location on ‘B’ 
trials less frequently in the OC condition (t(11) = 5.043, p < 0.001), while no such 
effect was found in wolves (t(9) = 0.208, p = 0.840). 
 
Figure 5.3.4.1.  
Comparison of dogs and 
wolves in the A-not-B 
task. Scores of correct 
responses (mean +SE) in 
the ‘B’ trials as a 
function of the hiding 
context. ***: paired t-test, 
p < 0.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The robust A-not-B error in the communicative hiding context in dogs, which 
was absent in extensively socialized wolves, represents a striking inter-species 
difference, which could be best explained by assuming that selective processes in the 
course of domestication of dogs led to sensitivity to human ostensive and referential 
signals. However, the fact that dogs, just like human infants, commit the 
perseverative search error when (and only when) the repeated hiding events are 
presented in a communicative context does not necessarily imply that this effect is 
mediated by the activation of the same type of interpretive bias that the ostensive 
cues were hypothesized to trigger in human infants (see in Experiment VIII/1.).  
 Evidence suggests that dogs’ response to human communication is primarily 
driven by a motivation to satisfy ostensively cued human imperatives even when the 
human’s action demonstration conveys inefficient or mistaken solution to goal 
approach (Pongrácz et al. 2004), food choice (Prato-Previde et al. 2008) or object 
choice (se also results in STUDY VII). These findings, along with the results 
presented in the current study, raise the question whether human ostensive and 
referential signals serve the same communicative functions in dogs as they do in 
human infants. If human communication is functionally interpreted as imperatives by 
dogs, it might be tied to the situational context, whilst infants, whose primary 
motivation is to learn from ostensive demonstrations, would attempt to generalize the 
communicative content to new situations.  
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5.3.5. EXPERIMENT VIII/5 
 
As one of the crucial components of the A-not-B task is the identity of the 
person they interact with, in the next experiment we investigated how dogs and 10-
month-old human infants react if, after the ‘A’ trials, the identity of the hiding person 
is changed and a new experimenter continues the hiding during the ‘B’ trials in the 
OC condition. If the ostensive hiding action is interpreted as an imperative order 
associated with a specific “instructor”, we could expect the perseverative search bias 
to diminish during the ‘B’ trials, which would represent a different imperative to act 
on as it is given by a different person. In contrast, if the ostensive hiding action is 
(mis-)interpreted as conveying some generalizable information about the type of 
object hidden or the function of the hiding location (Csibra & Gergely 2009) that is 
not related to the identity of the particular demonstrator, switching the experimenter 
should not reduce the tendency to commit A-not-B error. 
 
METHODS  
 
Subjects  
 
 Twelve adult pet dogs (6 males, 6 females; mean age±SD: 2.1±1.0 years) 
from different breeds (2-2 Border collies, Hungarian vizslas, 1-1 Belgian tervueren, 
Malenois, Australian shepherd, Cavalier King Charles spaniel, Dachshund and 3 
mongrels) and twelve 10-month-old human infants (5 boys, 7 girls; mean age±SD: 
306.6±6.2 days) participated. Two additional dogs were excluded from the 
experiment because they failed to fulfil the criterion in the pre-training trials (see the 
procedure above in Experiment VIII/2). Four infants were also excluded from the test 
because they failed to pass the reaching criterion in the ‘A’ trial phase (see the 
procedure above in Experiment VIII/1).  
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 The task included the same two phases as in Experiment VIII/2: pretraining 
and testing. In the pretraining trials, two women, who participated later in the test 
trials as experimenters, played with the subject. Therefore the two of them were 
equally familiar to the subject during the subsequent test phase. The experimental 
arrangement and the hiding procedure were similar to that of used in the OC 
condition of Experiment VIII/2 (for dogs) and Experiment VIII/1 (for infants). That 
is, during the four ‘A’ trials one of the experimenters performed the object 
manipulations using conspicuous ostensive-communicative cues. Importantly, 
however, after the experimenter had repeatedly hidden the toy in the ‘A’ trials, she 
left and another familiar person continued to demonstrate the hiding actions during 
the ‘B’ trials. The order of the two experimenters was counterbalanced across 
subjects.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 The first location that was inspected was regarded as the subject’s choice and 
response scores were created in a similar fashion as described above (see the Data 
collection and analysis sections of Experiments VIII/ 1 & 2). 
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RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
 During the ‘A’ trials, dogs fetched the object reliably from behind screen ‘A’ 
(mean percentage of correct choices: 98%) showing a performance similar to that of 
found in the OC condition of Experiment VIII/2 (94%). Infants also searched for the 
toy correctly in the majority of ‘A’ trials (82%) replicating the success rate (88%) 
reported in Experiment VIII/1 in the same ostensive-communicative hiding context. 
However, infants and dogs responded to the new experimenter in the ‘B’ trials 
differentially (Figure 5.3.5.1). 
 
Figure 5.3.5.1.  
Dogs and 10-month-old 
infants respond 
differentially to the switch 
of the experimenter in the 
ostensive communicative 
hiding context. Left (white) 
columns indicate correct 
responses (mean +SE) with 
the same experimenter (data 
from Experiment VIII/2 
(dogs) and from Experiment 
VIII/1 (infants). Right 
(shaded) columns indicate 
the performance during the 
‘B’ trials in the Experimenter-switch condition (Experiment VIII/5). **: one sample t-test, p 
< 0.02 in comparison to the success rate expected by random search (0.5 x 3 ‘B’ trials). 
 
 
 Infants displayed a perseverative search bias to reach to location A, and their 
success rate was significantly below chance level (t(11) = 2.932, p = 0.014). In 
contrast, dogs did not show a significant search bias towards the empty ‘A’ location 
(t(11) = 0.103 p = 0.920), suggesting that they did not generalize to the new situation 
in the ‘B’ trials what they had learnt during the ‘A’ trials.  
 These results show differential influence of changing a basic stimulus 
parameter (the identity of experimenter) on dogs’ and human infants’ tendency to 
commit the perseverative search error. The finding that, compared to the OC 
condition in Experiment VIII/2 dogs did not perseverate after switching the 
experimenter is consistent with the hypothesis that dogs anchor communication to 
the specific situation, and especially to the specific communicator who is ostensively 
addressing it to them. At the same time, and unlike in the NS condition of 
Experiment VIII/2, dogs were not always successful in finding the object hidden by 
the new experimenter. Their random search pattern indicates that the unchanged 
aspects of the situation (same object, same room, same screen, etc.) carried sufficient 
cues of the previous context to confuse them, and suggests that it is the overall 
similarity of the test situation to the training situation that determines whether dogs 
extend the scope of the learned imperative to the new context. Crucially, the human 
who ostensively communicates towards the dog forms an indispensable element of 
the context. For infants, however, it does not seem to matter who performs the 
ostensive hiding demonstration, and they readily generalize their erroneously learnt 
object-finding action to the new person context.  
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5.3.6. STUDY VIII. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 Results of the infant study (Exp. VIII/1) are not compatible with the currently 
widely accepted explanations for the A-not-B perseverative response bias that 
attribute this robust developmental phenomenon to the dominance (and lack of 
inhibition) of the prepotent motor search response. These results also challenge 
recent proposals that the motor priming of the prepotent response can be induced by 
simply observing the manual hiding actions directed at location ‘A’, mediated by the 
mirror neuron system (Longo & Berthental 2006), because the NC context provided 
the same amount of visual (as well as motor) experience of the repeated manual 
hiding actions directed at container ‘A’ as did the OC context. 
 Human infants are highly social creatures (Hermann et al. 2007) who cannot 
help but interpret the ostensive communicative signals directed to them. Although 
such a disposition prepares them to efficiently learn from adults, in certain situations, 
like the A-not-B task, it can also misguide their performance. Our demonstration of 
the social communicative determinants of infants’ early tendency for perseveration in 
motor search tasks provides independent support for the natural pedagogy hypothesis 
(Csibra & Gergely 2009) suggesting that sensitivity to ostensive-referential 
communication is a basic evolutionary adaptation that is fundamental to the 
emergence of human social cognition.  
 Results of the second experiment show an apparent behavioural analogy 
between human infants and dogs. In both species, one of the most important causal 
factors leading to perseverative search errors is the communicative ostensive-
referential context. The seemingly mistaken response, called A-not-B error, is not (or 
at least not only) due to insufficient attentional and motor functioning, but 
paradoxically, may be indicative of sophisticated social competence in both dogs and 
human children.  
 We have already provided evidence (see STUDY VII) that domestic dogs 
readily adopt inefficient responses in object choice tasks as a result of repeated 
observations of human action demonstrations, and their sensitivity to human social 
cues may lead to apparently faulty behaviours (see also Kaminski 2009). Such a 
disposition, which may result from the domestication of dogs and/or from their 
extensive experience with humans, is likely to prepare dogs to efficiently learn from 
humans in a wide range of situations. These claims are further confirmed by Exp. 
VIII/3 showing that dogs’ erroneous responses in the A-not-B task do not arise from 
inhibitory control problems or interference effects in working memory but can be 
altered by changing the location of ostensive cueing.  
 The lack of a similar sensitivity to human ostensive-communicative signals in 
extensively socialized wolves (Exp. VIII/4) supports the view that this is an 
evolutionary novel skill in the Canis genus providing a typical case for convergent 
social evolution (as the consequence of domestication) between man and dog. 
However, it seems that the precise function of the cognitive-interpretive mechanisms 
elicited by communication differs between dogs and humans. For infants, ostensive 
and referential communicative signals serve a primarily epistemic function by 
indicating an opportunity to acquire culturally shared knowledge about referent kinds 
(Csibra & Gergely 2009). Dogs’ sensitivity to these signals is parasitic on human 
communication by exploiting them for a different function: to give orders to perform 
some specific action at a referentially indicated particular location in the presence of 
(and “for”) a specific person presenting the imperative.  
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 In summary, dogs’ behaviour in the A-not-B error task probably driven by a 
combination of factors, including sensitivity toward human ostensive signals and our 
findings raise the possibility that dogs’ response to human communication is 
primarily driven by a motivation to satisfy ostensively cued human imperatives even 
when it leads to an inefficient or mistaken solution (see also STUDY VII above). 
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5.4. STUDY IX. CONSTRUCTION SKILLS - KNOWLEDGE ATTRIBUTION 
AND MINDREADING* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The main goal of this study was to investigate if dogs are able to discriminate 
between request tasks in which the human Helper has different knowledge states 
concerning the whereabouts of the reward and/or the tool, relying upon the Helper’s 
engagement/disengagement in the hiding processes of the two objects.  
In the first experiment the behaviour of adult pet dogs was compared to that of 2.5-
year-old children tested in the same nonverbal “mental attribution” task in which a 
human Helper’s knowledge state regarding the whereabouts of a hidden toy and a 
stick (a tool necessary for getting the out-of-reach toy) was systematically 
manipulated. In the four experimental conditions the Helper either participated or 
was absent during hiding of the ‘Target Object’ (toy) and the ‘Tool’ (stick) and 
therefore she knew the place(s) of (1) both the Target Object and the Tool, (2) only 
the Target Object, (3) only the Tool or (4) neither of them. The subjects observed the 
hiding processes, but they could not reach the objects, so they had to involve the 
Helper to retrieve the Target Object. Both dogs and children signalled the place of 
the toy more frequently if the Helper had been absent during toy-hiding compared to 
those conditions when she had participated in the hiding. However, unlike children, 
dogs indicated the location of the stick only sporadically. In those conditions in 
which the Helper was ignorant of the whereabouts of only one of the objects the 
children indicated the place of this object more often than that of the known one.  
Although both dogs’ and children’s behaviours appear to correspond (at least 
partially) with the Helper’s knowledge state; even the subtle distinction made by the 
children can be interpreted without a casual understanding of knowledge-formation 
in others. 
In the framework of a longitudinal case study on a specially trained service dog, 
Philip, the second experiment was aimed to get a more sophisticated insight into the 
cognitive functioning of the dog’s mind. We used the same ‘Ignorant Helper’ 
paradigm as in the first experiment, in this case, however, the procedure was 
identical to that used in an ape-study (Dona, the orang-utan: see - Gomez & Teixidor 
1992) and therefore provides the possibility for direct dog-ape comparison regarding 
their performance. Results show that similarly to the case with this “enculturated” 
orang-utan, after few trials Philip was able to adjust his communicative behaviour to 
the state of knowledge of his human partner and cooperated successfully in the 
problem solving task. Although the exact mechanism underlying this communicative 
behaviour is still not clear, this approach gives a new possibility to conduct 
comparative studies aimed to understand the evolution of social cognition.  
 
*Based on:  
Virányi, Zs., Topál, J., Miklósi, Á., Csányi V. (2006). A nonverbal test of knowledge 
attribution: a comparative study on dogs and human infants. Animal Cognition 9(1): 
13-26. 
 
Topál, J., Erdőhegyi, Á., Mányik, R., Miklósi Á. (2006). Mindreading in a dog: an 
adaptation of a primate ‘mental attribution’ study. International Journal of 
Psychology and Psychological Therapy 6: 365-379. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The recognition of another individual’s mental state is a sophisticated form of 
social competence as being manifestation of “distributed cognition” (Johnson 2001). 
Since Premack and Woodruff’s seminal study (1978) the question of mental state 
attribution in nonhuman species has been in the focus of heated debates (see e.g., 
Povinelli & Vonk 2003; Tomasello et al. 2003a, b). Studies investigating what 
chimpanzees know about seeing (see Call 2001b for review) have provided the 
strongest body of results supporting the hypothesis that chimpanzees understand “at 
least some psychological states of others” (Tomasello et al. 2003a).  
 Recently, the dog has been proposed to be a promising species for studying 
the evolutionary emergence of social cognition (see Part I for review) and several 
lines of research suggest that dogs may have evolved some special social skills for 
understanding cues of human communication (see e.g., the findings by Studies I-VIII 
above). Accordingly, the question arises if dogs’ social cognitive skills go beyond 
relying on humans’ behavioural cues and reach to some deeper understanding. 
 To study mental state attribution in nonhuman animals three basically 
different non-verbal methods have been developed: “Guesser-Knower” (e.g. Call et 
al. 2000), “Competitive Conspecific” (e.g. Hare et al. 2001) and “Ignorant Helper” 
(Gomez 1998, Whiten 2000) paradigms. These studies were designed to assess if 
subjects (mainly primate species) understand the casual connection between past 
perception and present knowledge and/or whether subjects are able to take their 
partners’ previous experience or perceptual access into account. 
 The ‘Ignorant Helper’ design (Gomez & Teixidor 1992; Whiten 2000) tests 
the subjects’ sensitivity to others’ past visual access in an object-specific way. Both 
studies involved human-raised apes (one orang-utan and three chimpanzees 
respectively) with human contributors in a cooperative situation in which the ape 
could get some out-of-reach food by indicating it to a human partner. The essence of 
this design is that two relevant objects—a piece of food and a tool necessary for 
getting the food—are involved in the procedure. To make it obvious, the subjects 
receive several warm-up trials, in which the cooperative human partner (the Helper) 
uses the tool to get the food that was hidden by another human (the Hider) and 
provides the food to the subject if it indicated the correct location of food (simple 
request task). Following the warm-up sessions, probe trials are introduced in which 
the Helper’s knowledge about the locations of the food and the tool is systematically 
manipulated. That is, the Helper may be ignorant of either the location of both the 
food and the tool, or the food only, or the tool only, or none of them. Importantly, 
however, neither of these studies involved all of the four possible combinations of 
the Helper’s knowledge regarding the food and the tool (i.e. food only, tool only, 
both food and tool, neither of them). 
 In the first experiment we used a modified version of Whiten’s (2000) study 
to measure dogs’ and children’s behaviour in conditions representing all possible 
combinations of settings. In the second experiment we replicated the Gomez & 
Teixidor (1992) study on Dona, the orang-utan with a specially trained service dog 
that had been trained to assist his disabled owner. 
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5.4.1. EXPERIMENT IX/1 
 
 The main goal of the first experiment was to investigate if dogs are able to 
discriminate between request tasks in which the human Helper has different 
knowledge states concerning the whereabouts of the reward and/or the tool, relying 
upon the Helper’s engagement/disengagement in the hiding processes of the two 
objects and to compare their behaviour to that of 2.5-year-old children tested in the 
same conditions. Children of this age were selected to make comparisons with dogs 
in this situation because evidence for mental understanding of causal intentions starts 
to accelerate around the end of the second year, with the comprehending pretence in 
others, a systematic understanding that visual attention causes knowledge, and the 
routine use of protodeclarative gestures to induce or modify intentional states in 
others appear (Wellman & Phillips 2001). A mature understanding of mental agency 
(i.e., naive theory of mind) however, is still not present at this age because a number 
of studies report that this ability arises around 4 years of age (see Perner 2000 for 
review). 
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects 
 
 Eleven adult pet dogs (5 females, 6 males; mean age: 4.9 years, range: 1–10 
years) and 11 children (5 girls, 6 boys; mean age: 29.4 months, range: 26–35 months) 
participated in the experiment. The dogs were from five different breeds (3 Belgian 
tervuerens, 2 German vizslas, 1-1 Boxer, Sharpei, Malinois) and three mongrels. 
Only dogs living in the flat together with their owners and keen on retrieving objects 
and playing with toy were selected. All the owners were women, their age ranged 
between 20 and 35 years. All children were from Hungarian middle-class families. 
Five additional children were excluded from the study because of motivational 
problems and/or because their mothers neglected the instructions in course of the 
experimental trials.  
 
Experimental procedures 
 
 Testing was done in a familiar room (minimal size: 3×5m) of the subjects’ 
home (Figure 5.4.1.1). A stick (1 m long) was placed out of reach of the dog/child in 
a position (standard place) where it could not be seen by the Helper from her 
predetermined position, which was indicated by a chair. The experimenter also 
determined four additional hiding places for the stick and three hiding places for the 
toy where the hidden objects were out of reach of the dog/child. The hiding places 
were located under (or on top of) heavy pieces of furniture (e.g. bed, cupboard, book 
case) from where the dog/child could not get the toy/stick out. The distance between 
any two possible hiding places was at least 1.5 m. The Helper’s chair was positioned 
in a way that she could see the entire room (all hiding places) from there.  
 For the dogs, the hidden object was a favourite toy (e.g. tennis ball) whilst the 
toy was chosen by the children from a set of rollable toys (mainly small cars and 
balls), which were offered by the experimenter prior to the experiment. The 
owners/mothers did not know the scientific goal and the hypothesis of the study in 
advance; they were informed that its purpose was investigating the manners of the 
dog/child-human communication in nonverbal situations. Before the experiment the 
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experimenter thoroughly instructed the owner/mother about the experimental trials, 
the owner/mothers received written instructions as well. The children were told only 
that the experimenter came to play a rolling game with them and their mothers.  
 
 
Figure 5.4.1.1. 
The experiment took place in a room 
of the subject’s home. The picture 
shows one example. In the 
foreground a chair is positioned for 
the Helper and the stick is in its usual 
place (behind the TV). In the 
background, on the right side the 
door can be seen where the 
participants can enter and leave the 
room. The triangles sign the hiding 
places for the toy and for the stick 
(➤): three-three out-of-reach hiding 
places for both of the objects. 
 
 
Warm up play session (retrieval tasks and toy hiding trials) 
 
 In order to make the dogs and children familiar with the experimental 
situation and to make them familiar with the use of stick and the toy, ‘Warm up play 
sessions’ were introduced. Because we assumed that dogs had less experience with 
sticks and their use, 7 consecutive daily sessions with 3 trials in each were run in the 
case of the dogs and only a single 3-trial session was provided for the children. The 
procedure of the warm up trials was also different to some extent for the dogs and the 
children.  
 
1st step: The owner/mother initialized playing with the dog/child 
 In case of the dogs, the owner first put the toy into one of the three 
predetermined hiding places and then called the dog by its name. When the dog 
responded, the owner tried to reach the toy with her hand 3-4 times unsuccessfully. 
Then she went to the stick, took it from its standard place and got the ball with it. 
Finally, she replaced the stick, called the dog and initiated a retrieval game. In case 
of the children, the mother took the toy that the child had just chosen, sat down on 
the floor, called her child and initiated playing with the toy (she said: “I roll it, you 
have to catch it!”). 
 
2nd step: Three consecutive warm up trials 
 The owner stood and threw the ball at a distance of 2–3 m and encouraged the 
dog to retrieve it (the mother and the child bowled the toy to each other while sitting 
on the floor facing each other). After the dog retrieved the toy at least three times 
(after bowling the toy to each other at least three times) the owner (mother) 
threw/rolled the toy into one of the three predetermined hiding places apparently by 
accident. From here the dog (child) could not retrieve the toy, so the owner (mother) 
went there and tried to reach the toy with her hands but did not succeed. Then she 
went to the standard place of the stick, removed it from its place and got the toy with 
it. She called the dog (child) if she/he/it was not attending to her actions. After 
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replacing the stick the owner (mother) resumed playing with the subject and the next 
warm up trial started with the same procedure, except that the toy was thrown/rolled 
into another hiding place. In the three warm up trials the toy was rolled 
“accidentally” into each of the three hiding places.  
 The first warm up session was made in the presence of the experimenter who 
corrected the owner’s (mother’s) behaviour if it was necessary. The next six sessions 
were completed by the owner, and on the eighth day the experimental trials followed. 
The children received only one warm up session, and the experimental trials were 
executed on the same day.  
 
Experimental trials 
 
 Following the warm up sessions four experimental conditions were 
introduced in which both the owner/mother (who played the role of the Helper) and 
the experimenter (playing the role of the Hider) participated. Importantly, 
experimental situations were designed so that the Helper’s knowledge concerning the 
whereabouts of the Tool (stick) and the Target object (toy) were systematically 
manipulated and all trials consisted of 6 different phases (see Figure 5.4.1.2). 
 (1) Entering phase: All experimental trials began in the same way: the Helper 
(owner/mother), the Hider (experimenter) and the subject (dog/child) entered the 
room. The next two phases, however, were different in the different conditions based 
on the timing of the Helper’s leaving and re-entering the room: 
 
‘Introductory Stick & Toy’ condition (The Helper participated in hiding of both the 
stick and the toy.)  
 (2) Stick-hiding phase: The Hider called to the subject to gain his attention 
(“Name + Look here!” was said to the dogs and “I will play with you, but before, 
please, look what we are doing!” was told to the children). Then the Hider and the 
Helper went to the place of the stick, removed the stick into one of the four 
predetermined hiding places. The Hider called the subject if he was not attending to 
the actions. 
 (3) Playing and toy-hiding phase: Following this, the Helper sat down (the 
owners sat on their chair, the mothers sat on the floor in front of their chair), and the 
Hider took the toy out from her pocket and staying standing and throwing the toy to 
the dog or sitting down on the floor forming a triangle with the child and the Helper 
and rolling the toy to the child initiated retrieval/rolling game with the subject in a 
way which was similar to that was played in warm up trials. In this case, however, 
the Hider was also involved to the game: The Hider threw/rolled the toy alternately 
to the subject and the Helper. (The dogs fetched the toy while the children and the 
Helper threw/rolled it back to the Hider.) When the Hider got the toy back for the 
third time, she threw/rolled it into one of the three predetermined hiding places 
apparently by accident. She looked at the subject, shrugged her shoulders (“Oh 
sorry!” she said) and finally left. The Helper stayed in the room.  
 
‘Toy only’ condition (The Helper participated only in the hiding of the toy.) 
 (2) Stick-hiding phase: After spending a few seconds together in the room the 
Helper left saying to the subject: “I will come back soon, stay here!”. Then the Hider 
called the subject (“Name + Look what I am doing!”) and went to the place of the 
stick, removed it and put it into one of the four predetermined hiding places. Care 
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was taken that the subject was clearly attending and following each step of 
manipulation.  
 (3) Playing and toy-hiding phase: After hiding the stick the Hider went to the 
door, opened it and invited the Helper into the room. After the Helper sat down the 
Hider played with the subject and the Helper, and hid the toy in the same way as 
described in the ‘Stick and Toy’ trial.  
 
‘Stick only’ condition (The Helper participated only in the hiding of the stick.)  
 (2) Stick-hiding phase: After entering the Helper stayed in the room and 
participated in hiding the stick in the same way as described in the ‘Stick and Toy’ 
trial.  
 (3) Playing and toy-hiding phase: After hiding the stick, however, the Helper 
left the room saying: “I will come back soon, stay here!”. After the Helper closed the 
door the Hider took the toy out from her pocket and initialized a fetching/rolling 
game with the dog/child which was similar to that played in warm up sessions. After 
throwing/rolling the toy to the subject three times, the Hider threw the toy into one of 
the three predetermined hiding places apparently by accident. She looked at the 
subject, shrugged her shoulders (“Oh sorry!” she said) and left. At the same time the 
Helper entered. 
 
‘Neither’ condition (The Helper did not participate in the hidings of either of the 
stick and the toy.) 
 (2) Stick-hiding phase: After spending a few seconds together in the room the 
Helper left in the same way as in the ‘Toy only’ condition, so the Hider hid the stick 
on her own while calling the subject’s attention to these actions (see ‘Toy only’ 
condition). 
 (3) Playing and toy-hiding phase: After hiding the stick (without inviting the 
Helper into the room) she took the toy out from her pocket and played with the 
subject and hid the toy in the same way as in the ‘Stick only’ condition. Then she left 
the room but in the same time the Helper entered. From this point on all experimental 
trials continued in the same way. 
 
 (4) Waiting phase: After the Hider’s disappearance, the Helper sat on the 
chair at her predetermined place for 30 s without saying anything and followed the 
subject with her attention by turning only her head. Looking in other directions than 
the subject was not allowed; she had to focus her attention on the subject only.  
 
 (5) Object retrieval phase: After 30 s had passed, the experimenter knocked at 
the door, and the Helper retrieved the stick and the toy as soon as possible. To 
achieve this she could rely on her knowledge if she had participated in hiding any 
objects and/or on the subject’s behaviour during the waiting phase (behaviours 
indicating the place of the objects) and/or she could visit systematically the possible 
pre-determined hiding places (known-well by the Helper). Importantly, when 
searching for the objects, the Helper had been asked to ignore the subject, and verbal 
communication was not allowed to prevent the subject from receiving feed back with 
regard to his/her behaviour. When the Helper got the stick she had to work the toy 
off by the help of the stick and then to replace the stick to its original, standard place 
as soon as possible. 
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 (6) Playing phase: After the Helper got the toy and replaced the stick she 
initiated a short fetching/rolling game with the subject. 
 
 
 1, STICK & 
TOY 
condition 
2, TOY 
ONLY 
condition 
3, STICK 
ONLY 
condition 
4, 
NEITHER 
condition 
Phase 1: Entering Helper, Hider and Subject enter the room 
Helper leaves Helper leaves 
Hider & 
Subject 
 
Helper, Hider 
& Subject Phase 2: Stick-hiding 
Helper, Hider 
& Subject 
 Helper enters Helper leaves 
Hider & 
Subject 
Helper, Hider 
& Subject 
Helper, Hider 
& Subject 
Hider & 
Subject 
Hider & 
Subject 
Hider leaves Phase 3: Toy-hiding 
 Helper enters Helper enters 
Phase 4: Waiting Helper & Subject 
Phase 5: Retrieving 
the stick and the toy Helper & Subject 
Phase 6: Playing Helper & Subject 
 
Table 5.4.1.1. Experimental schedule for the four experimental conditions based on the 
presence of the three participants. All trials began and terminated in the same way, the 
Helper, however, left and re-entered the room in different phases of the different conditions 
and accordingly she participated in hiding 1) both the stick and the toy, 2) only the toy, 3) 
only the stick or 4) none of them. 
 
 All dogs and children were observed in all four types of conditions in a 
session with 3–5 min breaks between the trials. The first experimental trial was the 
‘Introductory Stick and Toy’ condition for all subjects since this condition — having 
the owner/mother continuously present — was the most appropriate to introduce the 
novel elements of the experimental situation (playing with the Hider, etc.). The order 
of the other three conditions and also the hiding places of the stick and toy in all four 
trials were randomised and predetermined. The children received only one session, 
however the dogs were re-tested on the subsequent day in similar way except that the 
order of all four trials were randomised. In this way the children participated in one 
trial of each condition whereas the dogs received two trials of each condition on two 
consecutive days. Experimental trials were recorded by two video cameras in fixed 
positions and the behaviour of the subjects was analysed later.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 The behaviour of the dogs and the children was observed during the waiting 
phases of the experimental conditions (i.e. in the half a minute when the Helper was 
passive and looked at the subject attentively) and the analysis was focused on the 
“indicative behaviours” of the subjects. In line with earlier studies (Hare et al. 1998; 
Miklósi et al. 2000; O’Neill 1996) gaze-alternations between the toy/stick and the 
Helper and gazing at the toy/stick accompanied by vocalization (barking, whining) in 
dogs and verbal communication in children were defined as indicative behaviours. In 
the case of human infants, pointing (with extended arm) at the place of the toy/stick 
(while the child was either looking at the place of the object or at the mother) was 
also regarded as signalling behaviour. Gaze-alternation was defined as behaviours 
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when gazing at the Helper (owner/mother) was followed directly by a gaze at the 
place of the toy/stick or vice versa. We should note that children (and dogs) often 
combined different types of signalling behaviours and gaze alternations. For example 
children often alternated their gaze from their mother to the place of the toy, pointed 
to it and said “Give it to me!” at the same time. In these cases the different types of 
signalling overlapping in time were counted as one single indication. The direction of 
gazing was recorded on the basis of head/face orientation of the dogs/children. In 
accordance with these definitions the number of indicating behaviours (behaviours 
referring to the goal objects) was measured later from the videotapes separately 
toward the toy and the stick. Reliability of measuring the direction of gazing and the 
direction of pointing was assessed by means of parallel coding of the 25% of the total 
sample by two observers, one of whom was blind to the experimental condition. 
Their inter-observer agreement yield the Cohen kappas of 0.90 for the dogs’ 
orientation, 0.90 for the children’s gazing direction and 0.99 for the children’s 
pointing direction. 
 In order to analyse whether the presence or absence of the Helper during 
changes of the location of the toy/stick had a functionally relevant effect on subject’s 
behaviour, we recorded both the focus and the sequence of indicative behaviours (i.e. 
what is indicated and what the sequence of indication is if more than one location is 
indicated). In line with this approach (e.g. Gomez 1998), the ‘Scores for situation-
relevant signalling’ were established for the different experimental conditions as 
shown in Table 5.4.1.2.  
 
 
                  SCORES FOR RELEVANT SIGNALLING BEHAVIOUR CONDITION 
1 0 -1 
Stick & Toy No signalling behaviour Indicating either the 
place of the toy or the 
stick 
Indicating both the 
place of the toy 
and the stick 
Toy only Indicating only the place 
of the stick, 
or first the place of the 
stick and then the toy 
No signalling behaviour, 
or indicating first the 
place of the toy and then 
the stick  
Indicating only the 
place of the toy 
Stick only Indicating only the place 
of the toy, 
or first the place of the 
toy and then the stick 
No signalling behaviour, 
or indicating first the 
place of the stick and 
then the toy 
Indicating only the 
place of the stick 
Neither Indicating both the place 
of the toy and the stick 
Indicating either the 
place of the toy or the 
stick 
No signalling 
behaviour 
 
Table 5.4.1.2. Establishing the ‘Scores for situation-relevant signalling’ in the four 
experimental conditions based on which object(s) the dog/child indicated in which order.  
 
 Score 1 was given if the subject’s signalling behaviour was properly adjusted 
to the knowledge state of the Helper. 
 Score 0 was given if the subject’s signalling behaviour gave only partial 
information needed by the Helper (i.e. signalled only one of the unknown hiding 
places) or provided the necessary information only after giving unneeded 
information. 
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Dogs, Session 2
NeitherStick onlyToy onlyStick & Toy
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
toy
stick
 Negative score (−1) was given when the subject signalled only the location of 
the object(s) known by the Helper . 
Because variables were not distributed normally, nonparametric statistical methods 
(Friedman ANOVA, Mann-Whitney U test, Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank 
test) were used for the data analyses. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Frequency of indicating behaviours towards the goal objects (toy and stick) 
 To determine if the subjects indicated the location of the specific object(s) of 
which the Helper was ignorant more intensively than the location of the object(s) of 
which she was knowledgeable, frequency of the toy-indicating and frequency of 
stick-indicating behaviours in the same condition were compared. The dogs were 
found to signal the place of the toy significantly more often than the place of the 
stick in all conditions (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank tests, p < 0.02 in each 
condition for both sessions; Figure 5.4.1.2a, b). In contrast, the children tended to 
show toy- and stick indicating with similar intensity in those trials in which the 
Helper knew the places of both objects or neither of them (Z(11) = 0.0; p = 1.00 for 
‘Stick & Toy’ and Z(11) = −1.20; p = 0.23 for ‘Neither’ condition). In trials however, 
in which the Helper knew either the whereabouts of the stick or the toy, the children 
tended to show more indicating behaviours toward the place of the object which was 
unknown to the Helper (indicating the toy more frequently than the stick in ‘Stick 
Only’ condition: Z(11) = −2.2; p = 0.028; and indicating the stick more frequently 
than the toy in ‘Toy Only’ condition: Z(11) = −1.99; p = 0.046; Figure 5.4.1.2c, see 
also Table 5.4.1.3). 
Dogs, Session 1
NeitherStick onlyToy onlyStick & Toy
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4
3
2
1
0
-1
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.1.2. Number of indicating 
the toy and the stick by the dogs (N = 
11) in the first (a) and second sessions 
(b) and by the children (c) (median, 
quartiles and extremes). Asterisk 
labels significant difference between 
the number of toy and stick 
indications.  
 
 
 
Children
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Stick only
Toy only
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*
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*
               dc_378_12
 170
 
 Experimental condition 
 Indicating 
the 
STICK & 
TOY 
TOY 
ONLY 
STICK 
ONLY 
NEITHER 
Toy 7 (64%) 8 (73%) 11 (100%) 8 (73%) DOGS 
1st session Stick 1 (9%) 1 (9%) 2 (18%) 0 (0%) 
Toy 9 (82%) 7 (64%) 10 (91%) 10 (91%) DOGS 
2nd session Stick 2 (18%) 1 (9%) 1 (9%) 1 (9%) 
Toy 3 (27%) 3 (27%) 7 (64%) 7 (64%)  
CHILDREN Stick 3 (27%) 8 (73%) 4 (36%) 3 (27%) 
 
Table 5.4.1.3. 
Number (and percentage) of the dogs (N = 11) and children ( N = 11) who indicated the toy 
or the stick in the different experimental conditions 
 
 To analyse separately if subjects tailored their toy indicating behaviour to the 
Helper’s knowledge state of the location of the toy and their stick-signalling 
behaviour to the Helper’s knowledge state of the place of the stick the intensity of 
signalling an object was compared in the different conditions. Comparisons of the 
frequencies of indicating the toy across the four experimental conditions did not 
show significant differences in the first session for the dogs (Friedman ANOVA: 
chi2(3) = 1.500; p = 0.682), but the dogs in the second session and the children 
performed significantly different frequency of toy-indicating as a function of 
experimental condition (chi2(3) = 10.402; p = 0.015 for the dogs and chi2(3) = 9.592; 
p = 0.022 for the children). Considering the number of stick-indicating behaviours 
there were no significant differences among the four different conditions (dogs, first 
session: chi2(3) = 2.00; children: chi2(3) = 5.535; p=0.137). 
 
 Similar results were found when the number of toy indicative actions were 
summed for conditions in which the Helper was knowledgeable regarding the 
location of the toy (‘Toy-Knowledgeable’ trials =‘Stick & Toy’ + ‘Toy Only’) and in 
conditions in which she was ignorant (‘Toy-Ignorant’ trials =‘Stick only’ + ‘Neither’) 
and were compared to each other. ‘Toy-Knowledgeable’ and ‘Toy-Ignorant’ 
conditions did not show significant difference for the dogs in the first session (Z(11) 
= −0.62; p = 0.535) but both dogs in the second session (Z(11) = −2.81; p = 0.005) 
and children (Z(11) = −2.719; p = 0.007) were found to signal the toy more 
frequently if the Helper was ignorant of its location (Figure 5.4.1.3a). A similar 
analysis based on the Helper’s knowledge about the place of the stick (‘Stick-
Knowledgeable’ trials =‘Stick & Toy’ + ‘Stick Only’ versus ‘Stick-Ignorant’ trials 
=‘Toy only’ + ‘Neither’) showed no significant differences in either the dogs (Z(11) 
= −1.0; p = 0.317 and Z(11) = −0.38; p = 0.705 in the first and second session) or the 
children (Z(11) = −1.41; p = 0.158) (Figure 5.4.1.3b). 
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Figure 5.4.1.3. (a) Sum of 
numbers of indicating the toy in 
the two Toy-Knowledgeable 
(‘Stick & Toy’ + ‘Toy only’) and 
the two Toy-Ignorant (‘Stick only’ 
+ ‘Neither’) conditions (median, 
quartiles and extremes). (b) Sum 
of numbers of indicating the stick 
in the two Stick-Knowledgeable 
(‘Stick & Toy’ + ‘Stick only’) and 
the two Stick-Ignorant (‘Toy 
only’+’Neither’) conditions 
(median, quartiles and extremes). 
Asterisk labels significant 
difference between the 
Knowledgeable and the Ignorant 
conditions (Wilcoxon matched 
pairs test  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scores for situation-relevant signalling 
 
 In principle, the question of whether or not the subjects’ indicating behaviour 
shows some understanding of the connection between the presence/absence of the 
Helper (when stick/toy was hidden) and her knowledge/ignorance can be answered 
by the analysis of individuals’ mean scores gained in the four conditions. 
Interestingly, a comparison based on this consideration did not show significant 
differences between the dogs’ and the children’s overall performance (Mann 
Whitney U test, N1=N2=11, U = 39.0; p = 0.171 for the comparison between children 
and dogs in the first session, and U = 36; p = 0.116 for the comparison between 
children and dogs in the second session). However, if the children’s and the dogs’ 
performance was compared in all four conditions separately (Figure 5.4.1.4) this 
similarity appeared only in the ‘Stick & Toy’ (U = 46.5; p = 0.365 and U = 38.0; p = 
0.151 for the first and second session respectively) and ‘Neither’ trials (U = 52.5; p = 
0.606 and U = 55.5; p = 0.748 for the first and second session respectively). 
Importantly, however, the children showed significantly more relevant indicating 
behaviour in the ‘Toy only’ condition (U = 15.5; p = 0.002 and U = 18.0; p = 0.004 
for the first and second session respectively), in which the ‘situation-relevant’ 
behaviour was indicating the stick, or first the stick and then the toy. In contrast, in 
the ‘Stick only’ condition, the dogs out-performed the children in the first session (U 
a). 
Session 1 Session 2 Children 
……….Dogs 
Stick-Ignorant 
conditions 
Stick-
Knowledgeable 
conditions
Toy-
Knowledgeable 
Toy-Ignorant 
conditions 
b). 
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NeitherStick onlyToy onlyStick & Toy
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e
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-,4
-,6
-,8
-1,0
-1,2
= 27.5; p = 0.028) although in the second session their scores were not significantly 
higher than those of the children (U = 40.5; p = 0.193) (Table 5.4.1.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4.1.4 Scores for 
situation-relevant signalling. 
Mean scores of dogs (in session 
1 and 2) and children gained in 
the four experimental 
conditions (median, quartiles 
and extremes).  
 
 
 
 
 Experimental condition 
 STICK & TOY TOY ONLY STICK ONLY NEITHER 
CHILDREN 7 (64%) 6 (55%) 5 (46%) 2 (18%) 
DOGS 
1st session 
3 (27%) 0 (0%) 11 (100%) 0 (0%) 
DOGS 
2nd session 
2 (18%) 0 (0%) 9 (82%) 1 (9%) 
 
Table 5.4.1.4. Number (and percentage) of dogs and children who performed ‘situation-
relevant signalling’ behaviour (received score 1) in the different experimental conditions. 
 
 
 There was another difference between the performance of dogs and children 
shown in scores for situation-relevant signalling. The children did not show 
differences in their scores as a function of experimental conditions (Friedman 
ANOVA, chi2(3) = 6.0; p = 0.112). The dogs, however showed striking differences 
in both sessions (first session: chi2(3) = 21.35; p < 0.0001; second session: chi2(3) = 
19.35; p = 0.0002). That is, the dogs performed more relevant behaviour in ‘Stick 
only’ trial compared to ‘Toy only’ condition (Dunn’s post hoc test, p < 0.01).  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 Although significant differences were not found in the overall performance of 
the two experimental groups, only the dogs’ performance varied extremely as a 
function of experimental condition. Whilst the dogs’ behaviour appeared to be highly 
relevant in the condition in which the Helper was ignorant regarding the whereabouts 
of the toy (‘Stick only’ condition), they show less relevant signalling in the other 
conditions (predominantly indicated the place of the toy). This is so because they 
indicated more often the place of the toy compared to the place of the stick in all 
experimental conditions.  
Dogs, Session 1
Dogs, Session 2
Children
* *
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 Children, however, showed object-specific changes in their signalling 
behaviour. They showed similar frequency of indicating the toy and the stick in trials 
in which the Helper had the same information regarding the whereabouts of the toy 
and the stick (i.e. either participated or not in the hiding of both objects — ‘Stick & 
Toy’ and ‘Neither’ conditions). In trials however, in which the Helper had 
information only about one of the objects (‘Toy only’ and ‘Stick only’ conditions), 
the children specifically signalled the object more often the location of which was 
ignored by the Helper (more stick-indicating than toy-indicating in ‘Toy only’ 
condition and more toy-indicating than stick-indicating in ‘Stick only’ condition). 
These findings are consistent with other studies (O’Neill 1996; Dunham et al. 2000) 
showing that children as young as age 2.5 may be able to take into account which 
events their partner has witnessed and to tailor their communication accordingly. 
 Comparing the dogs’ performance to that of the children, one of the most 
striking differences is the infrequency of stick-indicating behaviours in dogs. One 
could assume that this relates to the species-specific differences in their object-
manipulation abilities. Namely, 2.5-year-old children are predisposed to be more 
skilful in problem situations involving tool-use. Children, undoubtedly, have a lot of 
individual experience in using and manipulating objects as tools. All of the human 
participants have already practiced using different stick-like objects to retrieve other 
objects from out-of-reach places before the experiment whereas dogs had only 
indirect experiences of these actions via observing humans. Accordingly, dogs had 
difficulties in recognizing the role of the stick in getting the toy, and the warm-up 
trials were insufficient to establish this relationship between the stick and the toy.  
 Moreover, the lack of interest in the stick in dogs may be the result of the 
different “motivational value” of the two goal objects (stick and toy). Dogs (unlike 
children) were probably over-motivated in order to get the toy, and therefore they 
were less attentive when the stick was manipulated and hidden. As a consequence, 
they were less motivated to show behaviours referring to the place of the stick. It 
should be noted that any of the combination of the aforementioned possibilities could 
be responsible for why the dogs indicated predominantly the place of the toy but not 
the stick in all conditions. 
 Going beyond the question of which object the subjects chose to signal more 
intensively, the frequencies of indicating a special object were compared in the pair 
of trials when the Helper was knowledgeable of the place of this certain object to the 
other, ignorant pair of trials in order to test if the subjects communicated about a 
certain object more intensively when the Helper was ignorant of the place of this 
object.  
 This analysis showed that the children adjusted the frequency of their toy-
indicative behaviour to the Helper’s previous participation/absence in hiding the toy 
but the Helper’s knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the stick did not influence 
the frequency of the stick-indicating behaviours. However, given that children 
younger than three year old show only limited ability of mental state attribution (e.g. 
Wimmer et al. 1988; O’Neill et al. 1992), the 2.5-year-olds’ performance in this 
study still seems to be beyond expectation. In fact, the ability to solve conceptual 
perspective taking or theory of mind problems is believed to show a significant 
developmental improvement in human infants between 3 and 4 years of age (e.g. 
Chandler et al. 1989). Some suggest however, that the traditional theory of mind 
tasks relying on verbal skills underestimate younger children’s abilities (see O’Neill 
1996, for review) because mind-reading skills manifest in nonverbal behaviour (e.g. 
gazing, pointing) earlier than children become able to perform it explicitly in their 
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verbal responses (e.g., Garnham & Ruffman 2001; Carpenter et al. 2002b; Kovács et 
al. 2010).  
 Although the dogs hardly showed any stick related behaviours and even their 
toy-indications were not influenced by the experimental conditions in the first 
session, in the second session they proved to be sensitive to the fact that the Helper 
had or had not participated in the hiding of the toy (less signalling when the Helper 
participated in the hiding of the toy). It is quite unlikely that this change in the dogs’ 
behaviour from the first session to the second one was the result of quick trial-and-
error learning because the dogs did not receive any feedback from the Helper in the 
course of the trials (i.e. any reinforcement about the appropriate action). Apart from 
trial-and-error learning, subjects might have learnt about the general meanings of the 
experimental situation. For example they may have learnt that the Helper is ready to 
get the toy and to play with them even in those conditions when she had not 
participated in the retrieval game and in hiding of the toy (‘Stick & Toy’ and ‘Toy 
only’ conditions). Therefore, facing an already familiar situation, the dogs in the 
second session behaved in a more active, initiating way, which resulted in indicating 
the place of the toy more intensively if the Helper had not participated in hiding the 
object.  
 In summary, like children, dogs (at least to a certain extent) may be able to 
tailor their communicative behaviour to their partner’s previous 
participation/disengagement in conspicuous events. The adequate changes in the 
frequency of indication of the toy in dogs may mirror a fast “insightful process” 
learning (Gomez 1998) rather than trial-and-error mechanism.  
 
 
5.4.2. EXPERIMENT IX/2 
 
 In the framework of a longitudinal case study on a specially trained service 
dog, Philip, the second experiment is aimed to get a more sophisticated insight into 
the cognitive functioning of the dog’s mind. We use the same ‘Ignorant Helper’ 
paradigm as in the first experiment, in this case however, our method is based on the 
study conducted by Gomez and Teixidor (1992; discussed also in Gomez 2004) 
using only one adult orang-utan (Dona) housed in a zoo cage. This nonverbal task 
was originally developed to assess Dona’s ability to understand knowledge/ignorance 
of her human partner in a cooperative communicative situation.  
 
METHODS 
 
Subject 
 
 The subject was the same dog who participated in the “Do as I do” study 
(Study IV – see above); a castrated male Belgian Tervueren, Philip, who was three 
years old at the time of the experiment (see Experiment IV/1, Methods section for 
more details). It is important to note that Philip can be regarded as “highly 
enculturated” individual being an extensively socialized and trained assistance dog 
for his disabled owner who routinely monitors the state of his owner’s attention and 
uses human behavioural cues in order to effectively cooperate in interactive 
situations. Therefore Philip can be seen as specially prepared for studying “mind-
reading” abilities. 
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Experimental procedures  
 
 We conducted the observations in the living room of the owner’s flat (6m x 
5m, see Figure 5.4.2.1), which was familiar to Philip. Three boxes (that may be 
closed by a key) were put on a counter at the height of the dog’s eyes at 0.8 m apart 
from each other. These boxes served to hide the dog’s favourite toy (tennis ball). 
Two persons participated in the experiment: the experimenter (Hider, J.T.) who hid 
the reward and the owner (Helper) who helped the dog to get the ball. All visits were 
recorded on video and the training and test trials were analysed subsequently. 
 
 
Figure 5.4.2.1.  
Experimental arrangement 
in the owner’s flat (view 
from above, not to scale) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preliminary training 
 
 In the first phase of the experiment the dog was trained to solve a simple 
requesting task. At the beginning of each training trial the Hider entered the room 
and attracted verbally the dog’s attention (“Philip, listen!”) with a tennis ball in his 
hand. Then he went to the desk (the standard place of the key) and picked up the key. 
After this the Helper slowly approached one of the three boxes, opened it by the key 
and put in the ball. Having locked the box he placed back the key on the desk and left 
the room. Next the owner (Helper) entered the room at a predetermined point looking 
at the boxes he stopped and waited for Philip to approach one of the boxes and to 
prickle the box with his muzzle. In this situation the owner was allowed to encourage 
Philip with the “Show it!” command. If the dog did not choose a box then the 
command was repeated at five seconds intervals, until Philip approached one of the 
boxes. When the dog indicated one of the boxes unambiguously the owner went to 
the desk, picked up the key and opened the box chosen by the dog. If the dog chose 
the baited box then he received the ball for a short play. If the box was empty the 
owner was not allowed to open another box. Finally, the Helper relocked the box, 
placed the key on the desk and left the room. 
 Preliminary training trials were presented 18 times altogether over the course 
of four weekly visits (4-5 trials per visit). Baiting locations were randomly 
determined with the restrictions that the ball was put in each box for the same 
number of times (6) and never placed more than two times in succession into the 
same box.  
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Test trials 
 
 Following the preliminary training sessions three experimental conditions 
were introduced in order to analyse Philip’s “requesting/informing” behaviour. 
Experimental situations were designed so that the Helper’s knowledge concerning 
the whereabouts of the Tool (key) and the Target object (ball) were systematically 
manipulated in three conditions: 
 
(1) Control condition:  
The procedure of this condition was identical to the task the dog had to solve in 
preliminary training trials. These trials included to reveal whether Philip acquired 
efficient signalling behaviour in the situation where he had to inform the Helper 
about the place of the reward only.  
 
(2) Hidden key condition:  
The procedure of this condition was identical to the Control condition except, when 
the Hider had locked the ball in one of the boxes, he did not put back the key to the 
desk but instead he hid it somewhere in the room. The hidden location of the key was 
different in each experimental trial. In these trials the Helper had no information 
about the actual location of the ball and he had no information about the location of 
the key either. 
 
(3) Relocated key condition:  
Prior to the trial both the Hider and the Helper entered the room and the Hider picked 
up the key from the table. He showed it to Philip and then relocated the key to 
another part of the room. During this the Helper followed the action and movements 
of the Hider very closely and care was taken that Philip was clearly attending and 
following each step of the manipulation. The hiding place of the key was varied from 
trial to trial (e.g. under the carpet, behind a book on the bookshelves etc.). Then both 
persons left the room and after some seconds the Hider re-entered. He attracted 
verbally the dog’s attention (“Philip, listen!”) with a tennis ball in his hand and went 
to the key. Next he slowly approached one of the three boxes, opened it by the key 
and put the ball in it. Having locked the box he replaced the key to its recent location 
(to the place where he found it) and left the room. From this point the trial continued 
in the same way as in Control condition. 
 
Behavioural rules for the Helper during the test trials  
 
 In order to standardize the Helper’s behaviour across conditions, he had to act 
according to the following instructions: After entering the Helper had to go to the 
“starting point” (see Figure 5.4.2.1) where he was waiting for the dog’s signalling 
behaviour. Once the dog indicated one of the boxes (i.e. he touched one of the boxes 
or only approached a box within 10 cm-s with his nose and waited there for at least 3 
seconds) the Helper had to act differently according to the particular type of trial:  
 
 Control.  
The Helper picked up the key from the desk and opened the box chosen by the dog. 
If the ball was there he initialised a short fetching game with the dog.  
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 Hidden key.  
The Helper approached the usual place of the key (desk) and started to look for the 
key for 5 seconds. Then he turned towards the dog and he was waiting for the dog’s 
further actions. If the dog indicated at any time any particular place in the room 
(approaching, sniffing, prickling with its muzzle, staring) the Helper went there to 
take a close look. If he found the key he picked it up and opened the box shown by 
the dog. If no box was indicated, the Helper went back to the starting point and kept 
on waiting. 
 
 Relocated key. 
 The Helper went to the actual place of the key (to where he put it together with the 
Hider) and opened the box selected by the dog. If the ball was there he initialised a 
short fetching game with the dog. The Helper was allowed to open only one box and 
if the box selected by the dog was empty or they did not manage to get the ball 
within 1 minute, the trial was terminated and the Helper left the room. The test trials 
were conducted over 11 weekly sessions, each condition was presented once in each 
session in a randomised order (3x11 = 33 trials in total). The box in which the ball 
was put by the Hider was also randomised across conditions. Video recordings of 3 
sessions were excluded from further analysis because the owner (Helper) violated the 
behaviour instructions described above. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
 The behaviour of the dog was observed during the 1 minute long trials and 
the analysis focused on the dog’s ‘indicative’ behaviours towards the predetermined 
directions (i.e. baited box, location of the key). These behaviours were as follows:  
 
 Approach: The dog orients towards one of the predetermined locations (key 
or bait) and approaches it within 30 cm.  
 Touching: The dog prickles the baited box or the key with his muzzle.  
On the basis of head orientation of the dog two behaviour variables were recorded:  
 Gaze alternation: Gazing (head orientation) at the Helper is directly followed 
(within 2 seconds) by a direct head orientation at the location of the baited box or the 
key or vice versa. We recorded how many times Philip oriented at the relevant 
directions (Helper, location of the key, baited box), and how many times he 
displayed gaze alternation (i.e. back and forth alternation between the three important 
directions). (For a more detailed description and justification of this kind of 
behavioural analysis in dogs see Miklósi et al. 2000) 
 Gazing sequence: For the analysis of the sequence of head orientations 
toward the three different directions (Helper, baited box, location of the key) we 
established their relative rank order by noting the order of the directions to which 
Philip oriented after the Helper arrived at the starting position. Reliability of 
measuring the number of approaches and touches and the direction of gazing were 
assessed by means of parallel coding of total sample by two observers. The inter-
observer agreements (Cohen’s kappa) were 0.92 (approach), 1 (touching) and 0.87 in 
the case of dogs’ orientation. 
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
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Training for the request task 
In the course of the preliminary training trials Philip mastered the requesting 
behaviour very quickly. He showed the Helper the baited box by approaching and 
touching it within one minute and the human could select the baited box in all but 
two trials (88% correct choices). 
 
Test trials 
In the test trials Philip showed good performance in all conditions. He got quickly 
the ball in all (8-8) trials of the ‘Control’ and the ‘Relocated key’ conditions (on 
average within 20 seconds) by utilizing the cooperative behaviour of the Helper. He 
found the ball in most of the ‘Hidden key’ condition trials (6 out of 8). It is important 
to note that in this latter condition for the successful problem solving the dog had to 
inform the Helper (and at the same time the Helper had to read the dog’s behaviour) 
about both the actually baited box and location of the key. The comparison of 
problem solving latency (i.e. how quickly the dog got the ball) showed significant 
differences among experimental conditions. Philip got the ball by the help of the 
Helper significantly later in the ‘Hidden key’ condition (Friedman ANOVA, chi2(2) 
= 11.2; p = 0.003; Figure 5.4.2.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.4.2.2.  
Latency (mean + SE) of 
getting the ball in the different 
conditions. (The time elapsed 
from starting the trial until the 
Helper opened the baited box).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We found that Philip indicated the location of the ball by approaching and 
touching the baited box in all trials of the ‘Control’ and ‘Relocated key’ conditions. 
In contrast, the dog in these conditions approached and touched the key only in 3 
cases (out of 2x8 trials). Philip picked up the key and gave it to the Helper before 
approaching and touching the baited box during the 1st and 2nd trial in the ‘Control’ 
and during the 2nd trial in the ‘Relocated key’ conditions. Importantly, however, 
dog’s signalling behaviour has changed in the ‘Hidden key’ condition. Philip 
informed the Helper about the location of the key in most of the trials (6/8). In four 
cases (3rd, 5th, 7th and 8th trials) he approached the key before going to the baited box, 
that is, while the Helper were still waiting motionless and in the remaining two cases 
(1st and 6th trial) Philip first approached and touched the baited box and showed the 
key only when the Helper failed to find it in the usual location. 
 Next we analysed how Philip divided his attention between the three 
particular directions (the Helper, the baited box, the place of the key) in the different 
conditions. In the ‘Control’ and the ‘Relocated key’ conditions Philip predominantly 
looked at the baited box and the Helper (in sum 84.4% and 85.3% of the total time 
respectively) and he gazed only rarely at other directions. Interestingly however, in 
those trials in which the Helper was ignorant regarding the whereabouts of the key 
(‘Hidden key’ condition), the pattern of Philip’s head orientation has changed 
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strikingly. He gazed less at the Helper and the baited box (64.5% of the total time) 
and at the same time he focused his attention towards the location of the key (26.2% 
of the total time vs. 4% shown in ‘Control’ and 7% in ‘Relocated key’ conditions; 
Friedman ANOVA, chi2(2) = 6.4; p = 0.039).  
 Next we studied the changes in Philip’s communicative behaviour as a 
function of the Helper’s knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the key by 
analysing frequency of gaze-alternations. Results show that Philip turned his head 
towards the location of the key approximately two times more frequently when the 
Helper was ignorant about the place of the key (‘Hidden key’ condition) than in those 
trials when the key was at its usual location or the Helper was involved in the 
relocation of the key (chi2(2) = 9.5; p= 0.008). Similarly, compared to other 
conditions Philip performed significantly more gaze alternations between the 
location of the key and the Helper in the ‘Hidden key’ condition (chi2(2) = 7.05; p= 
0.029). 
Moreover alternating head-orientations between the baited box and the location of 
the key were also observed in the ‘Hidden key’ condition, but not in case of the other 
two ones (chi2(2) = 10; p = 0.006). Figure 5.4.2.3 indicates differences in the total 
number of per-minute gaze alternations across the three experimental conditions; in 
‘Hidden key’ condition Philip alternated his gaze more frequently among the three 
distinctive directions (chi2(2) = 7.46; p= 0.023). 
 
 
Figure 5.4.2.3.  
The total number of gaze 
alternations (per minute) 
occurring between any two 
of the three distinctive 
directions (Helper, baited 
box, location of the key) in 
the three different conditions 
(median, quartiles and 
extremes). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We have also analysed the gazing sequence and found characteristic 
differences between the ‘Relocated key’ and ‘Hidden key’ conditions (Figure 5.4.2.4). 
In the ‘Relocated key’ condition when the Helper was knowledgeable regarding the 
whereabouts of the key Philip first indicated the baited box in all but one cases (in 
the third trial he showed first the location of the key); this was followed by gazing at 
the Helper and last (if at all) he turned towards the actual location of the key 
(comparisons of the ranks: chi2(2) = 10.75, p= 0.0024). In contrast, when the Helper 
had no information about the actual location of both the key and the reward (‘Hidden 
key’ condition) we did not find such bias in order of head orientations (chi2(2) = 0.75, 
p = NS). In this case the location of the key and the baited box was equally preferred 
to be gazed at as Philip started with looking towards the key in half of the trials (1st, 
4th, 6th, and 7th ) whilst he indicated first the baited box in the other four cases.  
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Figure 5.4.2.4.  
Rank orders of head 
orientations (first, second or 
third direction of looking after 
the beginning of the trial) in 
either of the three distinctive 
directions (Helper, Baited box, 
location of the key). Median, 
quartiles and extremes are 
indicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 These results show that similarly to that of reported in the case of the orang-
utan, Dona (Gomez & Teixidor 1992), Philip had no problem with the request task 
and he could show relevant “pointing behaviour” from the very beginning of the 
baseline training. Moreover, in spite of the dogs’ restricted gesturing abilities Philip 
modified his behaviour adequately to the different experimental conditions. Philip 
effectively cooperated with the Helper throughout the tasks because he showed 
relevant changes in his orienting behaviour and in the frequency of gaze alternations 
between the target places as a function of Helper’s participation in relocating the key. 
Philip’s seemed to have adapted his behaviour to the changes in the Helper’s state of 
knowledge, similarly as observed in the great apes (Gomez & Teixidor 1992; Whiten 
2000).  
 However, compared to Dona’s indicative behaviours in the crucial ‘Hidden 
key’ condition when the Helper was ignorant regarding the whereabouts of the key 
(see Gomez, 2004 for a more recent discussion) Philip’s performance differed 
markedly. Namely, whereas the dog approached the key before going to the baited 
box during the first ‘Hidden key’ trial and he behaved the same way during 3 
additional trials (out of 8), in the first six repetitions of the ‘Hidden key’ trials Dona 
pointed to the location of the key after the Helper tried to find it in the usual place 
(except for the first trial, when she did not indicate the location of the key). After 
these six repeated trials, however, Dona developed relevant signalling behaviour. 
Authors concluded that Dona’s pointing to the key was not a reaction to human’s 
ignorance (“mental state”) but a result of a fast and efficient associative learning. 
 In accordance with this suggestion we may also assume that a rapid learning 
process can explain the changes in Philip’s behaviour, and as a result he became 
capable of adjusting his behaviour to the different changed context of the problem 
situations. So, taking a parsimoniously low-level approach, we can say that 
discrimination learning is a plausible explanation for the observed behaviour. Some 
observations, however, seem to contradict this hypothesis. First, Philip met the test 
situations very rarely (one trial with each condition per week) and the total number 
of trials (including preliminary training and all testing conditions) was relatively low 
(51) compared to the several hundreds of trials in Gomez and Teixidor’s (1992) 
study with Dona. Second, over the three months period of the study we could not 
observe any trends of the changes in Philip’s behaviour. So if he had in fact learnt 
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behavioural strategies for solving problems, it should have been based on very rapid, 
“insightful” learning.  
 Although in situ learning might have contributed to his performance, the 
rapid adaptation to the social situation from the beginning suggests that he had 
already possessed most of the necessary social skills before coming to the 
experimental situation. This could be explained by his extensive experience with 
such social situations during his life as an assistant dog but the facilitating role of 
certain specific skills rooted in the adaptation process of dogs in general could not be 
ruled out at this stage.  
 
 
5.4.3. STUDY IX. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 The ‘Ignorant Helper’ design (Gomez 1996b; Whiten 2000) is a useful 
method for studying sensitivity toward other’s presence or absence in past relevant 
events in both nonhuman animals and in human subjects. Subjects’ ability to 
recognize what the Helper had perceptual access to should be manifested in the 
adjustment of signalling the place of the Target object and the Tool across the 
experimental conditions. Among others Whiten (1997) argued that the manifestation 
of such “mind-reading” skills could be species specific and are displayed as a special 
kind of behavioural and situational reading ability. Importantly, understanding such 
overt mental states in others can be developed without any insightful recognition of 
other’s subjective mind-states. 
 Since this behaviour of both the dogs and the children can be interpreted at 
different levels, we should make a clear distinction between the “blindly” 
associationist explanations and the hypotheses inferring theory-based causally 
interpretive use of relevant perceptual cues (Gergely & Csibra 1997). 
‘Arousal’ Hypothesis 
 First, it can be argued that the subjects gestured and/or vocalized more and/or 
alternated their gaze more often in the ‘Ignorant Helper’ trials because the Helper 
had left the subject alone in the room with the Hider, which could be more arousing 
for the subjects. This argument, however, cannot explain why these more frequent 
gestures, vocalizations and gazes were so specific, often restricted to only the object 
that the Helper had not witnessed being hidden. 
‘Discriminative cue’ hypothesis  
 A second possible explanation is that the Helper provided discriminative cues 
in conditions in which she/he was ignorant of the whereabouts of the toy (for 
example was looking at the subject more attentively) and dogs (and children) 
gradually learned to recognize these cues as asking for information of the place of 
the toy. Two arguments are against it. First, the procedures of both experiments were 
carefully designed not to allow the Helper to give any feedback to the subjects on 
what particular information (place of the Target object and/or place of the Tool) she 
needed. Second, even if the Helper gave unconscious cues to ask for information it is 
quite unlikely that these subtle cues could indicate to the subjects what particular 
information (place of the Target Object and/or Tool) the Helper needed. 
Consequently it seems reasonable to conclude that the subjects’ indicating behaviour 
was influenced specifically by the Helper’s previous participation in hiding the 
objects and not by discriminative cues given by the Helper while passively waiting 
for the subject’s signalling behaviour. 
‘Specific experiences’ hypothesis  
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 However, it is still possible to use the partner’s overt, observable features of 
her participation or disinvolvement as “past discriminative cues” without any 
understanding of what others have or have not had perceptual access to. In this case, 
the subject could come to discriminate the relevant conjunction of stimulus 
preconditions (Helper present/absent) and to use them to form her signalling 
behaviour discovering the correlation between Helper’s presence/ absence and her 
knowledgeable/ignorant behaviour. Thus it is possible that over the course of their 
life-long experiences with humans, subjects learned to use the absence of the 
owner/mother in the close past when a desirable object was getting out of reach of 
them as a discriminative cue that informs them that they are needed to indicate the 
place of this object more intensively. If we assume some understanding of the 
Helper’s participation/ involvement which goes beyond using specific cues only, the 
question remains as to whether this understanding is limited to representing the 
behaviour of the Helper or based on understanding the casual connection between 
participating and knowing. What do the subjects take into account? Do they tailor 
their indicating behaviour directly to the Helper’s involvement or absence in relevant 
past events or to the Helper’s knowledge or ignorance inferring from her past 
participation? 
‘Disinvolvement-ignorance-informing’ hypothesis  
 If the subjects are able to attribute knowledge and ignorance to their partners, 
and they are ready to react in an active, initiating and complementary way, then they 
are expected to provide the information which the partner’s ignorance requires. This 
interpretation implies the ability to understand the casual connection between seeing 
and knowing as has been observed in three-year-old children (e.g. Wimmer et al. 
1998; O’Neill et al. 1992) as opposed to the previous three and the next non-
mentalistic explanations.  
 ‘Disinvolvement-informing’ hypothesis 
 There is, however, a lower lever explanation that relies on a direct 
relationship between the Helper’s participation vs. disinvolvement in certain past 
events and his/her predicted behaviour without an intervening variable (Whiten 
1996) of a mental state attributed to his/her. When interpreting the results that 2.5-
year-old children tailored their toy-signalling behaviour to the previous visual access 
of the parent to the hiding of the toy, O’Neill (1996) suggested that “2-year old 
children tailored their communication by, first, taking into account the parent’s 
disengagement from the events taking place and, second, by wanting to update the 
parent about the relevant events that happened while the parent was disengaged” 
(O’Neill 1996, p. 673). This ability “may have rested not on a sophisticated, casual 
understanding of knowledge and its relation to sensory experiences but, rather, on a 
simpler, precursory understanding of the form “Tell other people about significant 
happenings they did not take part in with me”. (p. 674). Based on this argumentation 
the “disinvolvement-informing” hypothesis may explain the children’s (and dogs’) 
capability for adjusting to others previous perceptual access. 
 Finally, we should note that despite the surface similarities the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying such performance in dogs and children may rest on different 
processes. Nevertheless these findings provide further support for the dogs’ 
improved social competence suggesting that dogs (like children), having been raised 
in socially enriched human environment, may be able to generalize their own past 
experiences in order to predict other’s behaviour as well as to recognize that a 
particular sequence of events and/or actions precede certain behaviour response (and 
specific changes in mental states) in others. 
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5.5. CONSTRUCTING COMMUNICATION:  
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
 Social cognition as the capacity to process socially relevant information is an 
essential component of the dog cognitive equipment that allows this domestic animal 
to communicate and interact with humans. However, the enormous variations of 
human social behaviour and diversity in human communication often enough 
challenge the dog’s capacity to understand others.  When communicating, humans 
use an infinite number of communicative signals in at least the visual and acoustic 
modes. In addition they apply certain signals for initialising and maintaining 
communication (e.g., eye-contact) and rely on various behavioural cues for 
recognizing attention. An intriguing question is, to what extent do dogs demonstrate 
these features of communication? 
 
(1) Initializing communication with humans. 
 There are some indications that dogs have a strong propensity to initialize 
communicative interactions with humans, and for this they rely predominantly on 
visual signals (looking and gaze alternation) which are functionally similar to those 
used by humans. In this chapter we have provided some evidence that this pattern of 
behaviour can be revealed in situations where dogs are exposed to insoluble 
problems in the presence of humans (STUDY IX). Under these circumstances, dogs 
show many forms of behaviour (gazing, gaze alternation, vocalization) that direct the 
attention of the human onto themselves or the problem to be solved (see also Miklósi 
et al. 2000; Gaunet 2008; 2010). Comparative experiments have shown that this 
behaviour pattern also emerges more readily in dogs than in hand-reared wolves 
(Miklósi et al. 2003; Virányi et al. 2008). There are also indications that the 
preference to look at the human develops very early in dogs in comparison to wolves 
(see STUDY I. for more details), which can in principle provide the basis for the 
emergence of complex communicative interactions between humans and dogs in 
situations like the request task in the ‘Ignorant Helper’ method (STUDY IX). 
 
(2) Relying on visual cues of human attention.  
 The preference to look at the human’s face might have led to enhanced skills 
in reading behavioural cues of human attention in dogs. Dogs have a robust ability to 
share attention with humans; they are very skilful in using human gaze in object-
choice situations in which dogs both follow and direct human gaze (for a review see 
Kaminski 2009). Recent research has also provided clear indications that dogs are 
sensitive to the direction of human visual attention in various contexts; e.g. when 
they beg (Gácsi et al. 2004), perform forbidden actions (Call et al. 2003) or asked to 
fetch an object (Kaminski et al. 2009a). 
 Moreover increasing evidence suggest that domestic dogs show early (Riedel 
et al. 2008; see also STUDY VI) and somewhat infant-like (STUDY VIII) sensitivity 
to cues that signal the human’s communicative intent (eye contact, verbal 
addressing). It seems that dogs use eye-contact and directed talk provided by humans 
to infer whether they are addressed in a particular situation (STUDY VI /Exp. 1) and 
like infants, they can discriminate intended communicative acts and non-
communicative goal-directed behaviours (STUDY VI/ Exp. 2). 
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(3) Responsiveness to human communicative gestures. 
 Recently, intensive research efforts have revealed that dogs can rely on 
various human bodily gestures as communicative referential signals. In these 
experiments dogs have to find hidden food based on cues provided by a human (for a 
review see Miklósi & Soproni 2006). Dogs can use various forms of pointing (e.g., 
Hare et al. 1998; Soproni et al. 2002) as indications of the location. The performance 
of dogs in these experiments can be compared to 1.5-2 year old children (Lakatos et 
al. 2009), and young dogs are superior to hand-reared wolves (Miklósi et al. 2003), 
although the later can also rely on pointing cues after intensive socialization and 
some training (Virányi et al. 2008 but see Udell et al. 2008). There is also evidence 
that dogs can interpret a human pointing gesture even in early puppyhood without 
any explicit training (Gácsi et al. 2009).  
 In addition, other experiments have shown that some dogs tend to rely on the 
pointing gesture even when they have conflicting visual or olfactory information 
about the location of the hidden object (Szetei et al. 2003). The special importance of 
human manipulation even against other (non-social) discriminative cues is further 
supported by the results of STUDY VII and STUDY VIII showing that dogs 
preferably rely on human-given cues in two-way object choice tasks and this bias can 
lead to “efficiency blindness” in social learning situations. Dogs can make inference 
by exclusion, this reasoning however, is manifested in their performance only in that 
case when choice from among the two target places can not be made on the basis of 
social-communicative cues (directional gestures, eye contact, gaze shift – STUDY 
VII/ Exp. 1 & 2). Assessing the relative importance of social-communicative cues 
versus attention-catching effect of non-social discriminative stimuli we also found 
that dogs, like 18-month-old infants, show “efficiency blindness” in an observational 
learning situation depending on the ostensive–communicative signals from human 
demonstrator and the presence of the demonstrator during their choice( STUDY VII/ 
Exp. 3).  
 Further results of comparative experiments point to a novel aspect of dogs’ 
and human infants’ perseverative search bias: the role of ostensive-communicative 
signals in the emergence of A-not-B error (STUDY VIII). Our findings show that 
these errors reflect the subjects’ susceptibility to the human communicative cues 
embedded in the search task. It seems that human-reared wolves are unable to 
develop a similar sensitivity to human communicative signals. This functionally 
infant-analogue manifestation of social competence in dogs supports the hypothesis 
that caninization in the human environment have preferred traits for which the cues 
of human communication are relevant and important concomitants of the social 
environment. 
 Finally, it should be mentioned that the emergence of behaviours such as gaze 
alternation between an inaccessible target and a human, apparent attention-getting 
signals (e.g. vocalization) and the influence of the physical presence and/or the 
attentional status of a human on the propensity to exhibit these communicative 
signals (see also Miklósi et al., 2000; Gaunet 2008; 2010) support the view that dogs 
meet many of the operational criteria (see Leavens et al. 2005) for the initiation and 
maintenance referential and intentional communication with their human partners. 
 
(4) “Mind-reading” skills. 
 Further observations on dog communication with humans suggest that they 
might be able to complement information that is missing in the human (STUDY IX). 
The experiments presented in STUDY IX are the first ones which systematically 
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tested and compared children and dogs as to whether each is able to tailor their 
signalling behaviour to a human’s past participation/disengagement by understanding 
the social situation with especial regard to the contribution of the human partner in 
the manipulative actions. Results show that in spite of the dogs’ restricted gesturing 
abilities subjects, at least in some situations, modified their behaviour adequately to 
the knowledge of the Helper. Although one could invoke the ability of dogs to take 
the other’s perspective or recognize knowledge or ignorance in humans, for our 
purpose it is most important to note that dogs are able to provide humans with 
information that helps them in obtaining a goal; or, alternatively, dogs can rely on 
human behavioural cues indicating the lack of certain “knowledge”.  
 Dogs’ sensitivity to past perceptual access of humans is in line with earlier 
studies (Call et al. 2003; Gácsi et al. 2004 and STUDY VI), that have demonstrated 
in different situations, that dogs can recognise what a human can or cannot perceive 
(see) at present. This sensitivity of dogs can provide the grounds for tailoring their 
behaviour to the past perceptual access of others (for further corroborating evidence 
see Cooper et al. 2003). 
 
 In summary, the results presented in this chapter seem to confirm the 
hypothesis that dogs are evolutionary prepared to learn to use signals of the human 
non-verbal communication to interpret human action and they may also used these 
cues to extrapolate information from human behaviour. All this suggests that 
independently from the actual underlying mental mechanisms dogs display analogue 
functioning in terms of performance to preverbal infants in ostensive-communicative 
situations. At the same time, although dogs seemingly understand the 
communicatory nature of different interspecific (i.e. dog-human) social interactions, 
this does not mean necessarily that they represent and learn any about the mental 
state of the human or understand that others perform acts intentionally (with a goal in 
mind).  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
PUTTING THINGS TOGETHER: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
STUDYING SOCIAL COGNITION IN DOGS 
 
 
6.1. CHARACTERIZATION OF DOG’S SOCIAL COMPETENCE 
 
 Dogs undeniably possess a wide variety of social-communication skills. A 
puzzling feature of these skills is that these often manifest in a sophisticated manner 
in interspecific interactions (toward people) whereas dogs do not seem to utilize the 
very same skills in dog-dog (intra-specific) interactions. A good example for this 
strange variance is the use of gaze cues. Whereas dogs apparently tend to establish 
eye contact with humans and readily utilize human gaze cues in different 
collaborative situations (see the above studies for more details), they rely on this 
means of communication restrictedly in intraspecies interactions (Bradshaw & Nott 
1995).  
 It is increasingly accepted that the key to the puzzle of dogs’ “inter-specific” 
social competence is the fact that the human social environment provides a natural 
niche for dogs (see Chapter 2). The dogs’ ancestors encountered a human-dominated 
environment that was specifically challenging for them by virtue of its complex 
social and cognitive nature. Therefore, as a consequence of the shared environment, 
many social skills in dogs have undergone convergent evolutionary changes, and 
many aspects of dog behaviour have become functionally analogue counterparts to 
the corresponding human trait. Following this line of argument, it becomes evident 
that the parallel investigation of dog (versus wolf) and human (versus chimpanzee) 
behaviour may be beneficial for our understanding of the evolutionary processes. 
 In comparative work, however, the actual performance of the dogs should be 
compared in terms of the range of environmental and social factors and intrinsic 
constraining abilities (see enculturation issue below for more details). In the case of 
socio-cognitive abilities we suggest that such performance should be described in the 
framework of social competence. Social competence of an individual can be 
interpreted as the functional manifestation of an array of skills that allows it to 
conform to the changing challenges of its social environment. As abilities comprising 
social competence have been under divergent selection pressure in different species, 
one may expect that each species possesses skills that function within a certain range 
of social and environmental factors and differ in their complexity. The task for 
comparative research, therefore, is to find those aspects of social competence that are 
different or shared in dogs, wolves, children and nonhuman ape species.  
 In the last few years different ideas have been proposed regarding the typical 
characteristics of social competence in dogs as well as the key differences between 
dogs versus apes and dogs versus wolves. Note that these ideas are not necessarily 
exclusive but could provide a useful basis for systematizing findings and testing 
particular experimental hypotheses.  
 
6.1.1. Social dog – causal ape 
 
 The “social dog versus causal ape” hypothesis was coined by Bräuer et al. 
(2006) who suggested specific differences between great apes and dogs in the ability 
to make inferences from cues of different types as to the location of hidden food. 
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Accordingly, this hypothesis infers specific differences in the social competence of 
dogs and apes claiming that dogs have evolved inter-specific social sensitivity 
including preference for a wide range of cues of human ostensive and referential 
communication. This “infant-like” sensitivity (see Chapter 5 for more details) 
enables them to interpret human behavioural signals better than their non-
domesticated ancestors and better than the human’s closest relative. 
 In one set of experiments Bräuer et al. (2006) compared dogs’ and apes’ 
performance in two way object choice tasks in which subjects were required to find a 
hidden food on the basis of either non-social cues representing physical causal 
association (e.g. noise made by the hidden food) or social-communicative signals 
referring to the location of the food (e.g. pointing from a greater distance). Dogs, 
unlike chimpanzees, were especially skilful at reading human communicative 
behaviours whilst they showed little success in understanding physical causal 
relations. In contrast, chimpanzees outperformed dogs in understanding causal 
relations in the non-communicative versions of the object choice task. These findings 
support previous findings that great apes face problems in reading some human 
social cues, e.g. they typically perform at chance in situations in which a human 
informs the subject by communicative gestures (e.g. Herrmann et al. 2007, but see 
Okamoto-Barth et al. 2008). Importantly, it seems that reinforcement history in 
regard to using human gestures is of less importance for dogs because puppies as 
young as six weeks utilized human gestural cues for finding hidden food (Riedel et al. 
2008, but see Udell & Wynne 2010). 
 
6.1.2. Cooperative dog – competitive ape 
 
 A modified version of this account, which can be labelled as “cooperative 
dog versus competitive ape” (Hare & Tomasello 2005) hypothesis, suggests that the 
key difference between dogs’ and apes’ social competence is that domestication 
enhanced the development of special skills in dogs, which can be utilized especially 
in those situations in which a human communicates in a cooperative manner (e.g. 
providing informative cues and or imperative orders – see STUDY VIII). So whereas 
dogs follow cooperatively (“voluntarily”) human gestures independently of the target 
referred by the signal (see STUDY VII), chimpanzees show ”utilitarian” use of their 
(human) partner’s signals. Increasing evidence suggests that apes routinely interpret 
their partners’ acts (gazing, reaching etc.) as an indication of selfish intention to 
obtain a target (e.g. Bräuer et al. 2006; 2007; Okamoto-Barth et al. 2007) but have 
difficulties understanding the human’s informative (altruistic) motive (e.g. Povinelli 
et al. 1990). Whereas already 12-14 month old human infants comprehended 
communicative intentions in the object choice task (e.g. Behne et al. 2005), adult 
chimpanzees are seemingly unable (or unwilling) to select the referent successfully if 
it has no relevance for them. The fact that dogs and chimpanzees differ specifically 
in their use of human communication in object choice situations may lend further 
support to the hypothesis that dogs, unlike chimpanzees, have been specifically 
selected for engaging in cooperative activities with humans. This view suggests that 
the contexts in which partners share information about resources by providing 
communicative signals do not fit with the cognitive mindset of chimpanzees, whose 
social competence manifests more adequately in competitive situations. 
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6.1.3. Evolutionary enculturated dog – wild wolf  
 
 A third approach addresses wolf-dog differences in particular with regards to 
the functional manifestation of social competence in these species. The complex 
hetero-specific communicative abilities of dogs in comparison with wolves can be 
regarded as the outcome of specific evolutionary changes in the social cognitive 
mechanisms (see Hare et al. 2002) or non-specific associative conditioning (Udell et 
al. 2008). Evidently, it is unlikely that the relatively short evolution of dogs has 
produced fundamental changes in the cognitive machinery so there is no reason to 
suppose the existence of an innate ability to “understand” human signals in the total 
absence of individual experience. However, without denying the importance of 
learning (Udell et al. 2009) and individual socialization (c.f. enculturation - Chapter 
2.4), we may suppose the existence of evolutionary (i.e. genetic) predispositions in 
dogs, which facilitate the emergence of heterospecific communicative interaction 
with people.  
 It should also be noted that the genetic contribution to any particular “social-
cognitive” trait (measured in an experiment) may be small, and additionally, the 
effects of genes on such complex epiphenomena as social cognitive skills are likely 
to manifest through interaction with environmental factors. That is, genes influencing 
the emergence of cognitive skills in dogs may not do so directly, but rather indirectly, 
by making individuals more sensitive to the effects of certain environmental factors. 
Importantly, such small (and often interactional) effects can be easily overlooked if 
one varies environmental influences when comparing dogs to wolves. Keeping this 
point in mind, our studies (see STUDY I, STUDY II) compared the behaviour of 
hand-raised dogs and wolf puppies under identical conditions to reveal early species-
specific differences that could be attributed to the effect of domestication (see also 
Miklósi et al. 2003; Virányi et al. 2008; Gácsi et al. 2009). 
 This “gene-environment interaction” approach suggests that wolves with 
particular social experience may also show evidence for social-communicative skills 
(e.g., flexibility to detect human visual cues of attention – Udell et al., 2011; utilizing 
human pointing gesture – Gácsi et al. 2009), and the dogs’ social competence is also 
affected by the age, rearing conditions, and treatment practices. Interestingly, we 
may draw a parallel between dogs and human children with regard to the studies 
comparing “socially deprived” (shelter/orphanage) individuals with typically 
developed samples (pet dogs/children in families). For example, it has been recently 
reported that many children who have resided in very deprived institutional 
environments may exhibit specific deficits in cognitive and social functioning (Rutter 
et al. 2007). This autistic-type behaviour pattern is an acquired syndrome that may be 
related to institutionalisation. Thus, the environment can have a significant effect on 
human social cognition.  
 Note this hypothetical example: Providing evidence that enculturated 
(human-reared) chimpanzees outperform children with institutional autism (e.g., in a 
task based on the subject’s ability to follow human’s gaze) should not lead one to 
conclude that human-specific genetic predispositions, which may have evolved 
during hominization, play no role in gaze following behaviour in particular or in the 
manifestation of other aspects of human social cognition. In a similar vein, one 
cannot reject the possibility that a genetic predisposition (domestication effect) exists 
in the dog on the basis of the finding that dogs with limited human social experience 
often show poor spontaneous sensitivity to human signals, while intensely trained 
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and socialised wolves perform reliably under certain conditions (see e.g., Udell et al., 
2011). 
 
6.1.4. A synergetic model of the emergence of dogs’ social cognitive skills 
 
 In line with the approach focusing on the genotype-by-environment 
interaction we propose a model of the general effects of domestication that takes into 
account both genetic and environmental variability in the dog and wolf, as well as the 
fact that the same developmental endpoint (performance in a particular task) can be 
achieved through different pathways. This account differs from the linear gene– 
phenotype approach by positing a causal role for neither genes nor environment in 
isolation, but for their synergetic co-participation in the emergence of social 
cognitive skills, where the effect of one is conditional on the other.  
 This synergetic model (Figure 6.1.4.1) presumes that there was some positive 
selection for genetic factors during domestication, some of which play a role in 
sociality (e.g. von Holdt et al. 2010), especially with respect to heterospecific 
interactions. This could include preference towards humans, looking at human gaze, 
and so forth. These changes allow for social experience during development to have 
markedly different effects on the behaviour of dogs and wolves. The most important 
aspect of this model is that in dogs, the effects of positive selection (genetic 
advantages) manifest only in a proper social environment, and even without such 
selective history, wolves can also reach high levels of interspecific social skills if 
socialised intensively. 
 
Figure 6.1.4.1. A simple sketch 
of the synergetic model on the 
emergence of interspecific 
social skills in dogs and wolves. 
The model assumes some 
genetic advantage on the part of 
the dog for acquiring a range of 
social skills that are utilised in 
the human-dog relationships. 
These social skills emerge after 
relatively short social 
experience with humans. 
Wolves can also develop 
comparable social skills; 
however, they need 
significantly more intensive 
human social input to approach 
or achieve the same levels of performance. Lack or intermission of social experience may 
lead to deteriorated social performance in both species, but this process is faster in wolves. 
 
 Furthermore, there could have been several points in the development of the 
two species when, depending on the differential genetic and social environmental 
contributions, no difference between dogs and wolves would have been observed 
with regard to social skills. It is important to note that socialisation or social 
experience should be regarded as maintaining environmental stimulation, in the sense 
of Caro and Bateson’s (1986) model on behavioural development; thus, harmful 
social experience or intermissions of social experience may disrupt the manifestation 
of former social skills. In our view, species–environment interaction seems a 
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particularly suitable approach for understanding the development of social cognition 
in both dogs and wolves, because this epiphenomenon is known to be associated with 
environmentally mediated factors, yet individual dogs and wolves display 
considerable heterogeneity in their response to those environmental exposures.  
 The synergetic model makes several predictions for which there is general 
support. First, it predicts that dogs need less social experience with humans and less 
scheduled (i.e., more “ad hoc”) social experience with humans than do wolves to 
achieve the same level of social skills. It seems that dogs have a head-start in being 
attentive to humans and in responding to human-given cues correctly (Riedel et al. 
2008; Gácsi et al. 2009; see also STUDY 1). Second, dogs without or with little 
interspecific social experience show retarded social skills that may be actually 
inferior to those observed in socialised wolves (Udell et al. 2010), and third, the 
model predicts that intensive socialisation, as compared to the “customary” 
socialisation, will have a smaller performance-improving effect on dogs’ social skills 
in comparison to wolves.  
 In conclusion, the effects of domestication on the social skills of dogs should 
be evaluated in a framework of more flexible behavioural models that consider the 
contributions of genetic and social factors.  
 
 
6.2. THE INFANT-LIKE CHARACTER OF THE DOGS’ SOCIAL 
COMPETENCE 
 
 In line with the aforementioned theoretical considerations (Chapter 2) and on 
the basis of the experimental findings presented in Chapters 3-5 we propose that the 
social competence in dogs has been affected by the challenges of the human social 
environment. As a consequence of these adaptation requirements (i)dogs have 
evolved some special skills for interacting with and communicating with human 
beings, (ii)these skills provide the basis for fast (and efficient) social learning about 
human communicative behaviours in dogs and (iii)contribute to a more “infant-like” 
and less “wolf-like” functioning of social cognition in this species. In fact, recent 
observations have revealed interesting parallels between dogs’ and human infants’ 
tendency to participate in communicative interactions with humans and to gain 
knowledge through social/observational learning 
 
6.2.1. The interactive nature of human communication and its role in efficient social 
learning  
 
 When speculating about hominine evolution, it is often assumed that the 
adaptational demand manifesting in the necessity of making fast and efficient sharing 
of intentions and emotions and generic knowledge among group-mates was the 
crucial driving factor (Gergely et al. 2007). In line with this assumption it has been 
proposed that a highly specialized social learning system was one of the basic 
cognitive adaptations that evolved in response to this evolutionary challenge. In the 
long run this evolutionary innovation has paved the way for the emergence of culture 
in the increasingly closed and individualized groups of the homo line. 
 The crucial point of this evolutionary leap was that, during hominization, the 
communication became such an interactive mechanism that was characterized by two 
human-specific features. First, it enabled transfer of (cultural) knowledge in a 
uniquely fast and efficient manner between the companions even if the knowledge to 
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be acquired is cognitively opaque (that is, the recipient is limited in gaining insight 
about the causal structure/means-ends relationships of the manifested knowledge). 
Second, this mechanism ensured that naïve social learners acquire knowledge which 
is generalizable across contexts even after one or few observations (see Csibra & 
Gergely 2009 for a recent review).  
 The significance of this evolutionary innovation lies in the fact that 
transmission of generic knowledge between individuals via non-human types of 
social/observational learning is a very slow and fortuitous process. In fact, the 
knowledge manifested by a “demonstrator” in a social learning situation is always 
episodic: the recipient becomes informed about objects and/or events that are 
relevant only to the particular context of “here-and-now”. The acquisition of nut 
cracking in wild chimpanzees (Boesch et al. 1994), for example, clearly 
demonstrates the limitation of social learning without being supported by the 
aforementioned human-like interactive communication mechanism because the 
learning process is time consuming and it takes about 3–7 years for the infant 
chimpanzee to master the skill (Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa 1997, but see 
Mashall-Pescini & Whiten 2008) 
 The artificial world of humans has been far more challenging than the social 
and physical environment of chimpanzees. Human abilities for using and 
constructing complex tools as well as social structures made our world extremely 
complex, in which the cultural knowledge to be transmitted is often “opaque” 
regarding its aim as well as the cause-effect relationships. Therefore early humans 
must have faced serious problems at the emergence of material culture during the 
hominine evolution. Csibra and Gergely have recently hypothesized (2009) that a 
new type of communicative learning system, natural pedagogy, may have emerged as 
an evolutionary solution to this social-environmental challenge in order to facilitate 
the transmission of more complex knowledge more rapidly.  
 Increasing evidence suggests that this communicative learning system is 
present in early infancy and utilizes infants’ special sensitivity for ostensive-
referential demonstrations of knowledge (see Study VIII for more details). That is, 
during this interactive process, in addition to the manifestation of the knowledge to 
be transmitted (e.g. splitting the nut by stone), the “teacher” uses signals expressing 
his/her communicative intent and directional/referential signals to specify the referent 
(i.e. what (s)he is informing about). For the observer, at the same time, the ostensive 
referential communication serves to highlight the relevant, generalizable aspects of 
the knowledge and provides an effective guide even though the naïve learner (e.g. 
preverbal infant) has no clear understanding of causal relationships and cannot gain 
insight into the hidden cognitive processes of the “teacher”. Thus natural pedagogy 
creates a shortcut for the novice by getting around that long and cognitively 
demanding process during which the observer first has to understand the causal 
structure and cognitive background in order to acquire generalizable knowledge. 
 
6.2.2. The dog: infant mind in wolves’ clothing? 
 
 Importantly, human social settings provide a wide variety of cognitively 
demanding (opaque) inputs not only for young infants but also for dogs, whose social 
learning skills have been presumably adapted to the complex human social 
environment (see above). Our studies provide corroborating evidence that similarly 
to preverbal human infants, dogs fulfil at least two out of three operational criteria 
for being a recipient in “pedagogical” knowledge transfer (see Chapter 5). 
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 First, dogs show special sensitivity to such ostensive cues that signal the 
human’s communicative intention and they also show some evidence of the 
recognition of information transferring nature of communicative contexts. Like in 
infants, ostensive-communicative cues guide the dogs’ attention and influence their 
inferences and interpretations in object search tasks (STUDIES V, VII & VIII). They 
also show differential sensitivity to human gaze-shift in communicative context as 
compared to a non-communicative situation and ostensive-communicative 
addressing signals facilitate gaze-following behaviour in dogs (STUDY VI). 
 Second, dogs seem to comprehend the referential character of human cuing in 
a way similar to human infants (see STUDY VI for more details). These results 
suggest that human ostensive-communicative referential signals trigger an attentive, 
“ready-to-learn” (and/or “ready-to-obey”) attitude in the dog which makes the dog 
capable of remarkably adepting at learning from humans.  
 Third, an important consequence of this receptive learning attitude is that 
dogs are willing to reproduce those cognitively “opaque” actions that they have seen 
in a communicative referential context even if the action is unusual, or represents a 
counter-productive solution to the problem. The emergence of “efficiency blindness” 
(or selective responsiveness) in observational learning situations (STUDIES VII & 
VIII), which depends to a large degree on the ostensive-communicative-referential 
aspect of the situation, is a typical manifestation of this “ready-to-obey” attitude. 
 All of these findings raise the possibility that dogs may understand some 
aspects of human communicative motives, and, for the dog, the function of human 
demonstration is probably not knowledge transfer per se but facilitating the 
performance of those behaviour actions which lead to effective behavioural 
synchronization in order to avoid conflicts in the group and/or to co-act in terms of 
common actions without necessarily comprehending the causal structure of the 
collaborative interaction. Such a disposition prepares dogs (as well as young infants) 
to efficiently learn from humans in a wide range of situations. From an evolutionary 
perspective, this trait paved the way for the emergence of complex and variable 
cooperation between dogs and humans leading to a wide variety of shared social 
competences between domestic dogs and young preverbal human infants. 
 
In summary, we think that the theoretical and experimental analysis of the Dog 
Behaviour Complex in comparison with the Human Behaviour Complex has the 
potential to provide novel answers to the question of “What makes us human?”. 
Future research should extend this approach by making more detailed investigations 
concerning the convergent aspects of social competence in dogs and humans and the 
limitations of using the dog as a model species. 
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